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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the formation of ’Bodies that Stutter’ in instances of gay male 
photographic, pornographic, and networked online media. It argues that these bodies 
can be understood through the concepts of metonymy and impersonality allied to 
jouissance in the work of Jacques Lacan, which is informed by earlier Freudian 
approaches to homosexual identity and desire. It also uses post-Lacanian and queer 
theory to argue that when the representational exchanges between an Imaginary 
other and Symbolic Other intersect they facilitate impersonal desire through how 
‘Bodies that Stutter’ and the processes of Symbolic-stuttering aligned to them.  The 
thesis draws upon close analytical readings of three contextual instances: 
representational practices and uses of the website dudesnude.com; pornographic 
output produced by Triga Films; and sexually explicit representation primarily 
connected to ‘selfie’s’ posted in micro-blogs on the website tumblr.com. The 
analysis of these examples closely engage with Lacan’s concept of jouissance 
alongside of the Symbolic as a way of demonstrating that personal, metaphoric, and 
identity based models of gay desire are formed on the basis of how metonymic and 
impersonal modes of identification simultaneously facilitate and operate as 
jouissance. This close analysis claims that impersonal desire is formed through the 
Symbolic Other and Imaginary other in the formation of jouissance. More 
specifically it argues that recent critical and cultural studies use of Lacanian analysis 
misrecognises the dynamics of an impersonality of male gay desire and the ways in 
which it Symbolically-stutters. This thesis also illustrates that the convergence of 
metaphoric identity in the Imaginary and its metonymic displacement in the 
Symbolic intersect to facilitate the emergence of this form of jouissance which also 
stutters. This pursuit of jouissance through the rhetoric of visual representation 
results in ‘Bodies that Stutter’ impersonally. Yet this impersonality is also connected 
to the potentials of enigmatic signification and self-shattering of the ego as ways of 
expressing desire.  By locating gay sex, sexuality, and masculinity outside of this 
Imaginary ego or that which is imagined as uniquely gay it illustrates that it is the 
gay subjects loss of Imaginary identity that energises them as ‘Bodies that Stutter’ 
and informs their jouissance through processes of Symbolic-stuttering. Through 
these interventions and in the concluding parts of the thesis it is claimed that 
Symbolic-stuttering may form a way for gay male sexual desire to be articulated 
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through an intangible form of impersonal desire. It is here that the loss of jouissance 
in the Symbolic is the force for sexual desire, a desire which is ultimately 
impersonal. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The introduction explores the ways in which this thesis seeks to make an intervention 
and will do so by addressing five key areas of enquiry. It firstly discusses the overall 
objective of the thesis and the background to the project, this links to the aims section 
which attempts to organise a clear line of intent around the key purposes of the project, 
what it hopes to accomplish, and its relation to the key themes and issues being 
addressed. These aims will then feed into the key research questions and allow for the 
theoretical and conceptual arguments in Chapter 2 and the methodological and ethical 
in chapter 3 to be clearly positioned in terms of the contexts examined in Chapters 4, 
5, and 6. Finally an overview of all chapters will frame how the research questions and 
argument are going to be addressed in the thesis itself. In the final part of this 
introduction to the thesis, some conclusions will be drawn around the key issues at 
stake and are linked to the next chapter which examines the key concept of jouissance 
alongside of the work of Jacques Lacan, my own concept of ‘Bodies that Stutter’, as 
well as the dyads of metaphor / metonymy, and personality / impersonality which all 
guide the thesis’ key intervention and argument.  At this opening stage it is also 
important to state that alongside of Lacan a vital aspect of this project is derived from 
Tim Dean’s intervention into psychoanalysis and queer theory in Beyond Sexuality 
(2000).  Using Dean’s critique of Judith Butler’s Bodies that Matter (1993) into bodies 
that now ‘mutter’ (2000, p.202-05) it seeks to advance and explore the conflict 
between ‘mattering’ in Dean and ‘muttering’ in Butler as the catalysts that have 
enabled  ‘Bodies that Stutter’ to be theorised and analysed.  
1.1 Objective of the Thesis 
In a thesis which examines gay male desire it may be pertinent to briefly discuss my 
own subjectivity and identity as a gay man. A lot like the central issues allied to 
jouissance and ‘Bodies that Stutter’ which are then unpacked through modes of 
Symbolic-stuttering I have used gay personals, watched gay pornography, and self-
captured sexually explicit images of my own body (and the bodies of others) using a 
mobile phone.  As I performed and embodied these practices I began to ask myself 
‘how’ and indeed ‘why’ (along with millions of other men) I was doing/do this, and 
what did/do I want to get from these practices. In turn this heightened both my desires 
and anxieties around how these modes of representation, communication, and pleasure 
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operated.  Since I began this thesis the tensions between these practices as both anxious 
and desirable have increased through my own use the use of social media and its 
connectivity to discourses of gay male blogging, pornography and forms of sexual 
communication. I have also noticed that gay male desire and the gay male body has 
become a much more complicated site of desire as it is filtered through online and 
networked mediations such as dating sites and apps, web-caming, and micro-blogging. 
Who were / are these gay men?  How were / are they identified as gay?  What was / is 
gay identity?  What was / is gay desire? This curiosity initially brought me towards 
modes of academic enquiry that broached feminism and post-feminism, queer theory, 
gay male studies, porn studies, and aspects of media, new media theory and work 
which addressed SNS and sexual identity.  Whilst these interventions established a 
clearer sense of the ontological and epistemological intricacies of gay male history, 
strategy, and sensibility, they also confounded my thinking in terms of how these 
practices were allied to gay male sexual desire.  The main reason for this sense of 
perplexity related to questions that I had in relation to the visual representation of gay 
desire, and more so, the ways in which it was both possible but also potentially difficult 
to express and connect gay sexual desire to gay identity in a visual image. It seemed 
that whilst a lot of the early work I had engaged with offered rigorous accounts of gay 
identity, they were also diluted, quashed, and somehow resolute in terms of an identity 
politics and/or an ethical identity that was compliantly signified as ‘gay’ in visual 
culture.  
This brought me to the work of Tim Dean in Beyond Sexuality (2000) which sets out 
to queer the psychoanalytic work of Jacques Lacan and cultivate an impersonality of 
sexual desire using Lacan and psychoanalysis more broadly.  As a foundation to the 
discussions of gay male sexual representation that this thesis is concerned with, it is 
one of the main goals (and also challenges) of this project to re-engage with Dean, 
Lacan, and theorists working with psychoanalysis to examine how popular modes of 
gay male representation across networks of digital and social media such as personal 
profiles, pornography, and selfies initially express ‘gay’ sexual identity and desire at 
an Imaginary level. Yet it is also this Imaginary mode of expression that acts as the 
projects point of departure, in that this is a thesis that attempts to discuss modes and 
layers of sexual desire in terms of the Symbolic and forms of jouissance that are 
difficult and perhaps impossible to express in the Imaginary or through an Imaginary 
3 
 
other. In turn, this informs the central critical claim and trajectory of the thesis 
associated with the ‘Bodies that Stutter’. More specifically, the main objective of this 
project is to shift the locus of gay desire away from the politics of gay identity and 
personality in the Imaginary towards modes of identification and impersonality in the 
Symbolic. Through this move, the thesis seeks to suggest that when gay desire is 
understood outside of an Imaginary other and Imaginary-ego, it may find forms of 
expression elsewhere or through alternative means. In this introduction these are 
explored and positioned in light of jouissance and stuttering and as we shall see this 
alternative may be through a Symbolic Other and also through types of jouissance 
connected to the concepts of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-stuttering.   
Whilst this thesis aims to make a contribution to a number of existent fields within the 
arts and humanities, it is important to realise that a psychoanalytic and Lacanian 
critique of identity lies at its core.  Using this and more specifically the concept of 
jouissance as its starting point, its line of argument and the intervention it strives to 
make closely follows the work of Dean, who states that a purely historicist or rhetorical 
account of identity, desire, and, also, Lacan yields the danger of employing texts and, 
more so, textual analysis that generate ‘an account of Lacan that is not only inimical 
to the history of his work but also profoundly ahistorical with respect to psychoanalytic 
concepts’ (2000, p.26).  Lacan, as Dean goes on to state (and arguably legitimate), is 
so useful to the study of issues like impersonality, desire, and jouissance because, like 
these forms, his work allows for a theoretical ‘model that has the flexibility of allowing 
for its own disintegration under the pressure of individual readings of specific texts’ 
(ibid).  As a consequence, and in line with the purpose of a project that is attempting 
to reconsider and re-evaluate how gay male sexual desire is articulated and 
represented, it is psychoanalysis and the possibilities that lie in tapping into it that 
allow for a unique way of conceptualising the self, which has the capacity to traverse 
and negate the limits of sexual identity politics, the ego, and personality in ways that 
other disciplines cannot reach.   
 
Saying that it is also interesting to note that Dean’s work in Unlimited Intimacy: 
Reflections on the Subculture of Barebacking (2009) fails to fully address or utilise the 
possibilities of queering Lacan promised in Beyond Sexuality (2000). Dean avoids a 
Lacanian approach and instead favours an observational and self-reflexive method to 
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explore a controversial aspect of gay male sexual behaviour.  Dean attempts to 
participate in the subcultural practice of gay men having unprotected anal sex ‘by 
drawing on a range of methodological approaches, including feminist anthropology, 
Freudian psychoanalysis, disability theory, and queer critique’ (p.xii), but never fully 
manages to locate and provoke ‘the ethnography of subcultures, the anthropology of 
kinship, cultural studies of pornography, and the philosophy of the stranger’ (ibid) that 
his earlier work suggests is possible. This is rather disappointing in that he fails to 
manage and combine the potentials of Lacanian psychoanalysis with very specific 
aspects of contemporary gay male sexual desire. In the thesis this is something I have 
set out to address through the concept of jouissance and the bearing it has in relation 
to the gay male ‘Bodies that Stutter’.  The job of managing a project such as this, which 
deals with the politics of gay male intimacy, ethics, and desire is to emphasise and 
unpack the potentiality and complexity of Lacanian psychoanalysis and the conceptual 
possibilities of jouissance in terms of my own self-reflection and subjective investment 
as a gay man with the research subject/subjects, and the methodological process.  This 
is amplified when a predominantly Lacanian approach is used in an attempt to 
methodologically reposition and reconceptualise through empirical visual contexts gay 
male sexual desire. 
 
Still, Dean’s observations in his own introduction to Beyond Sexuality (2000) also 
serve as a useful starting point to situate the key objectives and aims of a thesis that 
uses his work and that of Lacan to discuss and understand how gay male impersonality, 
desire, and jouissance are articulated in contemporary media through an index of gay 
masculinity and sexual explicitness. This also forms a foundation to the ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ and their potentiality in terms of analysing gay desire visually. Dean asserts 
that Lacanian psychoanalysis is useful in attempts to analyse sexuality and its 
problematic relation to impersonality, desire, and jouissance because it pushes cultural 
analyses ‘beyond the couch – that is, beyond a framework comprising specific 
interactions between persons’ (ibid, p.2).  Yet, moving beyond either a psychoanalytic 
and/or a cultural analysis of persons does not necessarily mean that the person is 
eradicated from the analysis (or the text) per se.  On the contrary, it indicates that 
critically focusing on the vulnerability of the sexual representation as an identity, a 
personality, and, thus, an individual will allow for a shift towards a way of unpacking 
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the potentials of impersonality, identification, and Symbolic displacement in relation 
to that image and identity.   
  
In this thesis and at the crux of its empirical / analytic focus it is important to focus on 
the formation of these means of exchange through a clear account of the aims. In a 
project which addresses the tensions between an Imaginary other and Symbolic Other 
a set of aims are helpful because these tensions are often ambiguous, ambivalent, and 
multi-layered. To have a set of guiding principles which address the nuances of what 
the project seeks to accomplish will also connect to the broader problems of jouissance 
and the ways in which it can be used to reposition how we understand gay desire and 
identity in light of the two prevailing paradigms of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and jouissance 
as non-definitional, non-representational, metonymic, and impersonal. At this stage it 
is also important to note that this thesis seeks to use the tensions between jouissance 
and ‘Bodies that Stutter’ as concepts that will bring to bear potentially new ways of 
reading gay male desire contextually.  
 
In terms of the contexts, it is also important to assert that the personals website, 
pornography, and self-representation addressed here are all allied to digital and 
networked media. In this setting the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ do so in ways which rely 
upon the Symbolic-Other of the online / digitally networked mediation. That is, the 
images of gay male sexuality and desire are produced and consumed through a 
Symbolic-Other which underpins the bodies and their alignment to jouissance and 
stuttering as medium-specific.   Still, it is also essential to point out that this work does 
not claim that bodies only stutter if they are specifically ‘gay male’ bodies online. 
Rather, the gay male body and the setting of digital and networked mediation may also 
indicate that stuttering bodies can and do exist elsewhere. Through the analytics of the 
chapters and the detailed examination of practices of gay male sexual representation it 
also becomes apparent that stuttering can also be articulated in non-digital / networked 
spaces through  bodies that are in no way ‘gay’ or ‘male’. Taking these initial 
contentions into account, the main aims of the thesis are listed below and are elaborated 
upon so they make clear what the project seeks to accomplish and how the overall 
aspirations and expectations of the project connect to both the intent of its objectives 
and later the key research questions and argument. 
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1.2 Aims of the Thesis 
 
The thesis has four key aims. These are listed below and elaborated upon. Whilst they 
are presented in terms of their ascendency it is also important to grasp that they are 
linked together and in some instances they overlap. In many ways this correspondence 
between the aims of the thesis, as well as what it is hoping to achieve, reflects the 
nature of the project and the ways in which an examination of gay male sexual desire 
and the development of its potentials allied to ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-
stuttering requires receptiveness to their shifting and contingent qualities. This is also 
something that I have also attempted to pull through and work into how and why 
conceptual ideas such as stuttering and jouissance may prove useful in an empirical 
analysis of the cultural representations and visual practices allied to gay male desire.    
 
1. The main aim of the thesis is to address and evaluate the tension that occurs 
when gay male ‘identity’ and gay male ‘sexual desire’ converge and are signified in 
visual representation. Through this tension it also seeks to identify how gay male desire 
is signified in light of both gay and straight identity and desire. These exchanges and 
paradoxes between gay and straight male sexual desire and identity are also embedded 
in the broader shaping of the thesis’s argument and its examination of gay male 
jouissance and its affiliation to how both gay and straight representational bodies 
stutter. At this stage, it is also useful to suggest that whilst the first aim seeks to 
examine the relationship between how jouissance and ‘Bodies that Stutter’ are aligned 
to gay sexual desire and identity it requires a rubric and means to do so. This relates to 
the next aim and the need for a vocabulary to articulate the key concept of ‘bodies that 
stutter’ in the project and how this occurs in relation to gay sexual desire via 
impersonality, desire, and jouissance. 
2. The second aim sets out to establish the most appropriate terms / lexicon to 
investigate gay identity and its associations with ‘Bodies that Stutter’ via 
impersonality, desire, and jouissance. This aim of the thesis is allied to Chapters 2 and 
3 and the ways in which a psychoanalytic lexicon and a vocabulary connected to 
strands of queer theory, porn studies, and more broadly critical theory and cultural 
studies will contribute to the analysis of gay desire set out in the first aim. At this stage 
it is also important note that the central themes of the project which are circulated 
around gay male identity and desire are established through the lexicon in three ways.  
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a. The first is through the psychoanalytic focus of the thesis that allows for gay 
identity and desire to be unpacked and investigated in terms of the Real, Symbolic and 
Imaginary, the ‘other’ and Other’ dynamic which is developed around the key 
paradigm of jouissance and its association with ‘Bodies that Stutter’.   
b. The next is reliant on the tensions that occur between the binaries of gay and 
straight masculinity, identity and identification, personality and impersonality and as 
Chapter 2 details the nuances of metaphoric and metonymic representation in 
language.  In Chapters 2 and 3 it is particularly important to situate these binary 
formations so they can be deconstructed and analysed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.  
c. Building on this, the key themes of metonymy, impersonality, desire, and 
jouissance are refined so there is a specific focus on ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and how they 
are formed through an Imaginary other and a Symbolic Other. Finally it is through this 
sophistication that metonymy, impersonality, desire, and jouissance are allied to the 
key concepts of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-stuttering. In turn, this allows for 
the concepts to be developed and discussed in detailed context.  
3. In light of the above, the third aim is to use this vocabulary to discuss the 
potential advances that this project may make in terms of its development around 
theories of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-stuttering. This is addressed in Chapters 
4, 5, and 6 which both establish and analyse ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-
stuttering in relation to specific representational styles and practices of gay desire and 
identity. These are explored through the personal online profile, the pornographic film, 
and the micro-blog with a particular focus in Chapter 6 on the selfie. 
4. The final aim seeks use the concepts of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-
stuttering to reposition how jouissance deliberately displaces, fragments, and shatters 
gay identity and gay desire. This is an aim that is addressed in the thesis through the 
visual and textual analysis of the personal profile, the pornographic film and the selfie 
discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. It is also one that has the potential to connect to other 
branches of gay and straight impersonality, desire, and jouissance that are not 
configured or allied to sexuality.  
 
By initiating these aims, it could be suggested that they work towards establishing a 
theoretical foundation to the project and its intent. As well as the aims, it is also useful 
to acknowledge that this thesis is focused around four principal research questions or, 
perhaps more appropriately, indices. Continuing on from the ambitions of the project 
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these questions are also framed and shaped through the key themes of metonymy, 
impersonality, desire, and jouissance and their alliance to ‘Bodies that Stutter’. They 
also attempt to offer more detailing and critical provocation to the projects intent as 
well as shaping the argument of the thesis detailed in the next section.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
These questions have been developed in relation to the overall objective of the thesis, 
the aims of the project, and its attempt to use the themes of impersonality, desire, and 
jouissance that inflect to position and map out ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-
stuttering.  They are as follows: 
1. What do mediated representations and/or signifiers of sexual desire themselves 
‘represent’ in terms of ‘sexual desire’ as personal (‘gay’, ‘male’, straight’) and how 
can these representations and signifiers be discussed and configured in terms of 
impersonal desire? 
2.  If gay male sexual desire and desiring identities emerge and re-emerge in terms of 
a gay and/or a straight male person / personality as an Imaginary-ego / Imaginary other, 
how does that desire relate to the force of a Symbolic Other and an impersonal 
identification in language?  
3.  On that premise, if the articulation of gay male sexual desire is expressed 
impersonally what does it look like and how is it signified? 
4.  Is it possible to account for and thus signify an impersonality of desire which 
acknowledges the tensions between an Imaginary other and Symbolic Other, and if so 
how do the tensions resolve or antagonise the role of jouissance in terms of Imaginary 
and Symbolic modes of expression.  
5. Are the‘Bodies that Stutter’ addressed in this thesis most effectively conceptualised 
as signifiers that attempt to express an Imaginary-ego, yet also fail, and by way of that 
failure instigate a Symbolic form of jouissance that could be manifested as Symbolic-
stuttering?  
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6.  If Symbolic modes of impersonality, desire, and jouissance suggest that gay desire 
(or any sexual desire) cannot be clearly expressed or discussed then in what ways has 
it, and indeed, can it, be represented as gay desire? 
 
1.4 Positioning the Argument  
 
Whilst accounting for the projects objective, its aims, and key questions it is also 
crucial to position them in more detailed ways to specifically Lacanian, post-Lacanian 
and psychoanalytic approaches. It is also important to locate this thesis’ intervention 
through extant literature that assists in locating some of its arguments and claims 
within the more detailed and emergent fields of queer/post-queer theory, porn studies, 
and also work that addresses the broader paradigms of online identity, digital cultures, 
and networked self-representation.  It is worth noting that I have engaged with a 
number of texts that have been published during the course of this thesis and that locate 
its contribution in line with changing fields of critical and theoretical work concerned 
with sexual desire, representation, media, and impersonality both on and off-line.  In 
the field of post queer theory recent work by Kevin Floyd (2009), Shaka McGlotten 
(2013) and James Penney (2014) have informed my conceptual thinking and assisted 
in the analytical work undertaken in the chapters which examine the nuances of bodies 
that stutter. In addition to this the work of Leo Bersani and Adam Phillips (2008) and, 
more so, their concept of impersonal narcissism has proven useful in developing an 
argument that addresses how gay masculinity and representation can articulate 
something of the impersonal through a psychoanalytic lexis as well facilitating a  ‘self-
shattering’ of the ego.  This ‘impersonality’ is also carried through into the analysis 
chapters and more specifically the analysis of images of gay male desire that have been 
constructed ‘personally’.  
The visual analysis strives towards a mode of analysis that focuses less on the specifics 
of individual subjects and the specific content of images and more on the ways in 
which the conceptual potentials of visualising gay male desire is connected to how 
‘participants present particular aspects of their identities, [which] have a broad appeal 
as aesthetic cultural artefacts’ (Clark, 2012, p.21). Accounting for this and the 
challenges of attempting to visually scrutinise gay male desire and jouissance through 
the concept of ‘Bodies that stutter’ the idea of ‘shattering’ has also catalysed and 
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assisted in furthering my own claims around ‘stuttering’ and its alliance to the 
interventions of Judith Butler (1993) and also Dean (2000).  Hector Kollias’ work 
(2013), which engages with Bersani and Phillips, is also an example of how engaging 
with Lacan and contemporary thinkers on desire and homosexuality can generate new 
modes of enquiry and analysis around impersonality and desire.   
It is also important to note that, beyond the specifics of gay male desire, the aim of this 
project is to consider how psychoanalysis offers potentials to interpreting other 
paradigms and sites in contemporary culture. In Fashion and Psychoanalysis (2012), 
Alison Bancroft’s recognition that psychoanalysis can be used ‘to add layers of 
meaning to things that, without it, would remain obtuse, intractable’ (p.1) is a recent 
example of how a methodological re-engagement with both Freudian and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis can unpack and reveal how a cultural discourse, such as fashion, can 
be methodologically ‘read as [and through] paradigms of psychoanalytic concepts 
themselves’ (ibid, p.189).  These layers and paradigms are also embedded in how the 
visual instances selected for this project are read and interpreted and I follow a similar 
approach to Bancroft in my own visual analysis In addition, the essays gathered in 
After Sex? On Writing Since Queer Theory (Halley and Parker, 2011) have allowed 
me to develop the issue of impersonality and desire with a stronger level of integrity 
and accuracy.  The prolific output of Slavoj Zizek is also embedded into the work and, 
as Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate, it is thinkers such as Lee Edelman, John Champagne, 
and Bruce Fink that have enabled me to develop my ideas around the Symbolic, 
jouissance, and stuttering in ways that are less confined by the rhetoric of a forcefully 
and empirically visual, post-queer, porn studies, and new media studies approach. In 
both the analysis, and in the methodological and ethical decisions and choices which 
were made in terms of how and why these specific areas of analysis were the most 
appropriate, I followed the rubric that the categories of analysis could not be examined 
in isolation. On that premise I searched for mediated examples of gay male desire that 
seemed to speak to one another and overlap in terms of their sexually explicit yet 
culturally recognisable content. As a result, and as the project has evolved it has 
become increasingly apparent that the inter-sectional and convergent nature of the 
personal website, the pornographic film text, and the micro-blog / networked self-
representation operate in terms of this overlapping to reflect yet simultaneously 
dislocate how the gay male subject and their desire can be articulated.  
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On that, the discipline of porn studies has been useful and provocative.  In analyses 
that implicitly privilege the visual rhetoric of the Imaginary other and the ego 
(Attwood, ed. 2009; Smith, 2010; Williams, ed. 2004), I have found a way of 
unpacking impersonality, desire, and jouissance, as well as a way of re-reading 
pornographic imagery via Lacan and my own concept of bodies that stutter.  In 
addition, whilst other works, such as Kelly Dennis’ Art/Porn: A History of Seeing and 
Touching (2009), provided some insight into how psychoanalysis inflects sexually 
explicit imagery, they have done so by privileging an orthodoxy of highly visual 
concepts and readings which re-historicise the ultimately limit potentials of 
impersonality, desire, jouissance, and stuttering examined here.  Whilst I discuss the 
representational practices and/or visual qualities of the sexually explicit and also 
exploit a lexicon of psychoanalysis, I attempt to do so in ways that conceptually 
‘situate’ rather than visually ‘validate’ the pornographic nuances of how 
impersonality, desire, and jouissance are articulated. 
Identifying the ethical importance of visual research and its alliance to visual 
representations is also a focus of concern in that the visual fields of online identity, 
digital cultures, and networked self-representation form a fundamental part of this 
thesis.  In Chapters 4 and 6, all of the contextual examples are connected to sexual 
desire and identity online, whilst Chapter 5 addresses sexual identity and in 
pornographic film which is also available through online and on-demand / streaming 
content.  At this stage, it is also worth acknowledging that, in its early stages, this 
project had a far more empirical and culturally specific goal and aimed to look at gay 
male personals on the websites Gaydar.co.uk, dudesnude.com and Grindr.com.  Yet, 
the psychoanalytic ‘layers’ and ‘paradigms’ then enabled me to develop my thinking 
in line with issues of metonymy, impersonality, desire and jouissance and the scope of 
the project expanded which allowed me to conceptualise  the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and 
their location across online personals, pornography, and self-representations. The 
decision to work beyond the specifics of online gay personals sites reflects the inter-
sectional instances assembled in the analysis chapters and this was met in 2011-12 
when I began to notice that may of the men using these sites were also networking and 
linking in images from online pornography sites such as Triga Films and emergent 
platforms such as tumblr.com. In doing so an inter-textual and inter-sectional discourse 
of gay male desire and sexualised mediation also seemed to signal towards how I was 
12 
 
positioning the concept of stuttering and its conceptual potentials. A discussion of how 
and why I chose to focus on these specific contexts and instances is developed 
throughout the thesis in both the methodological and ethic sections of chapter 3 and 
the later analytical aspects.   
Work such as Sharif Mowlabocus’s Gaydar Culture: Gay men, Technology and 
Embodiment in the Digital Age (2010), where there are acknowledgements of how 
useful psychoanalysis and Lacan (ibid, p.91-101) may be in a reading of how gay male 
desire is expressed online, also energised my thinking about the scope of visualising 
Imaginary others online and the ways in which the non-visibility of the Symbolic Other 
affected, displaced, or influenced their representation.  As Mowlabocus asks in his 
own approach to gay desire online, ‘What discursive frameworks, what 
representational strategies – are deployed in the fashioning of the gay male body 
online? (ibid, p.80).  If, as I suggest, that impersonality, desire, and jouissance may 
encapsulate these ‘frameworks’ and ‘strategies’, I also follow the line that their 
arrangement is allied to stuttering and, more so, a ‘body that stutters’ through a 
Symbolic force that is manifested in ways which are simultaneously multiple and 
contextual.  As well as this, I think it is important to note that Mowlabocus’ work 
allowed me to grasp the ways in which gay male online / networked self-representation 
‘draws heavily on pornographic structures evoked elsewhere in gay subculture’ (ibid) 
in processes of online and/or self-representational media.  Here this concept of an 
‘elsewhere’ is interesting in that it signals towards the idea that the index of gay male 
desire and its visual representation relies upon a series of disparate, hesitant, and 
arcane resources which always fail and undercut the desire they attempt to express. In 
this failure to articulate I would argue that it is through this representational process of 
seeking to reify desire and amplify jouissance that gay desire and bodies stutter. 
Susanna Paasonen’s Carnal Resonance (2011), which examines how affect, 
resonance, and embodiment are important to the study of online desires, also offers an 
alternative and contemporary way to engage with the impersonality of desire and 
online representation.  Whilst this is work rooted in theories of affect it was one that 
allowed me to develop the approach to analysing the contexts in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
Paasonen follows Sara Ahmed’s work in Queer Phenomenology (2006) and, here, her 
assimilation of the phenomenological implications of emotion and trauma seem to 
align themselves to some of the ways I am working with Lacan and psychoanalytic 
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discourse.  Following her lead and, more so, the challenges of working amidst the 
visual explicitness of pornographic, self-representational, and online signifiers, the 
visual analysis of gay and straight male sexual desire is alert to the fact that ‘analytical 
approaches and theorisations need to be equally on the move’ (2011, p.28), so that 
‘research needs to try to address the moments in which words fail to grasp what 
resonates and moves us in our encounters with porn’ (ibid).  For me, these failures do 
not necessarily ‘fail’; rather, they find their visual expression through flawed Symbolic 
exchanges between metonymy, impersonality, desire, and jouissance –  exchanges, I 
suggest, are only ever articulated as ‘stutters’.   
As this thesis develops, I strive to locate some of these approaches to the complexities 
of how bodies stutter when they are riven by the Imaginary other and Symbolic Other, 
as well as identity (as ontology and as epistemological knowledge) and desire (as 
jouissance), to productively assert three key lines of argument.  At this stage, it is also 
important to reiterate that, whilst the work of Jacques Lacan and psychoanalytic theory 
is at the bedrock of this thesis and my suggestions around ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and 
Symbolic-Stuttering, these interventions are are also attained through an evaluation of 
gay ontology in cultural studies, queer theory, methodologies of the visual, and the 
construction of historical, rhetorical, and epistemological discourses of gay identity.   
 
The first line of questioning recognises that the construction and representation of gay 
desire (and the binary tensions between the constructions of gay men in relation to 
their straight male counter-parts) is founded on ‘an understanding of their irresolvable 
instability’ (Sedgwick, 1990, p.10).  This irresolution occurs between the binaries of 
gay/straight which are always unsteady, and also forms an implicit feature of how gay 
sexual desire is articulated and signified.  In this instance, I assimilate some of the 
implicit features of Sedgwick’s ‘axiomatic’ or ‘axioms’ (ibid, pp.1-63), which 
recognise that sexual identity and desire are governed by ‘internal incoherence and 
mutual contradiction’ (ibid, p.1), in contrast to the dangers of ‘discursive and 
institutional “common sense”’ (ibid).  In this way both poles in the relationship (in this 
instance gay/straight) are defined by their incoherent and reciprocal paradoxes so that 
neither is more or less consistent or identifiable.  In this way incoherence and 
contradiction becomes the foundation to how gay/straight relations are cemented.  This 
also guides an argument that is informed by the claim that homosexuality, as a sexual 
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definition, and gay identity in language have problematically taken on ‘as nugatory the 
distinction between relations of identification and relations of desire’ (ibid, p.159).  In 
terms of this thesis, the insignificance or elision between issues of identity and issues 
of desire has created ‘a conceptual knot whose undoing may be said to have been the 
determinative project, continually frustrated but continuously productive, of 
psychoanalytic theory from Freud to the present’ (ibid, p.160).  Within this project, 
this undoing of the tensions, ‘from Freud’ (ibid) onwards and associated with the 
tensions of condensation and displacement, metaphor and metonymy, as well as 
personal and impersonal modes of identification (and identity) in light of the power of 
desire forms the foundation to my concept of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and is most 
obviously captured in Lacan and the possibilities that come from engaging with 
jouissance to examine and rethink gay desire. It is also expressed in the analysis of 
visual contexts and the ways in which they facilitate and sophisticate an argument that 
attempts to situate ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-stuttering as evidence of how 
gay identity and gay desire may well be distinctive, antagonistic, and even 
incompatible to other forms of sexual identification.   
 
Through this, the second line of enquiry aims to consider how the cultural and 
discursive markings of a gendered, male, and gay body that stutters are (de)constructed 
in light of a psychoanalytic intervention and, specifically, a set of Lacanian approaches 
to sexual desire and jouissance.  Using Lacanian psychoanalysis as an underpinning 
and thus key line of investigation will help towards grasping that, whilst the rhetoric 
of desire is incongruous and ambiguously impersonal, it is also filtered through a gay 
body and gay desire in media constructed as consistent and personal.  The key concept 
of  jouissance informs the analysis of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ in chapters 4, 5, and 6 whilst 
acknowledging that the empirical analysis is also connected to the Lacanian concepts 
of Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary (R,S,I) – all of which inform and constitute a 
fundamental part of this thesis’ argument. Together with my concept of ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ these terms will be embedded and amplified throughout the thesis to introduce 
and frame some further questions and objectives allied to issues of impersonality and 
metonymy.  It also serves to emphasise that, whilst this thesis does not seek to offer 
solutions to the questions of metonymy, impersonality, desire, and jouissance, perhaps 
part of the answer to the problem of how they are articulated as ‘personal’ is to grasp 
that historically gender, sexuality, and the body have served as the narrative through 
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which gay identity has been considered and also understood.  Whilst Dean alerts his 
readers to a bold re-conceptualisation of queer desire and sexuality ‘outside of the 
terms of the ego, the individual, or the self’ (Sedgwick, 1990, p.3), this thesis 
endeavours to frame the complexities of the ego, the individual, and the self as 
simultaneously ‘outside’ of, yet intrinsic to gay male desire.  By allowing the personal 
and identity-led ego of the Imaginary other endless attempts at signifying desire, the 
Symbolic Other repeatedly manages to impersonalise and displace the Imaginary other 
through the operation of  jouissance and its alignment to bodies that stutter  Here, 
jouissance lies between and also beyond the binary tensions of the Imaginary to 
Symbolic, the metaphoric to metonymic, and personal to impersonal relation, and in 
this way it allows bodies to stutter and Symbolic-Stuttering to occur, particularly when 
those bodies are visually signified through the signifier.  Here, I am using the term 
signified and signifier to refer to the ways in which gay men both self-represent and 
are represented visually.   
 
The third area of investigation (and the key intervention into the convergent fields of 
psychoanalysis, cultural theory, and media analysis) claims that, when a gay body is 
marked and signified as a ‘gay body’, it begins to stutter.  In this way, it is argued that 
the body that stutters is the gay body of the signifier, which in this context is also 
tethered to the psychoanalytic context of the Imaginary other and Symbolic Other.  In 
turn, this guides the argument towards the key intervention and my claims that the 
‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-stuttering are close to how jouissance is realised 
and signified in contemporary practices of gay sexual representation.  The line of 
critical enquiry and the conceptual logic allied to how I am connecting ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ to condensation / displacement, metaphor / metonym personality / and 
impersonality are detailed in Chapter 2. In this chapter I begin by discussing Lacan’s 
Real, Symbolic and Imaginary (R,S,I) and do so in relation to jouissance to situate my 
main conceptual idea allied to ‘Bodies that Stutter’ using the powerful critique that 
Tim Dean stages of Judith Butler’s ‘Bodies that Matter’, through ‘Bodies that Mutter’ 
(2000, pp.174-215) as my critical stimulus. Dean boldly asserts that post-structural and 
post-modern ‘rhetorical machines’ (ibid, pp.174-75) are ‘faulty’ (ibid) and this flaw is 
connected to a ‘readiness to be persuaded that sex is fully mediated, our eagerness to 
think of sex as constructed in – or materialised through – the imaginary and symbolic 
systems that permeate mass culture (ibid).  In his critique, Dean goes to the 
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psychoanalytic ‘Real’ as that ‘which interrupts every symbolic trajectory, spoiling our 
imaginary view of things’ (2000, p.18).  This also goes some way to positioning my 
own claims around the body that stutters and stuttering as a broader way to examine 
the fissures in discursive language practices, representational politics, and the 
transitional nature of contemporary media.  The lines of argument that have been 
positioned in this section give an overview of how this thesis will go about addressing 
issues of gay male visual representations of sex and sexual identity in  terms of  
impersonality, desire, and jouissance. It also offers a foundation to the ways in which 
that investigation and the lines of argument will be followed. In this next section this 
is expanded upon and detailed in relation to the each of the thesis’ chapters. 
1.5 Chapter Synopses  
1.5.1 Chapter Two 
The first part of this chapter specifically addresses the work of Jacques Lacan and uses 
several of the essays gathered in the Ecrits (2003, [1977]), as well as his controversial 
and perplexing contributions in Seminar XX Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, The 
Limits of Love and Knowledge (1999) to situate and conceptualise jouissance.  This 
part of the thesis aims to clearly map out the terms and locate it within, what I have 
termed, ‘a Lacanian trajectory of Desire’.  Here, I also assert my position as a post-
Lacanian scholar by following the work of Tim Dean in Beyond Sexuality (2000), 
which sets out to use Lacan’s own notion of ‘“subjective foundations”’ (ibid, p.23) to 
reassess and re-examine ‘that while concepts have a history through which they come 
into being, their conceptual value exceeds the conditions and processes of their 
historical emergence’ (ibid).  In this chapter and throughout the thesis, it is my aim to 
work with this ‘conceptual value’, qua Lacan and Dean, to sophisticate the concept of 
‘Bodies that Stutter’ and thus acknowledge that impersonality and gay male desire 
‘involves pointing to Lacan’s [and also Dean’s] insistence that subjectivity must be 
theorised in several dimensions at once’ (Dean, 2000, pp.31-32).  The extent to which 
these ‘dimensions’ can be used involves a close engagement with Lacan’s work to 
offer bedrock to the methodological and analytic chapters which follow.   
The next part of this chapter builds on the interventions primarily allied to 
jouissance and begins with a critical consideration of both Judith Butler’s Bodies that 
Matter (1993) and Dean’s concept of ‘Bodies that Mutter’ (2000) to position ‘Bodies 
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that Stutter’. It is through the contextualisation of a ‘body that stutters’ that 
impersonality, desire, and jouissance challenge the antithetical dyad of the muttering 
and mattering body in Butler and Dean.  This chapter exploits the tension between 
these terms and how they are expressed to conceptualise the claims around ‘stuttering’ 
and its relation to both jouissance and the Symbolic. In turn, this suggests that the 
stuttering body is the one that may exist between the bodies which matter and mutter, 
because it relies upon and, in some instances, enjoys the processes of subjugation and 
impersonality in the Symbolic, shattering in the Imaginary, and also mutability in the 
Real in its incessant pursuit of jouissance. Alongside of this assertion there is a detailed 
exploration of the function and relationship between metaphor and metonymy in Lacan 
which are situated using the concepts of condensation and displacement in Freud and 
their importance in positioning how the strains between personal and impersonal 
desires are Symbolically permeated by language and discourse.  These foundational 
concepts and their impersonal features are then linked to a much closer consideration 
of how narcissism and the construction of gay masculinity in language are allied to the 
Imaginary other, the Imaginary-ego, and the arguments around Symbolic Other and 
Symbolic forms of jouissance and stuttering. This also goes some way to emphasising 
the foundation to the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ of the thesis and the claim that gay male 
desire ‘Symbolically-stutters’ when it is Symbolically expressed as jouissance  in 
relation to a gay male subject by engaging with Sigmund Freud’s theory of Narcissism 
(1914) and its alignment to the efficacy of Dean’s concept of ‘the impersonality of 
desire’ (2000), Lee Edelman’s ‘Narci-schism’ (1994), and homo-ness, self-shattering, 
and ‘impersonal narcissism’ in the work of Leo Bersani (1986, 1987, 1995, 2008).     
1.5.2 Chapter Three 
Chapter 3 is an attempt to methodologically consolidate and acknowledge the claims 
made in the previous chapter.  This is achieved by engaging with the philosophical 
tropes of Thumos, Logos, and Eros, in the work of Aristotle and Plato, as a way to 
reconsider how gay male ontological and epistemological meaning has been 
constructed in light of a discourse such as psychoanalysis, a concept such as 
jouissance, and more specifically ‘Bodies that Stutter’. This is also considered by re-
thinking Rene Descartes’ claims around what it means to ‘be’ a subject and how this 
relates to the pursuit of jouissance and the signification of Symbolic-stuttering. Here, 
considerations linked to the philosophical, ethical, and moral dimensions of looking at 
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sexually explicit material, pornographic media, online identity and identification, and 
the self-reflexive and auto-biographical nature of the thesis are also discussed.  This 
section also acknowledges the practical implications and ethical anxieties of working 
on a project that involves examining sexually explicit material online, as well as 
addressing the issues related to informed consent and the problems that this raises in 
terms of ‘gaining agreement to produce visual material but also to reproduce or display 
it among different audiences and in different contexts’ (Clark, 2012, p.19). In light of 
this there is also a discussion of the methodological decision not to use a lot of visual 
material in a thesis which addresses visual representation. Here the paradoxes that are 
allied the use of psychoanalysis in analysing the representation of gay male sexual 
desire as hyper-visible, impersonal, and public productively conflicts with the ethical 
dimensions of examining men who utilise these hyper-visible platforms to personalise 
and in some cases privatise their identities and desires.  
This, then, allows for the next three chapters and the contextual and analytical 
argument that focuses on the conceptual application of how bodies stutter on the 
personal website of dudesnude.com, the pornographic features in Triga Films, and also 
instances of blogging and self-representation on the online social network of 
tumblr.com.  More specifically, the three contextual chapters explore instances in 
online, pornographic, and networked self-representational media by using both the 
methodological and ‘theoretical potential of psychoanalysis’ (Dean, 2000, p.36). In 
turn, this also helps to overcome some of the ethical and practical barriers aligned to 
‘epistemological approaches, specific research contexts, […] and researchers’ and 
participants’ own moral frameworks’ (Clark, 2012, pp. 17-18) in visual research. It is 
the aim in these contextual parts of the thesis to develop the concept of ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ by using the lexis of psychoanalytical concepts and approaches detailed in the 
earlier chapters and, in so doing, consider how ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-
stuttering may offer ways of reading and positioning impersonality, metonymy, desire, 
and jouissance.  Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are outlined in the final part of Chapter 3.  
However, at this stage, it is also necessary to position them in terms of how jouissance, 
‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-Stuttering operate in each instance.   
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1.5.3 Chapter Four 
Chapter 4 examines signifiers of desire on the gay male personals website, 
dudesnude.com, and how they stutter in relation to tensions that occur between an 
Imaginary other and a Symbolic Other. This also ensues in relation to the ways in 
which personal and sexual imagery on the site may be impersonally exchanged and 
circulated between the users who are also the subjects of the personal profile and users 
or browsers of the site who do not have a profile.  Here, work allied to the fields of 
queer theory and paradigms of online identity and digital culture are used to discuss 
how specific aspects of the site (homepage, welcome/search page) and users and 
groups on dudesnude.com use the Imaginary other as a way to fallaciously personalise 
desire through a ‘personal profile’.  It does this by merging theorisations of the 
Imaginary gay / queer subject, and notions of online identity as ‘speaking’ or 
‘personalising sexual desire’, with those of Lacan and theorists, such as Dean, who 
work with a sceptical approach to the Imaginary other and identity politics.  I suggest 
that the ‘Dudes’ we see ‘Nude’ can only be signified and understood through the 
dimensions of the Symbolic Other, and it is through this that any trace of personality 
is rendered impersonal. In this way the site itself and the significations therein function 
as the Symbolic Other. I also suggest that personal and ego-driven desire are only ever 
expressed through an impersonal website, profile, or homepage, as ‘Bodies that Stutter 
which gives way to the force of Symbolic-stuttering.   
1.5.4 Chapter Five 
This notion of slippage links into the next chapter, which examines pornography, ‘
Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-Stuttering in the output of UK Company Triga 
Films.  In this instance, stuttering and impersonality are addressed as forms that 
converge when straight and gay male sexual desires combine.  In Triga Films, the 
Imaginary-ego of a straight male ‘other’ is signified through pornographic 
representation and, via this process, I suggest that both straight male-egos and gay 
male jouissance begin to Symbolically-stutter.  The chapter suggests that, within porn 
and porn studies, there may also be a shift towards the ‘impersonal’ as a Symbolic way 
out of the binds and traps of gay and/or straight masculinity and its representation as 
pornographic.  By analysing several scenes from Triga Films, Triga’s own website, 
and some of the actors/participants in the films, I argue that the encounters and 
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exchanges between men who are neither identified as straight or gay stutter.  They also 
produce ‘triggers’ of jouissance, which seem to be most clearly catalysed and signified 
through the figure of the straight chav in several of Triga’s most popular productions.  
By commodifying the hyper-masculine and ‘disgusting’ ego of the ‘chav’, for gay men 
to visually consume, Triga forms a dialogue of impersonal identification with the chav, 
which relies on both the straight Imaginary other and its gay Symbolically-stuttering 
Other.  In turn, this signals that modes of gay Symbolic identification are often 
ensnared by the straight Imaginary-ego in their pursuit of jouissance.  This suggests 
that, whilst an impersonality of gay desire is indeed ‘desirable’, it may also come at a 
cost – here, that cost is the regression of the gay Symbolic back into the straight 
Imaginary.   
1.5.5 Chapter Six 
In the final contextual chapter, the issues developed in Chapters 4 and 5 are positioned 
in relation to the social network tumblr.com.  Here, Symbolic-stuttering and ‘Bodies 
that Stutter’ are used to suggest that in processes of self-representation and, more 
crucially in the production and exchange of the ‘selfie’, gay desire is also articulated 
through notions of the impersonal and the metonymic so that self-signifying sexual 
desire only ever stutters.  I argue that it is within the uncertainty, hesitancy, frustration, 
and repetitiveness allied to capturing the self in a selfie that not only allows, but also 
forces, the subject to stutter.  Here, the issues connected to gay and straight masculinity 
in Triga Films, as well as to online personality and identity on dudesnude.com, are 
unpacked through an analysis of how images are assembled and exchanged on 
tumblr.com..  These contexts are also considered in relation to the concepts of the 
anamorphic gaze and mise-en-abyme and their alignment to Symbolic-stuttering and 
jouissance.  The selfie seems to condense and capture many of the issues I have raised 
in relation to stuttering and its application and, as such, it works well as a way into the 
conclusion of the thesis.  In this conclusion, I acknowledge several concepts and 
arguments that may have been left unaddressed as well as the ways in which ‘Bodies 
that Stutter’ may be applied to non-digital / networked representations and/or non-gay 
and non-male bodies   and those areas that can be developed beyond those that were 
examined in this thesis.    
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1.6 Conclusion  
The synopses that are discussed above go some way towards positioning the overall 
intent and ambition of this thesis to the reader.  This introduction has attempted to 
present a logical outline of a thesis and a series of discussions aligned to its objective 
and aims to open up and capture how metonymy, impersonality, desire, and jouissance 
relate to ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-stuttering. The introduction has also 
addressed how elements of stuttering may be connected to the broader social and 
cultural consequences of living with gay sexuality in contemporary media and culture. 
The main intervention to make at this early stage has been to identify and account for 
some of the ways in which the modes of metonymy, impersonality, desire, and 
jouissance which inflect the intervention that this thesis is striving to make are 
manifested in relation to the tensions between gay identity and gay desire and the 
associated ways of both representing and analysing them.  
Lacan’s emphasis on language renders (homo)sexual desire an ‘effect of 
representation’ (Dean and Lane, 2001b, p.26) and as a consequence much of Lacanian 
thought and discourse surmises that homosexuality cannot be coherently thought, 
spoken or written about. As a link to Chapter 2 which locates and examines ‘Bodies 
that Stutter’ in more critical detail and establishes a psychoanalytic lexicon for the 
thesis, this brings up a fundamental concern associated with representation and the 
ways in which the subject distinguishes between conscious representation itself and 
the effect of the representation on the unconscious. In his reconsideration of Freudian 
discourse and in particularly in his reworking and reconsideration of Freud’s concepts 
of condensation and displacement in ‘The agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or 
Reason Since Freud’ (2003 [1957]) Lacan addressed the ways in which Freud had 
struggled to situate the paradoxical divisions and overlaps between the conscious and 
unconscious and their association with language and the subjective self. Aligned to 
this, Lacan relies upon the tensions and operations that occur between metaphor and 
metonymy in the unconscious and their origins from Freud’s notions of condensation 
and displacement to understand and situate the Imaginary and Symbolic. This twinned 
with the impossibility of representing jouissance and the gay subjects’ attempts to do 
so are something that this thesis and more so the next chapter will address.  
It could be argued that it is through these conflicts that bodies stutter and perhaps that 
Symbolic-stuttering is the result of them. In this way the introduction has also 
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attempted to position a gay male subject of desire that is seen and heard to be 
contingent and conditional, always tempted by jouissance and predisposed to 
Symbolic operations in which manifest (conscious) and latent (unconscious) content 
articulate conflict, desire, and pleasure. Whilst psychoanalysis deals primarily with the 
(continuous) analysing of the psyche, this analysing is not governed by straightforward 
beginnings, middles, or ends: psychoanalysis, like identity, is not teleological in any 
linear sense but operates always on the basis of frustration, contingency and ambiguity.  
Just as psychoanalysis allows the subject to ‘break with [a] safe reliance on the 
enigmatic master signifier’ (Zizek, 2002 p. 58) we also see that this lies at the 
foundation of this project and how psychoanalysis may allow gay male representation 
to ‘stutter’.  Problematically, and for a thesis that addresses the pressures between the 
centrality and fragility of the metaphoric to metonymic, personal to impersonal relation 
via the Imaginary and the Symbolic we also see in Zizek’s reading of Lacanian 
analysis, there ‘is no “big Other”, no master identity or narrative, guaranteeing the 
consistency of the symbolic space within which we dwell: there are just contingent, 
punctual, and fragile points of stability’ (ibid, p.59).  
It is this ‘fragile stability’ that signals in the process of stuttering which is central not 
only to the key line of argument but also to the elements of how the thesis is structured 
and presented. Just as the master signifier (in this case the thesis), as in Zizek’s 
account, is ‘enigmatic’ or unstable, it also has the potential to stabilise meaning. Here 
Symbolic enigmas, desires, and ultimately jouissance – because of their uncertainty 
and mystery – remain pleasurable, powerful and determining forces of discourse and 
knowledge. Yet it needs to be stressed that Zizek acknowledges, that despite the fragile 
and conditional characteristics which underpin apparent consistencies in, for example, 
the epistemology and ontology of gay male sexual desire, historical and cultural 
(con)texts suggest that gay male subjects ‘do’ live with the enigma of coherence and 
identity, ‘as if’ there is a consistent representational space in which subjects ‘are’ 
(perform, enact, represent, signify) sexual desire.    
Building on this, the thesis suggests that gender and sexual identities can be most 
prolifically understood at the level of the Symbolic.  They aim to do so not on the basis 
of an identity which simply awaits its symbolisation; so much as the Symbolic domain 
serves to anticipate how the enigma of identity will be instated in (gay male) human 
cultural relations and texts explored in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.  However, and as discussed 
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in these three contextual chapters, perhaps what is more in doubt is the extent to which 
the space of the Symbolic itself is never consistent: signifiers only ever point to other 
signifiers and not to a final position, identity, or sexual orientation.  On a Symbolic 
and thus impersonal and/or metonymic plane, desire points to yet more signifiers and 
not a hetero or homosexual body (in the sense that there are no sexed or gendered 
bodies with any fixed Symbolic dimensions). In this setting how are gay male subjects 
to live with such contradiction and uncertainty? and are fixed and intelligible identities 
allied to gay masculinity more useful and indeed inevitable than the fractured 
unconscious and divergent subjectivity described by Lacan?  It is these points and the 
foundations of the project that have been outlined in this introduction that now lead us 
to the following chapter which on the one hand frames a discussion that takes place 
with and within the grain of Lacanian inquiry.  Whilst on the other, the dialogue goes 
against the grain of some of the traditions in Lacanian criticism and psychoanalytic 
thinking.   
The work undertaken in the name of Lacan is often written in a language which betrays 
indebtedness to identity, ego, and instinct rather than subjective formation, drives and desires, 
and the unconscious. These tensions and how they are are essential in terms of using and 
understanding how his work can be productive and valuable in an interpretation of 
impersonality, desire, jouissance and how the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ in this project do so. In 
light of this, jouissance and objet a both cause and complicate modes of signification which, 
as the next chapter will demonstrate, allow for the tensions between identity as personal and 
identification as impersonal to be expressed.  In the next section, the terms discussed here will 
also contribute to the sophistication of the concept of ‘Bodies that Stutter’.  This, then, allows 
for a consideration of stuttering in terms of a Symbolic Other and, later, a way to theorise and 
consider gay male sexuality and the signification of desire in networked and online, 
pornographic, and photographic media and culture.  More so, this next part seeks to add a 
further layer to the lines of psychoanalytic enquiry presented so far via a critical consideration 
of the way in which exchanges between impersonality and metonymy open up the scope of 
how desire and jouissance can and, indeed, will ‘stutter’ if they are psychoanalytically 
enunciated and conveyed through the rhetoric of gay personality and metaphor.   
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Chapter 2: Conceptualising Jouissance, ‘Bodies that Stutter’, and 
Identifying the Psychoanalytic Trajectories of Desire  
2.1 Introduction 
To begin to tackle issues of the impersonality of desire and the nuances of ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ through Lacan, there are four key areas and/or concepts that need to be 
discussed and detailed in this section.  They first involve the close theorisation of Real, 
Symbolic and Imaginary (R, S, I) which offer a bedrock to the conceptualisation of 
jouissance. Next, this enables a detailed conceptual account of ‘Bodies that Stutter’. 
As well as this there is also consideration of how condensation and displacement 
inflect the metaphoric and metonymic dimensions of desire and finally an account of 
how the rhetoric of impersonality relates to the above areas. It then goes on to consider 
how impersonality can be conceptualised in relation to a gay male subject, using 
Freud’s theory of Narcissism and its application in the work of Dean, which discusses 
‘the impersonality of desire’ (2000), ‘“narci-schism”’ in the work of Lee Edelman 
(1994), and homo-ness, self-shattering, and ‘impersonal narcissism’ in Leo Bersani 
(1986, 1987, 1995, 2008).  These concepts and their impersonal features are then 
linked to tropes of metaphor and metonymy to position how the tensions between 
personal and impersonal subjectivities are imbued by language and discourse.   
As well as this it is important to remind the reader that the thesis is primarily informed 
by Lacanian psychoanalysis and at this stage it is important to foreground his work 
and its relevance to the project.  The argument is attached to several of the essays 
gathered and translated by Alan Sheridan in the Ecrits (2003, [1977]) and Seminar XX 
Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge 1972-73 (1999) 
translated by Bruce Fink.  The efficacy of these works will allow for they key terms of 
Real, Symbolic and Imaginary (R, S, I) and jouissance to be situated for the pivotal 
lines of argument.  In this part of the thesis, the extent to which a gay male subject is 
able to articulate his desire as personal, and how his jouissance is caused and realised 
as impersonal will be examined.  It also develops the idea that gay male desire stutters 
when it is attempts to express jouissance.  It is also important to note that the 
personalisation of a subject’s ‘gay’ and ‘masculine’ desire is predicated by this 
stuttering.  This occurs through the Symbolic Other and the impersonality of 
identification that the subject mistakes for the personal identity of the Imaginary other.   
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Another decisive starting point for this approach to the impersonality of gay male 
desire and ‘Bodies that Stutter’ is through in the work of Tim Dean in Beyond Sexuality 
(2000).  Dean is a key (queer) theorist of Lacan, who boldly asserts that Lacanian 
modes of thought have become so pervasive and persuasive that we now all too easily 
assume that desire and sexuality are products of ‘rhetoric, discourse, culture, history, 
and social relations’ (2000, p.176) because this seems the only viable and convincing 
alternative to the biological argument that sex is derived from nature.  This widely 
accepted version of desire and sexuality as socially and culturally rhetorical has 
become so ubiquitous that it has, in effect, ‘naturalised itself in contemporary theory’ 
(ibid).  Dean suggests that a re-engagement or queering of psychoanalysis, and 
particularly the work of Lacan, may be where a new method or, indeed, a new 
discipline is located.  He also points out that the very action of asking ‘How?’ to move 
beyond rhetorical versions of sexuality and desire forms an ambiguity, in that the 
frameworks, methodologies, and academic literature for such an inquiry are 
themselves rhetorical.  Therefore, the task of this chapter and the broader claims of the 
thesis may be in abstracting how we use Lacan (and psychoanalysis more generally) 
to read gay male desire in a cultural context, so that we may be able to begin to interpret 
gay male desire outside the terms that ensnare it as ‘gay male desire’.  
This approach is fundamental to how the research project has been formed and is useful 
because both Lacan and Dean initiate and complicate established discursive and 
rhetorical meanings of desire and gay masculinity. Critics such as Leo Bersani (1995), 
Ellie Ragland (1986, 2004), and Bruce Fink (1995, 1999), working within the Lacanian 
tradition, in the spirit of Seminar XX and the writings that discuss desire gathered in 
the Ecrits, have made attempts to shift sexuality and desire away from the field of the 
psychoanalytic Imaginary and identity-based models of the other and into a realm that 
takes into account the operations of jouissance in relation to identifications with the 
Symbolic Other.  Yet other summaries and synopses of Lacan’s work, as well as more 
detailed studies that engage with Lacanian concepts (Butler, 1990, 1993; Edelman, 
1994), seem to rely on notions of sexual difference rooted in rhetoric of the body, ego, 
identity, and gender.    
In this chapter, the discussion considers how jouissance catalyses and underpins the 
‘Bodies that Stutter’ and how the trajectories of metonymic impersonality are both 
informed and antagonised by metaphoric personality. More specifically this chapter 
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sets up a critical foundation to the thesis and its argument by asking how ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ can energise an impersonality of desire conceptualised through Symbolic-
stuttering as a marker of jouissance.  Just as a clear grasp of Lacanian approaches are 
crucial to understanding how jouissance and Symbolic modes of the Other are 
expressed through impersonal representation and the impersonality of language, it is 
also important to consider these cultural and theoretical concepts and techniques to 
trace the lines of argument contextually in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.  This chapter will also 
acknowledge how gay male identity and the gay male body form a way for the gay 
male subject to metaphorically personalise and, thus, articulate his desire in relation to 
his own and an ‘other’s’ sexual identity.  Yet this form of recognition and the subject’s 
self-recognition and/or egotism are antagonised by the impersonal capacities of 
metonymy and its configuration through the Symbolic Other, which is formed in 
relation to precarious modes of jouissance and stuttering.   
By addressing these areas of concern, this chapter explores the divergent ways in 
which gay desire may be understood as metonymically impersonal when it is expressed 
through a series of ‘Other’ sexual representations and identifications.  This is opposed 
to an understanding of identities that are made to metaphorically reflect, cohere, or 
conform through the ‘other’ as a person and/or personality.  Yet it is also through 
metaphoric forms of the personal that modes of metonymic impersonality and the 
stuttering body as a manifestation of impersonal desire are facilitated.  This reinforces 
the assertion of the thesis that gay male desire ‘stutters’ when it is expressed through 
Symbolic forms of jouissance.  Eve Kosofsky-Sedgwick (1990) situates how, by 
definition, the ‘homosexual’ in language naturalises and denaturalises the locus of a 
personal identification with ‘homosexuals’ in culture and, in so doing, defines and 
locates the locus of gay male desire.  This is also embedded in the Symbolic 
impersonality of language we see in Lacan, in that it is the homosexual who remains 
crucial to the construction of the Others’ dominance through the very fact that he is 
marginalised by discursive forms in language.  These Symbolic forms are also outside 
of his subjective sense of self-identity, self-control, and agency as the Imaginary other.  
His body and its desires are also riven through this paradox; they are formed on the 
basis of an impersonality that is epistemologically read as embodied exclusion, 
secrecy, and mystery yet, in the contextual instances discussed later in the thesis, 
articulated on the basis of disembodied spectacle, self-exposure, and the relentless 
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jouissance of the other as a stranger.  In the next section something of this enigmatic 
yet impenetrable tension is extracted through an initial consideration of Lacan’s Real, 
Symbolic and Imaginary (R,S,I) and their facilitation of this project prevailing 
paradigm -  jouissance. 
 
2.2 Theorising Jouissance 
 
Before a discussion of jouissance can take place it is necessary to account for the ways 
in which the Real, Symbolic and Imaginary (R, S, I) are assembled in relation to 
identity and desire and how they originate in Lacan’s essay, ‘The agency of the Letter 
in the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud’ (2003 [1957]).  Here, the core features of 
the R,S,I as a triadic assemblage are developed through the unconscious’ alignment to 
both language and desire to highlight the effects that ‘subject to other’ relations in the 
Imaginary and ‘subject to Other’ relations in the Symbolic have on the signifier and 
the signified.  The subject to other relation in the Imaginary positions the relation of 
‘spoken’ language to another human being at a personal level because it is spoken by 
a speaker and heard by a listener.  The subject to Other relation riven through the 
Symbolic depersonalises language so it is spoken by many and heard by more in an 
infinite numbers of ways.  Understanding how these shifts and intersections occur 
needs to begin by considering the relationship between the ‘other’ of the Imaginary 
register and ‘Other’ of the Symbolic.  This association is outlined by Slavoj Zizek and 
his initial understanding of all three of the registers.  He observes that ‘First there is 
the Imaginary other – other people “like me”’ (2002, p.70) and ‘with whom I am 
engaged in the mirror-like relationships of competition’ (ibid); next ‘there is the 
Symbolic “big Other” – the “substance” of our social existence’ (ibid) and, 
interestingly, ‘the impersonal set of rules that coordinate our coexistence’ (ibid).  
Finally, Zizek discusses the ‘Other qua Real, the impossible Thing, the “inhuman 
partner”’ (ibid) or, more specifically, ‘the Other with whom no symmetrical dialogue, 
mediated by the Symbolic Order, is possible’ (ibid). 
The line of argument that the thesis follows uses the above as a way to consider the 
provenance of Lacan’s Imaginary and its power to affirm how desire can be understood 
through intersubjectivity, which remains an Imaginary as opposed to a Symbolic form 
of communication.  The key way of positioning this is to understand Imaginary 
28 
 
intersubjectivity through a subject-to-subject relation.  Symbolic intersubjectivity 
occurs through a subject-to-Other relation, where the ‘Other’ differs from the ‘other’ 
in that it occupies the space of impersonality, a space that is ‘strictly divested of 
subjective status’ (Dean, p.43).  If this is considered through the context of the 
psychoanalytical exchange between Analyst and Analysand, or Analysand and 
Analyst, we can see that desire may be ‘spoken’ in a psychoanalytic session, which 
facilitates intersubjective communication between self and other.  This form of speech 
and of speaking one-to-one is primarily formed as an Imaginary ego-to-ego schema, 
where the expression of sexual desire itself may be or may have been understood 
through subjects ‘speaking’ and, more abstractly, representing to ‘others’ in the 
Imaginary.  It is this intersubjectivity of speaking of one’s sexual desire that remains 
an Imaginary rather than a Symbolic concept (Dean, 2000, p.43) because subjects and 
egos are seduced into an intersubjective relation with the other through processes of 
sexual desire connected to that subject ‘speaking’ of their own and the other’s 
imagined identity, personality, and sexuality.  Yet through this act of ‘speaking’ one’s 
desire, we see that speech is always subject to the power of the Symbolic ‘Other’.  It 
is this ‘Other’ which has the power to reduce the Imaginary ‘other’ to something that 
(or indeed someone who) can only be identified impersonally, and can identify 
impersonally with desire through language.   
Although desire is formed through the unconscious desire of the Other (that is the 
Symbolic force of language beyond my control), it is done so because the Imaginary 
other is often visualised and signified as coherent. For instance in a discourse such as 
pornography we are seduced into ‘seeing’ gay others engaging in gay sex; in turn, this 
acts as a potent way of  repetitively enhancing and affirming an Imaginary rhetoric of 
gay desire.  Leonardo Rodriguez writes that the operation of desire is always ‘over and 
above the others who are concrete incarnations of the Other’ (in Glowinski, et al, 2001, 
p.57).  Here, we see that the Imaginary other is ensnared by the big Symbolic Other 
and vice-versa.  Just as Rodriguez suggests that this desire is not some ‘ “natural”, 
endogenous’ (ibid) appetite or proclivity ‘that would push the subject in one direction 
or another irrespective of his/her relations with the Other; desire is always inscribed in 
and mediated by language’ (ibid), we see that the need or demand a subject may 
articulate for sexual pleasure or a sexual relation will always be filtered through the 
mediating figures of the Other and the Symbolic strains of a language and/or desire the 
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other will never be able to fully grasp or express.  Yet to articulate a ‘need’ (for sex, 
for desire, for the other) is to engage language and to be engaged by language.  
However, to engage and to be engaged at the level of language is to also make strange 
the body and desire (the body is not language); rather, the seduction of the Imaginary 
and the constraints of the Symbolic converge to displace the body and depersonalise 
the subject through language.  At the same time, language has the effect of making the 
body appear familiar and personal.  For instance, the terms ‘gay desire’ and ‘male 
desire’ locate the Imaginary other through modes of recognition that are imagined and 
even understood to be desires that are both identifiably ‘gay’ and ‘male’.  Yet, when 
these terms are considered as Symbolic through an ‘Other’, and the underlying power 
of the Symbolic ‘rules that I follow [and] meanings that haunt me’ (Zizek, 2006a, p.9), 
we see that the ‘Big’ (ibid) Symbolic Other allows and even encourages me to 
(mis)recognise and doubt what ‘gay’ and ’male’ desire may mean in language.   
Accounting for these tensions between the Imaginary to Symbolic and other to Other 
relation we begin to see some of the fundamental ways in which ‘Bodies that Stutter’ 
begin to form through jouissance. We also see that desire can only be manifested as 
desire through complex and precarious inter-relations which falter.  Yet, when these 
abstract exchanges are turned ‘into signifying form’ (Lacan, 2003, p.316), and, in this 
instance, sexual and sexually explicit images of gay men, they begin to form a 
language of signification that constructs gay desire.  For Lacan, the ‘phenomenology 
that emerges from analytic experience is certainly of a kind to demonstrate in desire 
the paradoxical, deviant, erratic, eccentric, even scandalous character by which it is 
distinguished from need’ (ibid, pp.317-18).  These tensions between the Imaginary-
Symbolic can also be understood by positioning the Real.  The Real is ‘that which 
resists meaning’ (Dean, 2002a, pp.33-34).  Particularly in the work of Slavoj Zizek 
(1989, 1991, 1994, 2005, 2006a, 2006b), we see how the Real both catalyses and 
disrupts the Symbolic.  Here the Symbolic is constituted through its insistence on 
excluding the Real.  Zizek understands the Real as impudently ahistorical to language 
and representation; it is ‘both the hard, impenetrable kernel resisting symbolization 
and a pure chimerical entity which has in itself no ontological consistency’ (1989, 
p.190). As Dean suggests, this ‘unsymbolizable Real’ (2002a, p.25) is at the root of 
the Symbolic and may even form its ‘founding instance and that which fuels Symbolic 
machinery even as it threatens to disrupt it’ (ibid).  The Real also establishes ‘the gap 
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that separates us from the image’ (Lewis, 2008, p.194) and, in so doing, convinces the 
subject that ‘the Symbolic needs the Imaginary (the fantasy) because it is not complete, 
and the Imaginary needs the Symbolic […] because it is not complete’ (Lewis, 2008, 
p.195).  Through the Real, the tensions we see in the Imaginary-Symbolic relation and 
their implicit incompleteness is necessary because ‘the Symbolic would be otherwise 
infinite and meaningless, and the Imaginary would be so disorderly that the human 
species would die out’ (ibid).   
In the diagram Figure 2.1 I have provided the dimensions of how the Imaginary and 
Symbolic function to assist in understanding this implicit paradox of neither being 
complete entities.  Whilst the terms are confined to fields and thus aligned to binaries, 
they are, in fact, constitutive of an oppositional tension, which is also reciprocal.  This 
is important to the thesis because it sets out a way to grasp the tensions and 
reciprocities related to ‘Bodies that Stutter’ in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. It also illustrates 
that for bodies to stutter there is the necessity for exchange between these formations. 
Here, the ‘Imaginary-Symbolic scheme’ (Dean, 2000, p.45) seems to systematise and 
create a clearly defined way of understanding their functions in language and culture.  
Yet, if the Real and, more importantly for the forthcoming discussion, jouissance are 
aligned to any strand of the diagram, then each element of the chart is vulnerable to 
asymmetry, slippage, and fragmentation which incites ‘Bodies that Stutter’.  In 
particular, jouissance interrupts the intentions of the Imaginary and the Symbolic by 
inscrutably diverting the subject to a liminal space between these terms below.  The 
Imaginary-Symbolic relation is both a mutual tryst and a rutted conflict, in that it 
begins to displace and reposition the subject somewhere between the positions of their 
Symbolic and Imaginary jouissance, close to the Real gap or ‘faille’ within language 
and desire that Lacan refers to in Seminar XX (1999, p.4) and that will be discussed in 
later in the thesis.     
Between the Imaginary and Symbolic, the subject is ensnared by this jouissance and 
its startling and thrilling mutability.  Yet, because the Imaginary register is 
misguidedly singled out as the most important element of Lacan’s work, it is clear that 
theoretical inquiry will remain limited for as long as this constituent is stressed above 
the Symbolic and the Real.  Commenting on weaknesses in a number of critical 
commentaries on desire that look to the work of Lacan, Dean states how the objet a, 
as the cause of desire and the object of unconscious fantasy, ‘designates that which 
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escapes the Imaginary and the domain of the ego’ (2000, p.34).  He goes on to claim 
that for ‘as long as the other remains captive to the status of the subject, one is stuck 
in the Imaginary domain of psychologized relations’ (ibid).  More specifically, and as 
this thesis will examine, this traps the gay subject in the realm of the Imaginary and 
his intersubjective reflection through representation.  It is only with Lacan that moves 
beyond this bind of intersubjectivity are possible.  By theorising the other and 
otherness ‘impersonally’ and ‘in terms of the Symbolic Other, rather than the 
Imaginary other’ (ibid), a way to re-position and re-negotiate desire may eventually be 
possible.  I suggest that in this setting desire and the gay male subject should to be read 
through ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and more specifically via the operational unravelling pre-
empted by objet a and wrought by jouissance’s relation to the Symbolic rather than 
the Imaginary,  
This approach is further endorsed by Dean in relation to how he positions and identifies 
jouissance. He observes that, to grasp jouissance, one must understand that ‘it is [the] 
barriers or limits to jouissance that “permit the full spectrum of desire” ’ (2000, p.91) 
and that in terms of a gay (or, in Dean’s instance, a queer) subject, it is this barrier and 
‘not unlimited access to jouissance that permits queer desire to flourish’ (ibid).  This 
limit is often understood through the Real register and its position as ‘a zone of 
impossibility’ (p.88), which actually ‘renders it constitutive’ (ibid).  The Real is that 
which seems to resist, fall outside of, or fails to articulate signification in the Imaginary 
and Symbolic.  As Dean succinctly argues, ‘the real is not an effect of symbolic and 
imaginary orders; at most it is a theoretical construct that explains negatively the 
function and limits of these two orders’ (ibid).  Whilst it is in the limits of these two 
orders that jouissance seems to return (to that which is the Real), it seems that to begin 
to articulate something, indeed anything, of jouissance as impersonal desire, we need 
to return to the Symbolic and the ways in which language always instils a limit to the 
subject’s jouissance and also allows us to access and gain (temporary) pleasure from 
it.  This temporary pleasure is crucial in that it enables the subject’s desire for excessive 
jouissance to be contained, but also to be circulated and consumed within the limits of 
signification and the boundaries of the Other’s jouissance and also the other’s 
jouissance. Within this matrix of jouissance we also find the objet a or, as Lacan 
suggests, the element, which causes jouissance. This cause or stimulant of jouissance 
has its most obvious or explicit grounding in a materiality connected to jouissance’s 
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cause.  In other words, the objet a is a trigger for sexual pleasure that occurs prior to 
that pleasure.  In some cases, this is more pleasurable than the pleasure itself, in that 
the pursuit of it only ever reaches a particular point.  This is also the point that brings 
jouissance to an end.   
 
Lacan positions the concept of jouissance in ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the 
Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious’ (2003 [1960]).  In his early claims, 
he associates jouissance with the phallus and states that ‘the erectile organ comes to 
symbolise the place of jouissance, not in itself or even in the form of an image, but as 
a part lacking in the desired image’ (ibid, p.353).  This lack riven into the phallus is 
relevant to the development of a thesis which addresses gay male representation 
because it is signified in sexually explicit gay imagery as ‘the Symbolic phallus that 
cannot be negated, the signifier of jouissance’ (ibid, p.354).  Crucially, Lacan also sees 
jouissance embedded in the ‘function of desire in the man, insofar as he sets up 
dominance in the privileged place of jouissance’ (ibid).  Here and as we will see in the 
analyses of bodies that stutter, the attempts that gay male subjects make at articulating 
their privileged and phallic jouissance begin to fail because their jouissance is lost to 
the Symbolic Other or more specifically, and in representational practices that attempt 
to display the sexual-self ‘the instrument for the Other’s jouissance’ (Lacan, 1999, 
p.3).  This underpins how jouissance is positioned in the project as a form of desire 
that impersonally shifts and sways between its phallic and ‘Otherly’ pleasures, 
excesses, and, ultimately, limits.   
 
Aspects of how gay desire is articulated and complicated by jouissance are also 
discussed in Lacan’s Seminar XX, which was delivered in Paris from November 1972 
to June 1973.  The core themes of the seminar are composed around issues to do with 
sexual difference, knowledge, love, and the ways in which the pursuit of jouissance is 
implicit in how we theorise and act out desire.  This is also discussed in terms of objet 
a, as that which the subject seeks beyond and outside their own auto-erotic desire, and 
also as that which acts as the energiser of jouissance.  The objet a is an object or 
abstraction that sets desire in motion, especially the partial objects that fortify sexual 
desires.  Yet desire does not seek to attain the objet a, rather, desires are assembled 
around it in a continuous and retroactive cycle of jouissance.  Within the thesis, the 
shifting nature of jouissance acts as a device to discuss how the attempts that gay men 
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make at signifying it are preceded by a Symbolic and impersonal object, and allied to 
modes of metonymic identification. Indeed, these modes of enquiry also allow the 
argument to be developed in relation to the concept of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ to consider 
how the nuances of jouissance around them bear upon the ways in which impersonal 
identifications and a ‘radical impersonality of desire’ (Dean, 2000) can or cannot be 
represented.   
 
At this stage, it is also important to note that Lacan’s concept of jouissance is subject 
to a later reworking in his untranslated 1974 seminar, Troisieme (The Third) as “jouis-
sens” (see Patsalides and Ror Malone, 2000, pp. 123-134).  This could be most 
usefully interpreted as ‘the jouissance of meaning which is the jouissance of the 
unconscious’ and that ‘retro-actively we could say that Freud invented psychoanalysis 
in order to deal with this mysterious third jouissance’ (ibid, p.125).  This “jouis-sens” 
has the potential to align jouissance to the Symbolic and could be identified as 
jouissance’s place in language.  This is important to the way in which jouissance is 
situated and developed in the thesis because the tensions between “jouis-sens” and 
jouissance may work together, so that each ‘utters itself’ (Chiesa, 2007, p.185).  In 
turn, this opens up the potential to read the gay male subject as a ‘stuttering’ one, whilst 
also indicating that it may be in the utterances of “jouis-sens” and its ‘linguistic lack 
of sense’ (ibid) that the Symbolic as ‘a means of jouissance’ (ibid) can be expressed. 
“Jouis-sens”, also carries an emotional intensity that connects the paradoxes of 
language and desire to one another in attempts to speak, write, and represent 
jouissance; attempts that both excite and fail to express gay masculine desire, and ones 
that ultimately falter and stutter. As this project evolves, the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ 
implicitly draw upon “jouis-sens” because it allows for something of jouissance to be 
articulated through language without confining it to modes of the metaphoric, 
Imaginary, and personal.    
 
By this point it is clear that jouissance does not function in relation to a specific or 
singular mode of desire.  Rather, it is formed and reformed in relation to plurality and 
multiplicity.  The word ‘jouissance’ resists and subverts; it does not translate into one 
English term and, as a result, it is balanced on the threshold of signification and 
meaning.  For example, ‘In French jouissance is judicially defined and spelled out as 
the subject’s use and enjoyment of all of the advantages of a specific object of 
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privilege’ (Patsalides and Ror Malone, 2000, p.126).  It has ideological, political, and 
subjective interpretations and, in this way, jouissance becomes difficult and unruly.  It 
is often discussed through the signification of the phallus and phallic jouissance but it 
is also here that it begins to resist definition or representation, and the subsequent ways 
in which it is theorised call into question the critical nature of what jouissance may be 
in relation to desire.  In this way jouissance is also relevant to the development of the 
concept of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ because both are reliant upon yet remain difficult to 
translate and interpret in the Symbolic field.   
 
Lacan also posits a jouissance that is articulated in terms of a sexual relation or 
topography of two sexed polarities: 1. jouissance is defined by the hole, slit, or opening 
that he states ‘revolves around phallic jouissance’ (1999, p.7) and 2. for the other pole 
of jouissance, Lacan is uncertain of its nature or how it manifests itself.  He asks if 
‘something can be attained that would tell us how that which up until now has only 
been a fault (faille) or gap in jouissance’ (ibid, p.4) we may begin to ask in what ways 
jouissance could be identified, signified, and articulated?   If we could locate the slip, 
gap, break, and defect in jouissance, we may be able to conceptualise and then mark 
jouissance in a way that does not rely on the objet a; that being the inanimate and 
impersonal object located in the unconscious fantasy that, as Dean suggests, ‘escapes 
the Imaginary and the domain of the ego’ (2000, p.34). 
 
In light of this, what jouissance alerts us to are the gap[s] (faille[s]) that Lacan claims 
exist between self and Other. These gaps can be identified as a form of desire that 
demands.  That is, a desire which is never exacting or sufficient but, rather, a one that 
acts as a ceaseless and selfish cathexis; never giving up in its jouissance or, as Lacan 
states, ‘demanding it (ne cesse pas)’ (1999, p.5).  Here, jouissance literally demands 
jouissance in retro-active cycles of repetitive demands that continually rise and fall at 
uneven gaps so that the gaps in desire generate an insight into desire itself.  What also 
needs to be emphasised here is the split or slipping between the Other’s desire and the 
subject’s own sense of jouissance.  We could suggest that it is in through this gap that 
bodies stutter. As Philippe Julien states, ‘in psychoanalysis […] establishing this gap 
permits desire […] to recognise as its law, the other’s desire and not the Other’s 
jouissance’ (1994, p.106). The gay subjects of Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are riven by this 
notion in that they pursue the desire of the other through the Other’s jouissance and as 
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a result stutter.  In turn and at this stage of the thesis this stuttering may be allied to 
what Lacan identifies as the “Encore” (1999, p.4) within the gap (faille), going so far 
as to suggest that it is the proper name of the gap itself.  In this instance ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ and Lacan’s “Encore” may well be understood as forms of continuous and 
incessantly demanding desire for the other that are simultaneously subjugated and 
perpetuated through the jouissance of the Other.   
 
In Seminar XX, Lacan also cites the objet a, by building on his own suggestions that 
desire is not configured in relation to the body itself but rather that which is concealed 
and revealed as the remainder (reste) thereof (1999, p.6).  Desire, as the residual or 
excessive object that lingers in the space of that which is left over, is the key to 
jouissance; it haunts both the subject and language in visual representation.  Lacan 
positions desire that locates itself as object-like (objectal) as ‘a bunch of bull’ (ibid) – 
in other words, the founding and locating of desire at the level of coherent objectivity 
and identity is jettisoned by that fact that at the essence of desire is the concept of ‘that 
which constitutes a remainder in desire, namely, its cause, and sustains desire through 
its lack of satisfaction (insatisfaction), and even its impossibility’ (ibid)  may be closer 
to what desire actually is. Dean (2000) sees Lacan’s emphasis on jouissance and the 
objet a as a development of notions aligned to ‘othering’ implicit in Freud’s work.  If 
the sexual ‘instinct’ is independent of its object, as Freud argues, then there is no 
axiomatic connection between erotic desire and the opposite (or other) sex.  Moreover, 
the objet a and jouissance move with some degree of gender neutrality in that they can 
be arbitrarily triggered by a sound, a smell, the Gaze, the voice, the lips, etc.  For Dean, 
a key psychoanalytic insight is that ‘many sexual pleasures do not necessarily involve 
the genitals’ (p.195), just as Lacan’s work underlines that, whilst there is sex per se, 
there is no sexuality outside or without the unconscious.  It is this last point that Dean 
seeks to underline more than most throughout his book.  Steering a way through the 
nature-nurture controversy or essentialist and constructionist debates that have beset 
recent studies (elements of which are examined in the next chapter), Dean argues that, 
in Lacan’s work, sexuality is explicable in terms of: 
 
neither nature nor nurture, since the unconscious cannot be considered biological – it 
isn’t part of my body and yet it isn’t exactly constructed either.  Instead the 
unconscious may be grasped as an index of how both biology and culture fail to 
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determine subjectivity and sexual desire.  Thinking of the unconscious as neither 
biological nor cultural allows us to distinguish (among other things) a properly 
psychoanalytic account from a merely psychological notion of the unconscious.  
(p.221) 
 
Of course, to move beyond any categories by and through which experience is made 
intelligible is no easy manoeuvre.  However, if the continuing emphasis in some 
theories of sexuality also entails a commitment to bodily or gender coherence, 
subjective interiority, and the Imaginary-ego, then, despite problems in the work of 
Lacan, his stress on the operations of the unconscious through the Symbolic Other via 
the jouissance and objet a is a way of moving beyond a theory of sexuality in which 
the Imaginary and the ‘other’ continue to inhibit and restrict the movements of desire 
which cause bodies to stutter.   
 
2.3 Bodies that Matter, Bodies that Mutter, Bodies that Stutter 
 
To understand the relevance of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and stuttering in this thesis it is 
essential to account for the point that many feminist and queer scholars have taken up 
Freud’s concept of the ego as a ‘bodily ego’ aligned to conscious, anatomical, and 
biological sexual difference and, as a result, have neglected the ways in which egos 
‘occlude - rather than manifest - desire’ (Dean, 2000, p.200).  Through this occlusion, 
the Imaginary gay male body that is represented, read, looked at, and thus embodied 
can only be re-represented, re-read, interpreted, and positioned through its own 
Symbolic disembodiment that stutters.  This stuttering involves processes of bodily 
and egotistical representation that falter, stammer, and hesitate to express the nature of 
jouissance and the meaning of sexual identity.   
Stuttering involves impersonal processes of association between the signifiers within 
an image, the user and the viewer, the impersonality of representation itself as the 
locale of where desire is signified, and the inexorable quality of the images transience.  
In the image the subject can only express themselves through a series of identifications 
that rely upon impersonal and metonymic contiguity and in so doing they begin their 
own practices of stuttering.  Through this process, the ego and the associations that it 
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has with an Imaginary other fails to articulate desire and, in so doing, shifts the 
potentiality of how jouissance can be realised to the Symbolic.  It is in images that 
attempt to instil and represent the personal dimensions of the body via the 
amplification of sexual desire that the signifier and the user’s bodies begin to stutter. 
Dean’s work (2000) is alert to some of these issues in its critical dismantling of the 
work of Judith Butler (1993) and Lee Edelman (1994). Dean effectively states that in 
Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ Butler has misread Freud and 
circumvented Lacan through her failure to investigate the ways in which desire and 
the subject are in fact ‘predicated on the incommensurability of body and subject’ 
(ibid, p.200).  In Dean’s intervention he transforms Butler’s bodies that matter into 
bodies that now ‘mutter’ (ibid, p.202-05).  He also suggest that there is an implicit 
failure in Butler to recognise that jouissance is limitless because it cannot be 
rationalised or totalised and, therefore, it cannot be clearly defined through an ego or 
a body that ‘matters’.  What is central to Dean’s critique of both Butler and Edelman 
is hinged on the restrictive ways in which we, as desiring subjects, misconstrue and, 
in many ways, misrepresent desire in terms of an identifiable, personalised, and bodily 
‘other’ as opposed to a Symbolic Other and also the third register of the Real.  For 
instance, Butler sees desire in terms of a materiality that she accounts for as both ‘prior 
to signification’ as well as ‘an effect of signification’ (1993, p.30).  In turn, she also 
suggests that there is a paradox associated with this body in that it is bound to ‘the 
insolubility of materiality and signification’ whilst also retaining ‘materiality as its 
constitutive condition’ (ibid).  Here, the body is one that is aware of its ‘mattering’ and 
materiality but unaware of the ‘muttering’ possibility of desire.  Or, in other words, 
the mattering body is one that accounts for ‘subjects of the signifier and not subjects 
of desire’ (Dean, 2000, p.187).  Here, the mattering body fails to recognise desire and, 
more so, jouissance beyond the constraints of the ego and the materiality of that ego.   
The mattering body is contained within the signifier, unwittingly and negligently 
limiting its jouissance to Imaginary othering.  This subject of the signifier is indicative 
of how queer theory and gay identity politics privilege the Imaginary body and neglect 
to address the potential of the Symbolic, jouissance, objet a, and also the Real.  This 
is configured through the corporeality of an ontic and social body, which the subject 
imagines is there to satisfy or fulfil desire.  In all of the contexts of this thesis, this 
mattering body is locked into a materiality by the signification of a bodily ego or, as 
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Dean’s argument claims, a one restrained by the Imaginary and Symbolic registers.  
For instance, within the contextual chapters, it is clear that the personals website, the 
pornographic text, and the selfie are all tropes in which an egotistical ‘body that 
matters’ attempts, yet also fails, to express jouissance.  Through this failure to express 
jouissance the body begins to stutter so that the imprudent preservation of narcissism 
discussed later in this chapter, and instilled through an Imaginary other, gives way to 
a subject that on the one hand is torn, uncertain, and impatient, and on the other urgent, 
stimulated, and desirable.   
In light of these conditions in which bodies may stutter, Dean’s assertion that there are 
‘bodies that mutter’ (2000, pp.202-205) is also useful.  These muttering bodies are the 
ones ‘that speak almost inaudibly, unintelligibly’ (ibid, p.202) to ‘obliquely indicate 
desire in the form of a failure in the Other’s discourse’ (ibid).  Dean aligns the 
muttering body to a critique of both Butler and Edelman’s work, to suggest that their 
intervention produce bodies ‘bearing egos but devoid of subjective desire’ (ibid).  
Here, jouissance is subsumed rather than enabled by the ego, and ‘the subject of desire 
emerges not when an identification ([…]) is made, but when it fails to be made’ (ibid).  
It is in this failure of identification that metonymy and impersonality also work 
towards carving out new landscapes for desire and jouissance.  Dean prefers to see the 
body muttering through the Real and the place of jouissance within the Real.  He 
argues that he has an ‘objection to critically analysing sex and sexuality in terms of the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic’ (ibid, p.231) because the Real alerts us to ‘the specific 
modes of […] cultural images’ and discourses’ failure’ (ibid).  In Dean, the muttering 
body is that which he views as ‘always relational, oppositional, in the subversive sense, 
rather than substantive’ (ibid) and it is the body that, following Lacan, he locates 
through ‘negativity and mutability’ with the ego (ibid, p.230).  The problem with this 
muttering and its alliance to the Real is that Dean is reluctant to examine ‘the constant 
media barrage of sexualised imagery’ (ibid, p.231) that allows the muttering to occur 
through the Imaginary-Symbolic relation.  Due to this, the body that mutters also 
remains the body that ‘resists assimilation to any Imaginary and Symbolic universe’ 
(ibid, p.232).  Whilst recognising that ‘this claim may be counterintuitive’ (ibid, 
p.231), Dean also permits the body to continue muttering; lost in the unspecific 
abstractions of the Real and the ways in which it ‘designate[s] everything that resists 
adaption’ (ibid, p.230).   
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This muttering body also serves to emphasise the failures and limits of an ego that 
‘obscures the subject of desire’ (ibid, p.202), to formulate that ‘while the ego matters, 
the body mutters’ (ibid).  Whilst Dean conveys this in terms of an Imaginary-ego that 
matters and a Real body that mutters, it is also within this formulation that the notion 
of Symbolic stuttering is, on the one hand, neglected and, on the other, beckoned in.  
If this is the case, the alignment of ‘Imaginary-Mattering’ and ‘Real-Muttering’ could 
be furthered in this thesis to suggest that as and when the body operates through 
jouissance, it forms a Symbolic-stuttering.  This stuttering relies upon the Symbolic 
Other and a cultural signifier (the body, an object, an image, a series of images) but 
also follows Dean’s claim that ‘the difference between muttering and speaking 
[mattering] concerns the distinction involved in the notion of desire as something in 
language but not itself linguistic’ (ibid p.203).  Stuttering occurs in this gap between 
mattering and muttering.  The body that stutters occupies the space between the body 
that matters and the body that mutters so that the triadic registers of Imaginary-
Symbolic-Real (which in this case would be transformed into I, S, R) may also be 
understood as Matter-Stutter-Mutter. Here, bodies must stutter through the force and 
peril of the Symbolic Other before they can even consider the notions of ‘mattering’ 
or ‘muttering’.   
Building on both Butler and Dean, this new construction forms a ‘contingent 
foundation’ (ibid p.205) of how to read desire, in that it locates the body and the subject 
of jouissance   between bodies that matter and mutter.  Whilst muttering is ‘struggling 
to be heard’ (ibid p.203), the ‘stuttering’ I suggest is not necessarily struggling.  It is 
repetitively activating desire through the process of stuttering – the stuttering body 
produces a Symbolic from of   jouissance that will also stutter because it is torn 
between a body that matters and a body that mutters.  In this case, the subject of the 
Symbolic is the stutterer, a subject who is both alert and naïve to the constraints and 
the limits of Imaginary and Real modes of jouissance.  The body that stutters is located 
between the mattering and muttering self, and the stuttering that is provoked in this 
space, between mattering and muttering, is done so hesitantly, indeterminately, and 
repetitively, like the process of stuttering in language.  In this setting, stuttering is 
always realised retroactively through a gap, an excess, or a slippage between mattering 
and muttering.   
40 
 
As a result, egos and bodies that matter do not stutter or mutter.  As Dean contends, 
they are so ‘completely rhetoricalised that paradoxically they are devoid of desire’ 
(ibid, p.187).  In contrast, the body that mutters is akin to the ones that stutter in that 
its ‘desire is [inevitably] enmeshed in the Symbolic order’ (ibid, p.203), yet it is a body 
that ‘condenses and carries with it jouissance in a way that ordinary language cannot, 
since jouissance and language conventionally are conceived as antithetical’ (ibid).  The 
muttering bodies are entirely disembodied and, because Dean does not contextualise 
them through the Imaginary-Symbolic dynamic, they deliberately continue to mutter.  
In this thesis it is through the contextualisation of impersonality, desire, and jouissance 
that stuttering is challenging the antithetical relationship between the muttering and 
mattering body.  Whilst this remains close to Dean’s understanding of muttering as a 
form of non-verbal and non-representational jouissance that through the Real and the 
symptom ‘signify[ies] desire that has not been heard, has not found its signifier’ (ibid), 
the stuttering body requires the signifier by way of attempting to express its jouissance.  
Here, the stutterer is the asinine subject who requires the absurdity of the signifier to 
articulate his own and relate to the jouissance of the Other.   
The stuttering body that relies upon the conflicts rather than the failure ‘to distinguish 
others from Others’ (ibid, p.187) in its search for jouissance can only be a body that 
stutters; a body that Dean would may describe as ‘suave’ (ibid).  This  ‘suave body’ is 
positioned as the body that has been rehearsed, smoothed over, repetitively copied and 
‘so completely rhetoricalised’ (ibid), it is effectively ‘devoid of desire’ (ibid),  Yet it 
is also the body whose devolution of desire is desire itself, a desire activated by its 
own loss of desire. Through this process of suaveness, which we see in all three of the 
contextual instances where jouissance is always  strategised, constructed, and 
manipulated  and ‘not in any way liberated or liberating’ (ibid), the ‘suaveness’ 
becomes an indicative part of how jouissance as Symbolic-stuttering is expressed.  
Here, the personals website, the pornographic film, and the networked selfie initially 
present us with a suave subject who appears to contain desire and thus ‘matter’.  Yet 
this ‘mattering’ implodes because of its representation as suave. This allows the 
mattering body and Imaginary-ego from within the image to give way to impersonal 
modes of sexual representation that Symbolically-stutter because they are suave.   
Whilst Dean is resolute that jouissance ultimately ‘remains at the level of the Real’ 
(p.186) and that ‘both Butler and Edelman miss the psychoanalytic point by making 
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sex performative and graphemic’ (ibid), he also relies upon the Symbolic and his 
notion of muttering to do so.  Dean focuses his critique on their accounts of the self 
and subjectivity   that ‘constantly falls back into the ego’ (p.193) because it fails to 
fully realise or articulate the potential of its own and the other/Other’s jouissance.  As 
Dean states, ‘Lacan theorises sexuality not in terms of gender but in terms of 
jouissance’ (ibid) and, more problematically, through the notion of jouissance as 
stuttering, we see that the sexual pleasures of the stuttering subject are embedded in 
something that is lacking, missing, or which remains frustratingly disavowed in both 
the Imaginary and the Symbolic.  Through the Real, a muttering body is inaudible 
whilst a stuttering body is one that can be partially understood through Imaginary-
mattering and Symbolic-stuttering.  For example, if we consider the millions of images 
that are circulated online as ‘personal’ and thus masquerade as metaphorical 
reflections of the subject’s Imaginary-ego that ‘matters’, we see that they do something 
to position that subject as a subject.  Yet is through this subjectivisation that gay male 
identity, personality, and sexual desire remain tethered to Symbolic ‘meaning as a 
substitute for sexuality’ (ibid, p.188) that stutters.  In turn, and as this section will go 
on to demonstrate, this is configured through the metonymic and impersonal potential 
of a jouissance that stutters and the stimulating impossibility and impersonality of a 
‘body that stutters’ as a substitute for that meaning.  Whilst the Real may be the limit 
and the actual place of jouissance, we also see in signification and via the signifier 
that, because the Symbolic ‘Other is lacking’ (ibid, p.205), the subject’s jouissance is 
most powerfully realised as a form of stuttering.  
Whereas ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and processes of Symbolic-stuttering are analytically 
addressed in Chapters, 4, 5, and 6, at this point in the thesis it is also necessary to 
examine how the concept of stuttering in language (which also informs the claims 
made in the thesis associated with impersonality and jouissance) may be understood.  
Work which uses psychoanalysis to consider how and why the ‘stutter’ disrupts the 
position of speaking (Coriat, 1943; Fenichel, 1949; Fisher, 1970) attempts to determine 
and essentialise stuttering as a verbal and linguistic problem.  However, for this next 
section which examines stuttering through jouissance and the Symbolic, it is necessary 
to reposition it through a conceptual approach.  Juan-David Nasio (1998) clearly states 
that ‘when speech fails, jouissance occurs’ (p.16); that is, when desire or (sexual) 
pleasure manifest themselves, the speech and the position of the speaking subject 
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falters and fails to express desire clearly and coherently.  It is when speech goes astray 
(ibid) and language is frustrated that stuttering gestures towards a way of a way of 
speaking jouissance.  In this way, stuttering is also a way of expressing jouissance that 
can ‘signify creativity’ in verbal and non-verbal ways (Gunn and Edbauer Rice, 2009, 
p.215).  As a result it is through the body that stutters that the juxtapositions between 
speech as a verbal manifestation of desire and jouissance as a non-verbal trace of desire 
meet.   
Jouissance may also be close to a way of stuttering identified by Gilles Deleuze in his 
essay ‘He Stuttered’ (1994). Stuttering forms the place in which the Symbolic Other 
meets jouissance and, as a result, ‘puts language in a state of perpetual disequilibrium’ 
(p.27).  Here, he claims that ‘when stuttering no longer affects preexisting words, but, 
rather, itself ushers in the words that it affects’ (p.107), it presents us with ‘an affective 
and intensive language (langage)’ (ibid).  This is embedded and expressed through the 
Symbolic Other and jouissance, as opposed to ‘an affectation of the one who speaks’ 
(ibid) rooted in the Imaginary.  This also links the stuttering subject to the impersonal 
dimensions of stuttering and its capacity and potential to express desire in ways that 
jar and shake up the ego and its Imaginary façade.  If we locate the idea of stuttering 
through the Symbolic we also see that, a lot like speech, desire requires a form of 
writing or representing to occur.  In light of stuttering, a way for the speech act or the 
process of speaking one’s desire to stammer, slip, slide, and run together with the 
representation (the writing) of that desire.  Here, the Imaginary and narcissistic divide 
between the (hetero- or homosexual) ‘I’ and “other’ fails because these ‘coherent 
(id)entities’ cut across one another.   
Fink (1995) alludes to this notion of non-speech as jouissance and speech as non-
jouissance through a focus on Lacan’s search for ‘a signifier of the subject [that] could 
be found in statements, that is, in what is said’ (ibid, p.37).  Fink examines Lacan’s 
use of Roman Jakobson’s theory of “shifters” (1957) and more specifically the 
complex ways in which Jakobson formulates how ‘personal pronouns such as “I,” 
“you,” “he,”’ (ibid, p.38) etc. ‘cannot be defined’ (ibid) as such ‘without reference to 
the messages in which they appear’ (ibid).  Here, the patterns of speech and the 
exchange of words are dependent on how ‘“I” designating the message sender and 
“you” the message receiver or addressee’ (ibid) create a reciprocity or shift between 
what the message means and how it is interpreted.  This ‘shifting’ meaning also goes 
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some way to initially define the message sender through the Imaginary-ego in that ‘the 
personal pronoun “I” designates the person who identities his or her self with a specific 
ideal image’ (ibid).  For example, in Chapter 6 which examines tumblr.com in context, 
we see, through the selfie, an attempt by the subject/‘I’ to speak the desires of their 
Imaginary-ego, yet it is through this attempt at ‘speaking’ (and thus representing) that 
desire begins to Symbolically stutter towards jouissance.   
Craig Dworkin also observes that the dysfluency of stuttering ‘has such Symbolic force 
that we tend to forget the extent to which a range of corporeal opacities are in fact a 
perfectly normal part of speech production’ (2009, p.166).  In this way the stutter is an 
implicit component of speech production and coordination.  This is echoed in the ways 
that jouissance stutters; it requires the loss of the other and the contingency of speech 
production to account for its pleasure as jouissance of the Symbolic Other.  More 
specifically, Fink also suggests that ‘the French word ne, literally “not”’ (1995, p.38-
9) and ‘the [English] word “but”’ (ibid, p.39) interrupt the certainty of speech and, in 
so doing, introduce ‘a conflict […] played out […] between a conscious or ego 
discourse, and another “agency” which takes advantage of the “possibility” offered by 
English grammar (and French grammar in the case of ne) to manifest itself’ (ibid, 
p.39).  Here, ‘ne’ and ‘but’ are allied to the disruptive and repetitive patterns of 
stuttering as jouissance.  We see, in much the same way that ‘ne’ and ‘but’ expose the 
precarious nature of speech and the enunciating Imaginary subject, that the 
Symbolically-stuttering subject of jouissance introduces ‘a certain hesitation, 
ambiguity, or uncertainty into the utterance in which it appears, as if to suggest that 
the speaker is denying the very thing he is asserting’ (ibid).  This tension between the 
denial and assertion of desire locates the stuttering subject as one that refutes and slips 
through clear and articulate speech patterns.  If we think about this in relation to 
something like the lack of conversational dialogue in Triga Films (and pornography 
more broadly), we see that it is through the muffled groans, the repetition of 
profanities, and orgasmic moans that jouissance is attempting to find a voice.  Yet, this 
signification of desire is not consistent or coherent; it stutters or, as Fink also suggests, 
‘points to a sort of “no-saying,” a saying – “No”’ (ibid) that also reflects how ne and 
“but” gesture towards an always ‘ambivalent speaker who says yes and no at the same 
time’ (ibid) through a series of Symbolic-stutters.   
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All of the instances examined in the contextual chapters seem to stutter, repeat, and 
retroactivate desire in both systematic and arbitrary ways.  Following the line that 
‘the stutter moves from being merely descriptive to becoming an integral part of the 
formal structure of a text’ (Dworkin, 2009, p.167), we can also see how the 
precarious and restless desire to transform jouissance as non-representational into 
representation results in the stutter; this may be a body that stutters, a subject, or a 
signification of the two.  As a consequence, the images we perceive as gay, as sexual, 
as arousing, and allied to jouissance are connected to the movement between ‘the 
subject of the signifier and the subject of jouissance’ (ibid).  This, in turn, positions 
the speaking subject (the body) through ‘a kind of stuttering or stammering, an 
inability to settle on one side of the other’ (Gunn and Edbauer Rice, 2009, p.217) or, 
more problematically, the Other.  The repetitive syllables that characterise speech as 
stuttering do so in relation to an Other jouissance that always falters as speech. It is 
this faltering both in terms of speech but also its realisation through subjective modes 
of identity and identification that is used in the next section to examine the 
modalities of the Symbolic, stuttering, and jouissance in relation to the operations of 
condensation and displacement and metaphor and metonymy.  
 
2.4  Locating Metaphoric Identities and Metonymic Identifications in terms of 
Impersonality, Desire, and Jouissance    
 
In this part of the chapter, it is the intention to consider how impersonality, desire and 
jouissance are shaped by condensation and displacement in the work of Freud and 
metaphor and metonymy in Lacan, which have, in turn, helped to frame the analysis 
of identities of ‘homosexual/gay/queer’ masculinity we see in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.  A 
useful rhetorical tool, in relation to the central claims of this thesis, aligned to 
impersonality, desire and jouissance lies in the functions of how both condensation 
and displacement in Freud and metaphor and metonymy in Lacan work in relation to 
the significance of the conscious and unconscious drives.  It is widely recognised that 
the bedrock of a psychoanalytic unconscious is structured around ‘the mechanism 
Freud lays out in The Interpretation of Dreams – condensation and displacement, 
associated by Lacan here with metaphor and metonymy’ (Fink, 2004, p.72). Whilst 
Lacan himself used the linguistic work of Roman Jakobson to position metaphor and 
metonym he is also attributed these ‘two great axes of language’ (Ragland-Sullivan, 
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1986, p.236) to Freud’s theories of condensation and displacement. In The Function 
and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis’ (2003 [1953]) Lacan ‘laid 
conceptual groundwork to show that the primary-process work of condensation and 
displacement […] proceeds analogously to secondary-process metaphor and 
metonymy’ (Ragland-Sullivan, ibid). It is the aim of this section to situate these terms 
in relation to gay male desire, ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and use these variations as ways to 
begin to (psycho)analyse them through jouissance.  
In Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) in which he addresses the tensions 
allied to conscious and unconscious drives he famously asserts that ‘a dream is a 
(disguised) fulfilment of a (suppressed or repressed) wish’ (in Wollheim,1971, p.66). 
In his analysis of this dynamic and more so in his conceptualisation of the ‘dream-
work’ Freud begins by extracting several layers of the ‘dream’ to position its 
importance. Firstly he asserts that the dream contains both manifest content as ‘that 
which we experience and remember’ (ibid, p.68) as well as ‘latent content connected 
to those ‘dream-thoughts’ that ‘gives the dream its sense or meaning’ (ibid). In this 
way he positions latency and manifestation as intersectional rather than binary forms 
and this goes some way to forming the exchanges developed later in Lacan’s work. 
More specifically in Freud’s paper ‘The Unconscious’ (1915) and the ‘discussion of 
the difference between ‘word-presentations’ (Wortvorstellungen) and ‘thing-
presentations’ (Sachvorstellungen) (Bowie, 1991, p.50) he underlines the contention 
that when ‘words’ and ‘things’ as ‘presentations’ or more specifically ‘word-things’ 
(ibid, p.51) converge in the dream-work they are ‘intensified and mobilised by desire’ 
only to be pulled apart again through the processes of the preconscious and conscious 
which are in some ways external to the ‘dream’.  
Here we see that Freud employs ‘such notions as translation, transcription, inscription 
and paraphrase in describing movements between one mental ‘zone’ or ‘level’ and 
another’ (ibid, p.70). In turn, these inform how the ‘fundamental mechanisms of the 
dream-work – Verichtung (‘condensation’) and Verschiebung (‘displacement’)’ (ibid) 
can be aligned to the linguistic modes of metaphor and metonymy in Lacan and more 
so questions about the nature of jouissance and whether or not its unconscious vectors 
conceptualised in ‘Bodies that Stutter’ are subject to the Symbolic structures of 
grammar, language, and syntax in language. This also adds credence to the Lacanian 
claim that the relationship between these forms indicate ‘that the unconscious is 
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structured like a language’ (Grigg, 2008, p.151) whilst also alerting us to the notion 
that this unconscious ‘has no existence outside of language and no structure other than 
the one language affords’ (Bowie, 1991, p.71). In other words the tensions between 
conscious and unconscious are expressed through the exchanges between 
condensation / displacement and metaphor / metonymy ‘operating without 
intermission’ (ibid) or within a continuum of ‘unconscious mechanisms’ (Fink, 2002, 
p.5) that bear down on a subject’s jouissance and within the context of this project how 
their body stutters.  
A key component of the Freudian ‘dream-work’ is the initial idea that ‘the dream lacks 
that which is most characteristic of language: grammar or structure’ (Wollheim, 1971, 
p.69) yet as this is developed and more specifically aligned to the operations of 
condensation and displacement it becomes more apparent how they form a 
‘complementary axes for the production and transformation of meaning […] to 
perceive structural regularities in a domain that could otherwise easily appear as an 
ineffable mental flux’ (Bowie, 1991, p.57). In Freud condensation is formed in relation 
to the dream and relies upon ‘the formation of composite or intermediate figures’ 
(Wollheim, 1971, p.69) which ‘prevents there being any neat one-one correspondence 
between the elements of the manifest content and those of the latent content’ (ibid). 
An overarching feature of condensation is its relation to metaphor and its position as 
‘a trope of resemblance’ (ibid) as well as that which is similar or analogous to 
something or someone. Yet this metaphorical possibility can only be expressed 
and ’accounted for in terms of […] semantic relations within language’ (Grigg, 2008, 
p.155) which also involve metonymy. In this way metonymy that involves ’the 
substitution of (the sign of) the part, cause, container’ (ibid) is always allied to 
metaphor and its impact as a semantic and syntactical counterpart.  
Displacement is closely allied to metonymy and in Freud it is often positioned as a 
form of substitution that in the unconscious has the power to veer condensation off-
course and within the dream-work a force that may be associated with ‘the disguise 
that the dream wears’ (Wollheim, 1971, p. 70). It also has the potency to ‘shift 
[meaning] away from the central point […] to an inversion of emphasis’ (Ricoeur, 
2008, p.93) towards one that is formed through unpredictable and enigmatic 
contiguity. Freud’s condensation and displacement are permeated with contradiction, 
but this is also their conceptual strength. Their significance and adaptation by Lacan 
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into metaphor and metonym can be synthesised in such a way to ‘demystify the 
unconscious itself’ (Bowie, 1991, p.71) whilst also serving to reinforce that 
‘condensation means compression, [and] displacement means transference of forces’ 
(Ricoeur, 2008, p.93) in both the unconscious and in language. Like metaphor and 
metonym, condensation and displacement function as ‘methods of distortion […] 
which are imposed on thoughts or wishes as the condition of their entry to 
consciousness’ (Wollheim, 1971 p.164), yet also ‘can be regarded as inherent 
characteristics of unconscious mental activity’ (ibid). Just as the joke or the slip of the 
tongue in Freud are something ‘dipped momentarily in the unconscious’ (ibid), we also 
see in Lacan’s Imaginary-Symbolic relationship and perhaps more so through 
jouissance a simultaneously formal and erratic form of expression.  All of these 
unconscious expressions could be allied to linguistic and/or bodily ‘stutters’ that rely 
upon the tensions between condensation / displacement and metaphor / metonymy to 
articulate something of their desire. More specifically we could suggest that the 
productive uncertainties of both Freud’s and Lacan’s dyads are imbued in ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ and their relationship to the unconscious.  
 
Lacan, by locating sexuality in relation to language and desire, is able to position 
sexuality (with its connectedness to desire, language and the unconscious) awry, in 
light of the potency of metonymic movement and transition, as opposed to metaphoric 
equivalence and necessity.  To the extent that desire is not fixed, so sexuality is less 
about the essence of the subject or ego and more about how the subject’s relations to 
desire are never fixed or wholly static.  It is within ‘The Function and Field of Speech 
and Language in Psychoanalysis’ (2003 [1953]) that Lacan writes that ‘man’s desire 
finds its meaning in the desire of the other, not so much because the other holds the 
key to the object desired, as because the first object of desire is to be recognised by the 
other’ (2003, p.64).  Now, whilst this notion of specifically homosexual recognition 
and intersubjective communication is problematic (i.e. the metonymic axis to which 
desire is linked can never finalise itself), Lacan implies, nonetheless, that any desire 
might be my specific desire, but that it ceases to be specific when it connects to the 
desire of the ‘other’.  Here, the subject’s explicit desire to this other is more to do with 
a series of Imaginary identifications rather than one coherent identity. For example, in 
all three of the contextual instances discussed in this thesis, the gay male subject 
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identifies with a potentially infinite number of sexual representations through the 
photographic signifier, online and in pornography, which are similar to constructed 
and condensed   as metaphorical images of gay desire.   
As Lacan states, ‘I shall designate as metonymy, then, the one side (versant) of the 
effective field constituted by the signifier, so that meaning can emerge there’ (2003, 
p.173).  For example, in the sexual imagery examined in the later chapters we see this 
in the ways that an image metonymically seduces the other into taking the part (of an 
object, a body) for the whole identity of the subject.  They exist outside of the image 
because they are ‘Symbolically Other’ to all of the men who chose to click on the 
image, yet they also remain precariously personal to the other who lives with them and 
possesses them.  Whilst capturing the image of himself in the mirror for the other to 
‘see’, the subject also manages to photograph a number of contrasting objects and body 
parts through a series of misaligned angles that metonymically Other him and embed 
his jouissance in the Symbolic.  He remains something (‘it’) rather than someone (‘I’) 
and his personality is silenced through the impersonality of the image he has just 
captured.   
 
Building on this dialogue between Freud and Lacan queer theorists like  Edelman 
(1994) as the feature of language that imparts ‘a powerful tropological imperative that 
needs to produce a visual emblem […] for the “singular nature” that now defines or 
identifies a specifically homosexual type of person’ (p. 8).  In this way metaphor can 
be formulated in relation to an equation whereby one entity or ‘emblem’ (e.g. x) is 
compared or likened to a separate identity (e.g. y) as a tactic to locate ‘the arbitrary 
slippages characteristic of metonymy into units of “meaning” that register as identities 
or representational presences’ (ibid, p.9).  In this way metonymy ‘can only generate 
“meaning” in the context of a logocentric tradition that privileges metaphor as the 
name of the relationship of essence, the paradigmatic relationship that invests language 
with “meaning”’ (ibid, p.8)   Yet, it is metonymy that makes clear that the identity is 
always displaced and formed on the basis of combinations that never terminate (e.g.  x 
could be a, b, c…).  A metaphor assumes in essential terms that x = y, so that one thing 
is literally another; ‘I am like you’ therefore ‘I am the same as you’.  In obstruction to 
this, a metonym is where a part stands in for the whole and, as a consequence, displaces 
the thing it is actually referring to (x = a, b, c…).  In this rhetorical ‘turn’, the tensions 
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between metonym and metaphor can be affiliated to notions of impersonality, 
identification, and the Symbolic Other’s alignment to jouissance, all of which disrupt 
the assumption that gay male desire is tangible and reducible to an object, an ‘other’, 
or a series of signifiers that represent that desire.   
 
For example, to appear as a selfie / self-representational post on tumblr.com, and for 
the subject to post it with the other’s jouissance in mind (having momentarily fulfilled 
his own), this image relies upon the Symbolic impersonality of an Other to position 
(for the Imaginary other) how desire is assumed and located in language. This Other 
remains impersonal because ‘it’ cannot be seen as a metaphoric substance or an 
identity, rather ‘it’ remains a metonymic part of a vast discursive language of gay male 
desire and its relation in language to semen and mirrors.  Yet, alongside of this, there 
is a sense that the metaphoric also challenges the metonymic because there is mutual 
anticipation and understanding that the other also ejaculates and also feels aroused by 
the image.  However, this veil of intimacy and empathy are only ever encountered 
through the metonymic Other of an image which is assembled through a chain of 
signifiers in language that both connect and displace via the discourse of tumblr.com.  
The images rely upon the ways in which these objects and identities converge in 
relation to an Other that is always outside of the frame and beyond the metaphoric 
power the other feels when he encounters the image.  In this case, selfies do not reflect 
gay identity through metaphor. Rather, they metonymically displace and stand in the 
place of an Imaginary other that has been constructed in the Symbolic.  
 
Building on this we can also see that a screenshot from the Triga Films homepage 
(Figure 2.2) demonstrates some of the tensions between metaphoric and metonymic 
approaches to desire and jouissance.  In the image, the advertisement for Screws: Extra 
Time (2013) appears along the top of the screen yet, after five seconds, dissolves into 
another advert for similar features, such as Builders Piss-Up (2013) and Blokes down 
the Boozer (2013).  In contrast to this, there are two static images, below, which 
promote The Cock Inn (2013) and Gangland Cock (2013).  Here, the facilitators of gay 
male jouissance are provided through metaphors associated with tropes of straight and 
working class masculinity which range from organised crime and violence, the pub, 
manual labour, and the prison.  In the image and text for Screws: Extra Time (2013), 
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we read and see that ‘These Bad Lads get banged up…right up the arse!’  Here, the 
notion of a prisoner being ‘banged up’ in jail is metaphorically equated with them also 
being ‘banged up the arse’.  The panorama of a young chav behind bars, with two 
prison guards (‘screws’) holding him down, and another smoking and tensing his 
muscular arm as another guard stands beside him, also compares the identity of the 
guard and the relationality between guard and prisoner to the metaphor of the ‘screw’ 
and ‘screwing’.  Here, the notion of the ‘screw’ (prison guard) and the transposition of 
him ‘screwing’ the prisoner in ‘Extra-Time’ is condensed down further via the slang 
term ‘screwing’, associated with sexual penetration.  Yet, we also see that the 
metaphoric association between the guard and a screw is defined by a metonymic 
relation.  That is one where a fragment (a ‘screw’) stands in for the discourse of 
Screws: Extra Time and the polysemic signification of sex and jouissance between 
men in prison, the discourse of the prison, and its inter-textual alignment to the cultural 
production of gay pornography.  Here, the metaphors of personality and identity allied 
to ‘screws’ and screwing’ are transformed by metonymic identification into a series of 
impersonal identifications that displace what is actually being referring to.   
 
We can also see, on the homepage, that this works in terms of the The Cock Inn, where 
the allusion to the name of a pub is displaced by the signification of a cock entering 
‘into’ somebody, and also in the tagline for Gangland Cock, whereby ‘Bringin’ in 2014 
with a proper good bang’ both associates and shifts the slang meaning of anal sex as 
‘banging’ to the notion of the bang of a gangster’s gun.  Furthermore, the typography 
of the film’s title, within the image, has transposed the letter ‘L’ in ‘GANGLAND’ 
with an upright gun and, through the letter ‘O’ of ‘COCK’, we get to see an erect cock.  
Here, it is argued that it is not the metaphoric similarity between the cock and the gun 
that triggers meaning but rather the metonymic contiguity of both; here the partial 
object (the cock, the gun, and, at a broader level, even the production itself) stands in 
for infinite scope of gay male desire and jouissance.   
 
When desire works in this way and functions through metonymy and at the level of 
the Symbolic rather than the Imaginary, it is always something the subject strives for 
but can never grasp.  As a result, desire is ‘written’ and codified onto objects and 
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bodies through a series of displaced metonymic shifts which are reliant on the 
metaphor.  Through this we see that ‘it is   only within the logic of metaphor that 
metonymy as such can be “identified” and retroactively recognised as having “been” 
there from the start’ (ibid, pp. 8-9). David Halperin (1995) proposes that inherent 
problems emerge from metaphorically assigning gay/homosexual desire only as a 
binary resistance or subjugate to heterosexuality.  He suggests that homosexual 
identity should be wary of an ontological and metaphoric ‘mirror reversal’ or ‘pure 
one to one inversion’ of heterosexuality, and that a metonymically fuelled ‘reversal 
that takes us in a new direction’ (p.59-60) could mean that oppositional forms of 
identity subversively implode, so that the homosexual is somehow already integral to 
dominant power rather in direct conflict with it.   
 
This tension is dramatised within and across representations of male sexual desire, 
where there is an interplay between the metaphorical subject who imagines he ‘sees’ 
and the unseen metonymic Other who is unseen, seen askew, or misaligned to the 
other.  Once again, this is clear in Figure 2.2 where the gay porn consumer may well 
engage with the commodity of Triga and the commodification of an identity such as 
the chav through metaphor.  For instance, the metaphoric comparisons and alignments 
that may be made between hetero- and homosexual desire, in light of the relations 
between ‘dads and lads’ or ‘bad lads and screws’, are pornographically signified so 
that they appear to equate gay desire through straight male scenarios and signifiers that 
can be seen.  Yet, the key to desire and, more so, jouissance lies in how it is blocked 
and scuppered by metonymy.  Here, we do not actually ‘see’ the full depth and 
discursive scope of dads and lads or prisoners and guards having sex, of gay and/or 
straight identity and desire, and the subversion or assimilation of these forms within 
the young offenders home/prison; rather, we see ‘3 hours of classic Triga action’, 
which works as both a pornographic and metonymic substitute for this much broader 
aspect of gay and straight jouissance.    
The metaphors of both straight masculinity and the chav embedded in Figure 2.2 are 
positioned as the ones that accept, assume, and thus, strive to present and resolve the 
complexity of gay male desire.  Yet, what emerges from reading these images as 
metonymic, and via Lacan’s Symbolic Other, is that there is no personal resolution (of 
my desire as the ‘I’) because the impersonal (‘it’) can never finalise/complete that 
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desire.  Attempts to think of desire outside of the field of the ‘other’ are almost 
impossible to conceive because representations are inhibited by the Symbolic Other.  
This Other remains the metonymically ‘unseen’ index of desire in the sexual image; 
yet, it is through this Symbolic invisibility that the image falls prey to a metaphoric 
identity in which the subject envisages they can ‘see’ the Symbolic ‘it’, as the 
Imaginary ‘I’.   
 
By now, we can see that the strains between condensation and displacement and 
metaphor and metonymy are delineated by what can be named as an ‘Otherly’ 
seduction in sexually explicit imagery.  In the next part of this section, this is discussed 
through interventions which examine how discursive and cultural constructions of 
both hetero- and homosexuality rely upon an implicitly Symbolic impersonality and 
metonymy, as opposed to a series of metaphoric associations with a sexual 
self/personality.  This reinforces Lacan’s claims that ‘the creative spark of the 
metaphor does not spring from the presentation of two images, that is, of two signifiers 
equally actualised’ (2003, ibid). Rather, the metaphor relies on a form of metonymy 
that can take ‘the place of the other in the signifying chain’ (2003, ibid) because of ‘its 
metonymic connexion with the rest of the chain’ (2003, ibid). Lacan aligns (sexual) 
desire and jouissance with metonymy whilst also recognising that it is often 
(mis)recognised and (mis)understood as metaphor.  As Edelman also points out, 
‘sexuality cannot be identified with the metonymic without acknowledging that the 
very act of identification, through which it is constituted as sexuality, is already a 
positing of its meaning in terms of a metaphoric coherence and necessity’ (1994, p.8).  
Metonymic meaning is produced through the metaphoric essence of the signifier, 
which only produces meaning in ‘reference to a signified imagined as somewhere 
present to itself’ (ibid).  This indicates that the signification of desire points us in the 
direction of something that attempts to present a metaphorical subject as someone that 
reflects and is analogous to the other.  Yet, this signification is impossible in that the 
metonymic fragments render the metaphor an associative and displaced figure of 
Symbolic speech or inadequate component   of the ‘Other’ representation. Just as 
Lacan sees the metaphor as something that metonymically ‘flashes between two 
signifiers’ (2003, p.173) we can suggest that this ‘flash between’ inaugurates 
something of the representational space of gay desire. In turn, this becomes the space 
where ancillary and impersonal forms of jouissance assemble metonymically to 
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produce misleadingly metaphoric and ‘personal’ identities we both construct and 
sustain as gay. 
At this stage it is important to note that this thesis does not seek to dialectically position 
homosexual or heterosexual desire as metaphorically condensed or metonymically 
displaced, personal or impersonal, and also Imaginary or Symbolic.  Rather it seeks to 
recognise that it is through the exchanges, dependencies, and ambiguities between 
these forms that bodies stutter. As the first two sections of this chapter have 
demonstrated this is because the Imaginary and personalising metaphors of gay 
identity are riven by metonymic features in the Symbolic that can only be realised 
through a series of impersonal identifications.  Whilst this particular section has 
outlined the ways in which metaphors and metonymy are important to the formations 
of the Symbolic Other and Imaginary other, it is in the final section of this chapter that 
the impersonal nature of desire and jouissiance will be considered and conceptualised 
through the ‘bodies that stutter’ which have been referred to so far.  Through the 
conceptualisation of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ in relation to those that ‘matter’ and ‘mutter’ 
the intervention that this thesis is attempting to make is also developed in relation to 
the concept of ‘Symbolic-stuttering’. As well as this and in the next section, there is 
an inference on how jouissance may ‘stutter’ and signal towards an impersonality of 
language in the Symbolic that cannot define or foreclose an Imaginary or personal 
form of coherence and therefore cogent way of categorising or naming gay sexuality, 
identity, and desire because of this stuttering. 
2.5  Positioning Impersonality/Re-Positioning Gay Personality    
In The Oxford English Dictionary, the etymological origins of ‘impersonal’ as an 
adjective are derived from the late Latin word impersonalis, which combines the forms 
of ‘in’ (not, opposite to) and ‘personalis’ (personal).  In terms of grammar, it can be 
traced back to 1520, when it is cited as ‘if it be a verbe impersonal’ (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2014 [Online] Available from: http://tinyurl.com/nkz7hda [Accessed 
31/01/14]).  By 1620, ‘impersonal’ is also defined and ‘applied to other parts of speech 
which have no inflexions’ (ibid), as well as ‘not pertaining to or connected with any 
particular person or persons; having no personal reference or connection’ (ibid).  For 
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instance, in 1880, The Daily Telegraph reported that ‘the jewels and other 
appointments of the harem are quite impersonal, belonging to the establishment and 
not to any of their successive wearers’ (ibid).  Here the ways that the impersonal is 
‘not possessing or endowed with personality; not existing or manifested as a person’ 
(ibid) begins to demonstrate that there is a Symbolic and, thus, definitional limit in 
language to the term ‘personal’; this being the ‘impersonal’ adjective as ‘an impersonal 
thing or creature’ (ibid).    
Impersonality, as a noun, is a variant of impersonal, and refers to the feature described 
by the adjective.  Here, there is a linguistic paradox in that the expression of a subject’s 
impersonality is enabled through a personalising trope of identification with that 
subject.  It is also in the grammatical and semantic tensions between personality and 
impersonality that the terms themselves are expressed or reverberated as ‘words’ 
(Riley, 2005, p.25).  That is, as Symbolically impersonal words that can only be 
understood through their ‘truly impersonal quality’ (ibid) as words.  In so doing, the 
impersonality of the term itself in the Symbolic can be ‘return[ed] to the generality of 
utterance from whence it came […] to acknowledge its superb and sublime capacity 
to take me or leave me’ (ibid).  This directs the countenance of impersonality towards 
a psychoanalytic expression of an impersonal subject as ‘it’ rather than ‘I’.  In so doing, 
this also locates that subject as a Symbolic rather than an Imaginary concern within 
psychoanalysis.  This occurs because ‘it’ does not have a clear subject, which alerts us 
to its Symbolic impersonality both in, and of language.  Whereas ‘I’ seems to address 
and refer to a subject that is ‘personal’ and thus configured as Imaginary. However if 
both ‘it’ and ‘I’ are considered through the Symbolic force of language and articulated 
in ways which are impersonal we begin to see that ‘I’ also has the capacity position 
the subject impersonally in language.  
Deploying a formal use of the impersonal in language also depersonalises the 
characteristics of the writer’s personality.  Here, the seduction of personal pronouns, 
such as ‘I’, ‘you’, and ‘our’, are replaced by impersonal objects and, in English more 
specifically, impersonal verbs.  Impersonal verbs, which use the impersonal pronoun 
of ‘it’ (as in ‘it’s raining’, it’s sunny’, it’s windy’), are also those verbs in English that 
do not indicate any direct individual actions or personal incidences specific to a 
personalised grammatical subject.  They ‘have the subject it […and] do not form a 
sharply defined class’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 2014 [Online] Available from: 
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http://tinyurl.com/nkz7hda [Accessed 31/01/14]).  Rather, the impersonal verb lacks a 
coherent subject, and in so doing, alerts us through language to the impersonality of 
that to which it refers.  Here, the subject remains distant and implied rather than 
subjective and emotive.  When a personal pronoun, such as ‘I’, is displaced by an 
impersonal pronoun, such as ‘it’, the subject is once again impersonalised and 
expressed as something rather than someone.  We see the ambiguities in practice when 
someone (‘I’) is transposed into something (’it’) on a discourse such as the online 
‘personals’ website of dudesnude.com. Here the gay male subject may address, refer 
to, and engage with the other users as ‘someone’ through the use of personal pronouns 
(‘I think you’re hot’, ‘You are sexy’, ‘I want to suck your dick’), but these ‘I’s’ are 
only enabled through the construction of the user as an impersonal ‘something’ within 
the broader Symbolic dimensions of the language.  This occurs when the subject and 
the other are more obviously impersonalised with the pronoun of ‘it’ (‘it’s a sexy 
picture’, ‘it’s really turning me on’, ‘it’s so hot’). Whilst ‘it’ indicates that   the 
personality of the user has the potential to become impersonal, we also see that ‘I’ 
relies upon ‘it’ to personalise the other and desire in language.  
The construction of impersonality in language and how it is allied to gay male desire 
in psychoanalysis can be situated through Freud’s paper “On Narcissism: An 
Introduction” (1914 [2012]).  Here, Freud suggests that the relationship between the 
processes of personal self-identification and an impersonal identification with the 
‘same’ may be dualistically expressed as homosexual/narcissistic love.  This love for 
the same gender and/or for the self is also mediated through tensions in language. 
These occur between the Symbolic as an impersonal force and the Imaginary as a 
personal expression of auto-eroticism with that gender and/or self (Dean, 2001).  In 
turn, this auto-eroticism and the transient satisfaction that the subject feels during a 
process such as masturbation are experienced as a personal pleasure, both embodied 
and experienced through the gendered body of that subject.  That is, a pleasure 
experienced as unique, specific, and intensely self-referential to the gay male subject.  
The notion that a love or desire for the same gender can be also be allied to a love for 
the subject’s own gendered and sexed body (in this case the masculine and the phallus) 
also positions narcissistic identification as one that occurs through a paradox of self-
pleasuring, self-anxiety, and ‘otherness’.  In the last century and in terms of a 
personality and/or identity, the homosexual narcissist that Freud is alluding to has also 
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been epistemologically constructed and ontologically identified as a person who is 
perverse, deviant, aberrant, or simply ‘ill’.  Homosexuals have been perceived as tied 
to, and restricted by, either a psychosexual/psychological stage, a specifically personal 
and subjectively nuanced narcissistic condition, or series of unresolved Oedipal 
conflicts (see summaries, for instance, in Lewes 1995; and Dean and Lane 2001a).  
This personification reflects how much thinking, therapy, and scholarship in the sphere 
of sexuality is dominated by identity-based models that metaphorically tie 
homosexuality to a narcissistic personality and thus pathology.  Just as the influence 
of Freud and psychoanalysis is ambiguous, rhetorical (as much as clinical) versions of 
psychoanalysis have found it difficult to resolve problems and confusions in the 
theorisation of matters concerning gay male sex, sexuality, gender, and desire in terms 
of a gay male personality. 
Homosexual narcissism and a narcissistic personality are also built around the 
contradictions riven through narcissistic and anaclitic object-choices (Dean, 2001, 
p.124). Here the fissures which exist between narcissism and anacliticism are relevant 
to the ways in which this chapter and the thesis more broadly addresses impersonality, 
metonymy, and ‘Bodies that Stutter’ as features of gay desire that through jouissance 
undermine the Imaginary-ego.  Dean differentiates between narcissism and 
anacliticism by stating that whilst ‘Anaclisis determines object choice based on 
parental care […] by contrast narcissistic object-choice entails a person loving (a) what 
he himself is, (b) what he himself was, (c) what he himself would like to be, or (d) 
someone who was once part of himself’ (ibid).  Here, the anaclitic self-discipline of 
object-choice is positioned in opposition and contrast to narcissistic self-satisfaction.  
These divisions of the anaclitic and the narcissistic self are supposed to correspond in 
Freud (1914) to the distinctions between homosexual narcissist and heterosexual 
anaclist as a personality or identity, yet we see, in every dimension of Lacan, that they 
begin to implode the moment the distinction is made.   
More specifically and in a similar way to the modification of condensation and 
displacement into metaphor and metonymy, we begin to see this in how Lacan re-
works Freud’s concept of narcissism in the Imaginary register and the mirror stage.  In 
the specular dimensions of the mirror, the narcissistic ego ‘discerns a subjective 
relation to otherness’ through the ‘ego’s identification with an image outside itself, a 
reflection’ (Dean, 2001, p.126); it is in this reflection that the refracted or shattered 
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self of the self-absorbed narcissist struggles to identify with and articulate a coherent 
personality through what is re-presented as an impersonal image of his narcissistic ego.  
This image becomes a continuous threat to the subject’s ego and their understanding 
of their own personality and the personalisation of the other.  This is the foundation to 
the analyses of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 and the ways in which they 
have the potential to point the gay ego in the direction of a shattering/stuttering of 
desire which might be realised beyond the physicality and presence of people.   
The potential that a shattered ego and ‘Bodies that Stutter’ have to undermine the 
Imaginary-ego is connected to what Bruce Fink identifies as ‘that Other kind of talk’ 
(1995, p.3); that is, the stuttering of an ego that is both sustained and disavowed by the 
Symbolic in language.  Here, the ‘words that are spoken, blurted out, mumbled, or 
garbled come from some other place, some other agency than the ego’ (ibid, p.3-4) 
and, thus, destabilise the ego.  In this thesis it is through this destabilisation of ‘words’ 
(and their translation through the signifier) that desire cannot be fully expressed and 
articulated.  These faltering and stuttering significations are the ones that can only be 
partially expressed via the Symbolic and jouissance.  They also form the stutters that 
position the aimless, random, and obtuse slips in language close to how desire is 
always expressed both metonymically and impersonally.  This approach to the 
impersonality of identity and ego can also be found in the critical reconsiderations of 
the narcissistic gay man in Edelman’s concept of ‘“narci-schism”’ (1994) and 
Bersani’s critical exploration of impersonal narcissism (1986, 1987, 1995, 2008), 
which push gay masculinity towards practices of narcissism outside of the gay male 
ego and its Imaginary other.   
Edelman’s theory of theory of ‘“narci-schism”’ (1994, p.108-110) adds another 
dimension to what has been developed so far because it suggests that the active 
(heterosexual) subject differentiates himself from the non-differentiation of the gay 
narcissist through the process of ‘“narci-schism”’ (ibid, p.110).  Edelman understands 
that there is an Imaginary relation between the narcissistic gay subject and the mirror 
as constitutive of gay subjectivity, and, in turn, gay desire.  Yet, as Edelman argues, 
this is also the foundation for an alternative notion of gay subjectivity or activism that 
would involve a self-disciplined depersonalisation of narcissism as “narci-schism”, so 
that ‘the luxurious “passivity” derided as “narcissism”, that signifies the erotic 
indulgence of the [gay] self that always threatens to undo the “self”’ (1994, p.110) is 
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either undermined or removed.  In this instance, “narci-schism”, which is assimilated 
from the ‘erotic mode of the dominant [straight male] subject’ (ibid) as self-
disciplinary, has the potential to simultaneously reposition the gay male narcissist and 
his capacity as a ‘mirror bound narcissist[s] reviled for a passivity’ (ibid, p.108) as a 
‘narci-schisist’.  That is, the gay subject who moves beyond his Imaginary-ego and the 
metaphors of gay identity towards a way of expressing his subjectivity (and 
jouissance) Symbolically and impersonally.  For instance, in the discourse of Triga 
Films, we see how gay masculinity holds the potential for “narci-schism”, through its 
simultaneously ambivalent assimilation and subversion of hyper-straight masculinity.  
In these productions, the nuances of a narcissistic and Imaginary gay ego jostle with 
those of the straight anaclist.  In this way the films produced by Triga shape a 
representational ‘schism’ which allows ‘Bodies that Stutter’ to sway between straight 
and gay masculinity. In turn, the tensions between the Symbolic and jouissance 
developed above also allow the subjects and the consumers of the pornographic text 
to both negate and affirm gay and straight masculinity as ‘narci-schisist’.  More 
broadly and in terms of how the argument is being developed this alerts us to the ways 
in which masculinity is subjugated by an Imaginary narcissism and the ego, but also 
one that has the potential to use the Symbolic to reposition how desire and jouissance 
are realised and expressed.    
In this way, the potential ruptures that the ‘narci-schisist’ and “narci-schism” instil can 
also contribute to considerations allied to narcissism and the Imaginary subject of 
desire seen in Bersani’s theory of a ‘self-shattering’ of the ego and subjectivity 
(Bersani, 1987, p.222).  This shattering can be understood as a conceptualisation of 
the ‘self’ that Bersani recognises via Freud’s assertions that the narcissistic 
‘sexualising of the ego is identical to the shattering of the ego’ (2008, p.66).  In ways 
which will be developed and embedded in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 we see that this self-
shattering can be allied to ‘Bodies that Stutter’ because both ‘bring[s] subjects together 
only to plunge them into a self-shattering and solipsistic jouissance that drives them 
apart’ (ibid, p.96).  By aligning a shattering of the ego to a stuttering of the body it is 
also useful to think about how in his early use of the terms, Bersani used shattering as 
a device to imagine gay masculinity ‘in which […] the self is exuberantly discarded’ 
(1987, p.217-18).  Aligning this to how metonymy, impersonality, desire, and 
jouissance are being positioned in this thesis also emphasises how the personal 
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nuances of the Imaginary and its narcissism in the mirror stage lead us to claims that 
it is through the self-shattering of the ego, and through the ego’s own struggles with 
narcissistic and ‘narci-schisistic’ desire, that something Besrani constitutes as 
‘“impersonal narcissism” begins to make its own insensible sense’ (Bersani and 
Phillips, 2008, p.92).  In this setting, impersonal narcissism engages with what Bersani 
refers to as ‘a certain type of failure in Freud’s thought’ (1986, p.3) and, more 
specifically, Freud’s concept of narcissism.  Bersani believes that these failures (in 
Freud but also in psychoanalysis more generally) can produce ‘a process of theoretical 
collapse’ (ibid, p.2-3) that should be embraced ‘because of those errors’ (Kollias, 2013, 
p.992).   
Impersonal narcissism also builds upon another of Bersani’s earlier concepts of 
‘homo-ness’, in which he suggests a ‘redefinition of [gay] sociality so radical that it 
may appear to require a provisional withdrawal from relationality itself’ (1995, p.7).  
At this point it is possible to  position impersonality alongside of a ’homo-ness [that] 
offers an anti-identitarian identity’ (ibid, p.101), in which homosexual desire for the 
‘same’ allies itself to an unconscious ‘difference’ already riven into the homosexual 
subject’s ego.  An impersonality of desire is also close to how homo-ness may well 
allow for homosexual (and indeed heterosexual) desire to position homo-ness as the 
‘privileged model of sameness – one that makes manifest not the limits but the 
inestimable value of relations of sameness, of homo-relations’ (ibid, p.6-7).  In turn, 
this also works against the ‘narcissism of a securely mapped ego’ (ibid, p.125) and the 
location of a narcissistic homosexual identity.  Homo-ness indicates that 
homosexuality and desire are infused with ‘an impersonal sameness ontologically 
incompatible with analysable egos’ (ibid), which both energises and eradicates the 
possibility of gay male personality, identity, and self-hood.  If we once again use Triga 
Films to illustrate this point, we can see that this occurs in terms of how these ‘homo-
relations’ may be articulated.   
In the third scene of the production Dads and Lads Weekender (2010), a group of five 
straight young ‘lads’ are watching straight pornography the night before an important 
football match.  As the narrative of the scene evolves, the lads begin to masturbate in 
front of one another whilst making reference to how they would fuck the female 
subjects of the porn film they are watching.  Here, the identification with straight lads 
watching straight porn and the invigoration of jouissance is not securely performed 
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through an anaclitic straight male ego or a narcissistic form of gay identification.  
Rather, as the scene develops and the ‘straight lads’ move into a series of sexual 
encounters with one another, which centre around a straight lad being penetrated by a 
dildo and sucked off by another lad (Figure 2.3), we see that there is a transition from 
the personal positions of anaclitic identity and narcissistic desire discussed earlier, 
towards the nuances of impersonal desire that are more usefully positioned through 
Edelman’s “narci-schism”,  Bersani’s self-shattering and impersonal narcissism, as 
well as  the‘Bodies that Stutter’ in this thesis.  This occurs because the expression of 
straight identity and gay desire simultaneously schism, shatter, and stutter when they 
are realised as jouissance. In this instance gay and/or straight desires (as anaclitic, as 
narcissistic) in the Imaginary are rendered as a series of Symbolic amalgamations 
which displace and undermine the ego. As a result, jouissance is connected to a 
Symbolic form of relationality that ‘require[s] a provisional withdrawal from [both 
homo and hetero] relationality itself’ (ibid, p.7).  More so, the scene (and most of the 
output from Triga) disavows discernible gay identities and personalities as anaclitic 
and/or narcissistic to frame gay desire in terms of a sexual sameness both determined 
and abstracted by both hetero- and homosexuality yet, ultimately, manifested through 
series ‘of “homo-relations”’ (1995, p.7) that find their place in the schism, the shatter, 
and the stutter of jouissance.  In this way the impersonal nuances of jouissance and 
the relations of sexual sameness between straight and gay male forms collapse into 
each other so that ‘clearly delimited and coherent identities […] become suspect’ (ibid, 
p.3).   
Hector Kollias (2013) suggests that it is within the suspicions between gay and straight 
masculinities that ‘Bersani discovers ‘a narcissistic pleasure that sustains human 
intimacy, that may be the precondition for love of the other’ (p.992).  This relation 
between self and other, which Bersani develops out of homo-ness and situates as 
‘impersonal narcissism’, is something that cannot be understood by the self as a 
narcissistic ego conveyed through personality.  Rather, to grasp the impersonality of 
the ego and, thus, impersonal narcissism, Kollias suggests that narcissism has to be 
transposed into ‘a perfect knowledge of otherness’ (ibid).  In this instance, that 
otherness is understood through Bersani’s claim that, rather than a love of the self or 
of persons, the kernel of impersonal narcissism is ‘object-love as self-love’ (1987, 
p.53-4).  That is, a love or a desire for an impersonal object or identity that can only 
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be understood outside of ‘the formation of the self-congratulatory ego’ (ibid, p.34).  
The couched desire for pornography, the desire for the vast rhetoric of sexual 
representation on tumblr.com, and the desire to engage in ‘personal’ networks of image 
and language exchange on dudesnude.com go some way towards this because they 
resituate the gay male narcissist as impersonally narcissistic, and, at their core, they 
allow and encourage the gay subject to desire impersonally and impersonally desire.     
These shifts in the theory and analysis of the narcissistic gay man as a person or a 
personality are also the result of how we might understand jouissance as an attempt to 
articulate an Imaginary personality through the impersonality of the Symbolic Other.  
By locating sex and gender outside of the Imaginary-ego or that which is imagined as 
uniquely individual, Lacan begins to highlight how desire is mediated in terms of the 
Symbolic (or an impersonal pronoun such as ‘it’, impersonal tropes, objects, texts etc.) 
and not on the basis of the subject’s personality or the other’s ‘subjective’ identity.  As 
Dean observes, whilst the ‘classical, poetic Figure’ of the mirror and ‘its seductive 
lure’ (2000, p.38) are useful tropes connected to narcissism, it is also vital to remember 
that mirrors and the Imaginary identifications associated with them are understood by 
what we do not see in them (ibid).  In Lacan, the gay male narcissist is prevented from 
fully seeing himself as a person and thus personalising his own reflection by ‘fact of 
the ambivalence proper to the ‘partial drives’’ (2003, p.27), which are connected to 
homosexuality.  The Symbolic ensures that the subject can never freely or fully 
personalise their identity, and, even if they attempt to, it is inevitable that the process 
of self-capturing or self-representing the identity will always remain incomplete.  
Lacan understands narcissism through its vacillation of the reflection in the mirror, as 
well as the dangers of reading a narcissistic identity as subject to ‘the stereotyped, 
ceremonial formalism of the aggressivity that is manifested in them’ (ibid).  In this 
thesis, this stereotypical formation of gay identity, which is often presented as gay 
desire, is reiterated and repeated in the construction of the identity as personal, as 
opposed to impersonal.  It is also examined through the possibilities that jouissance 
can bring to the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and the potentiality of a fractured “narci-schism”, 
and shattered Imaginary-ego.    
 
As well as this, it is the Symbolic impersonality of jouissance in language and its 
relation to the Imaginary-ego of the other that yields the power to overcome the 
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narcissistic ego.  So far, the interventions of both Edelman and Bersani have suggested 
that the gay male subject is capable of new formations of identity by rupturing this 
narcissistic-ego of the self and the other via impersonality and jouissance.  At this 
point, it is also useful to understand the potential of this breach through Dean’s notion 
of the ‘impersonality of desire’ (2000, p.240).  Here, Dean links the psychoanalytic 
unconscious and its ‘loss of mastery or decentring’ (ibid) to Guy Hocquenghem’s 
notion of (homosexual) desire as dehumanising (1972 [1993]).  Hocquenghem 
suggests that gay culture (or more specifically the gay movement) ‘pushes capitalist 
decoding to the limit and corresponds to the dissolution of the human; from this point 
of view, the gay movement undertakes the necessary gay dehumanisation’ (1993, 
p.145).   
 
These dehumanising practices are riven through capitalism’s drive to depersonalise 
gay identity to the extent that it is ‘condensed into a cultural signifier’, so that ‘the 
[gay-self] as commodity remains securely fetishised’ (Hennessey, 2000, p.128) and 
reduced through repetition and signification to an image of itself.  When the gay male 
body as signifier is signified as a sign of gay personality, then gay identity, itself, is 
assembled as an impersonal trace of that person and their personality.  The broader 
and instantaneous processes of pornographic and/or self-representation examined in 
this project add to this when they position desire in terms of a ‘de-ego-ization’ (Dean, 
2000, p.241), occurring between self and ego through the construction of such 
representations.  By way of this, the ‘speculative formation of the ego’, as produced 
through identifications that, as a consequence of their illusoriness, are bound to be 
frustrating’ (ibid, p.39), begin to collapse.  Just as Lacan himself maintains that “[T]he 
unconscious is the unknown subject of the ego” (ibid), it also acts as a space in which 
the formation of the ego as both a seductive and deceptive personality is shaped 
through its own impersonality.   
 
The Freudian and Lacanian theories discussed here, and ‘queered’ by scholars such as 
Dean, Edelman, and Bersani, demonstrate how the gay subject as a subject of desire is 
torn between personal and impersonal paradigms in the search of jouissance.  
Accounting for the ways in which narcissism, impersonality, and jouissance have been 
positioned in this chapter, we also see that all three contextual instances are 
problematic when they are identified as personalising spaces where desires are 
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represented and expressed impersonally.  Personal websites, pornographic media, and 
social networks all promote and espouse the line that there is such a thing as an 
identifiable gay man with subjective and common desires.  Yet, they also produce and 
facilitate a cultural space where the men who do not conform or recognise themselves 
in terms of a gay personality, identity, and/or ‘gay object choice’ can pursue sexual 
pleasure impersonally.   
 
This index of impersonal anonymity remediated through earlier gay male sexual 
practices, such as cruising, is also intrinsic to the clandestine and enigmatic pursuit 
and signification of desire online.  In work that examines cruising and gay sex as 
impersonal in social spaces, such as bath-houses, saunas, public parks, and tearooms 
(men’s public bathrooms where gay sex occurs), there is clear evidence of this 
anonymity (Humphreys, 1970; Weinberg and Williams, 1975; Gove, 2000).  
Humphrey’s work is particularly well known for recognising that impersonal sex in 
tearooms involves sex for ‘a minority of whom are active in the homosexual 
subculture’ (1970, p.11) as well as ‘a large group [...] who have no homosexual identity 
at all’ (ibid).  In these often silent and transient spaces, gay and straight identities 
understood through personality and/or recognisability have the capacity to disintegrate 
and impersonalise themselves.  Weinberg and Williams also identify ‘a basic model of 
the social organisation of impersonal sex’ (1975, p.125), which sets out a core of ideas 
around the characteristics of impersonal sex and how it destabilises sexual desire as 
personal.  They state that;  
 
a pure case of impersonal sex would be sexual activity without any personal 
involvement whatsoever between sexual partners.  In effect none of the aspects of a 
primary relationship would appear.  The inter-change would be easily transferable 
from one partner to another and narrowly confined in its social depth and breadth; the 
partner would be a means to an impersonal, purely sexual, objective (ibid)   
 
This earlier rhetoric of impersonal sex that involves ‘sex without commitment, 
obligation or a long-term social relationship’ (Weinberg and Williams, ibid), as well 
as sex that is pursued impersonally ‘as an end in itself’ (ibid), can be allied to the earlier 
claims around the schisms, shatters, and stutters that shape how an impersonality of 
(gay) desire antagonises and undercuts the ego.  These impersonal cruising practices 
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of gay men could also be aligned to how the ‘mirroring machismo […] specific to a 
particular sex/gender dynamic frequently’ (ibid) is ‘(not always) at work when […] 
gay men cruise one another’ (Gove, 2000, p.109).  In other words, cruising can also be 
understood as something that is not ‘exotically specific to, or originating from, gay 
men’ (ibid).  If something like cruising is considered in this way,   and narcissism is 
repositioned through ‘Bodies that Stutter’ in light of “narci-schism”, homo-ness, self-
shattering, and impersonal narcissism, older gay practices, such as cruising, may also 
be understood as fundamental to the displacement of a gay ego and personality.  A 
lack of personal knowledge of the ‘other’ through an impersonal sexual encounter, 
such as cruising, and the identification with an impersonal sexual partner shatters the 
narcissistic self (as gay, as straight) and undermines the discursive and strategic social 
practices associated with a gay sexual identity and ego.   
 
Dean suggests that it is online or, more broadly, through the private consumption of 
pornography and sexual communication that ‘everyone’s pleasure diminishes’ (2009, 
p.193).  Just as ‘the privatisation of public space homogenises pleasure’ (ibid), gay 
male processes of cruising, notions of the stranger, and paradigms of silence and 
anonymity also ‘narrow[ed] into more-privatised spaces’ (ibid) and transformed ‘the 
erotic possibilities latent in an encounter with otherness’ (ibid, p.179).  In the detailed 
discussions of dudesnude.com, Triga Films, and tumblr.com, gay men often rely upon 
the impersonal signification (which can only occur through the impersonality of the 
signifier itself) of ‘straightness’ and the ambivalence attached to both the straight 
‘other’ and ‘Other’ in an attempt to locate and enunciate jouissance.  We also see, in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, there is no definable narrative or clear way in linguistics and 
language to locate homosexuality.  Rather, the ‘self’ as both subjective and subordinate 
is ‘dominated by a [Symbolic] law which he does not create but which creates him’ 
(Weeks, 1993, p.27).   
 
Yet, in relation to this, there is also the notion the Symbolic fortifies discourses linked 
to masculine/feminine and gay/straight which seem to entangle the subject in tropes 
aligned to the personal nature of sexual role, identity, citizenship, marriage, and civil 
rights (Bawer, 1993; Adam, 1995; Warner, 1999; Bell and Binnie; 2000, Rimmerman; 
Wald and Wilcox (eds.), 2000; Rimmerman and Wilcox (eds.), 2007).  This is how 
erroneous versions of gay epistemology and ontology continue to be perpetuated, 
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developed, and sustained as hetero- (straight) and homo- (gay) sexual bodies and 
identities.  As we will also see in the contextual chapters, whilst the return to psychic 
and social identifications have the potential to undermine and question the kernel of 
identity and desire, they also possess the power to continue the project of (sub) 
cultural/queer identity politics, which suggests sustain ‘(gay) sexualities which 
participate in the logic of the commodity and help support neo-liberalisms 
mystifications’ (Hennessey, 2000, p.109).  The contexts of online profiles, 
pornography, blogging, and self-representational photography all connect to this way 
of expressing ‘gay desire’, also identified by Hocquenghem, which relies upon 
capitalism ‘in a multiple form’ and renders jouissance ‘only divisible a posteriori, 
according to how we manipulate it’ (1993, p.50).  Also, terms that have emerged out 
of the queer moment, like ‘post-gay’ (Sinfield, 1998), ‘anti-gay’ (Simpson, 1999) or 
‘post-queer’ (Ruffolo, 2009; Halley and Parker, 2011), may also offer a way of 
grouping these relational, differentiated and excluded identities in conventional and 
coherent ways; ways that function perfectly in capitalist societies of consumption that 
‘manufacture[s] homosexuals’ (Hocquenghem, 1993, p.50) as personalities through 
impersonal modes of representation.  
 
2.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the ways in which ‘Bodies that Stutter’do so through forms 
of jouissance and the relationship that this has to the metonymy and impersonality of 
a Symbolic Other. These are the bodies that have been developed out of Butler’s ones 
that matter and Dean’s ones that mutter to suggest that there may be a way to conceive 
of a body that involves both because it stutters. Whilst the bodies that matter are allied 
to the Imaginary and the bodies that mutter gravitate towards the Real, the ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ are most productively understood through the Symbolic and the Symbolic 
Other that allows and encourages them to falter when they are signified through a 
convergence of explicit sexual imagery, limitless clicks of a mouse, uncertain re-
bloggings of imagery, and the hesitant coordination of self-capturing, cropping and 
posting examined later.  These ‘Bodies that Stutter’ are also reliant on the personality 
of the subject that is displaced by the impersonality of the signifier.  In this way, the 
Imaginary ‘signifier takes the subject’s place, standing in for the subject who has now 
vanished’ (Fink, 1995, p.41) in the Symbolic.  As a result, we may well suggest that 
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when desire is constructed as an Imaginary other of desire, there is the potential that 
the Symbolic Other of jouissance has already been eliminated.  Yet, when bodies 
stutter and ‘the subject appears only as a pulsation, an occasional impulse or 
interruption that immediately dies away or is extinguished’ (ibid), then there is also 
the possibility that speech, language, and the operations of the personal/impersonal 
and the metaphoric/metonymic reenergise jouissance’s pleasurable self-destruction 
through stuttering.   
For ‘Bodies that Stutter’ to stutter there needs to be a particular set of tensions in place. 
These are reliant upon the dynamics between personal and impersonal modes and 
metaphorically condensed and metonymically displaced tropes in both language and 
representation. Also in this chapter the example of Narcissism derived from Freud and 
then resituated in light of Edelman’s concept of “narci-schism” and an amalgamation 
of Bersani’s homo-ness, self-shattering and impersonal narcissism prove a useful way 
to firstly reposition gay male desire, but also to connect to the potential of gay ‘Bodies 
that Stutter’ which may well find pleasure and jouissance in their own disintegration. 
These interventions and the implications that are developed in relation to the effects 
that the schism, shattering, and stuttering have on an Imaginary other, an Imaginary 
ego, and also a gay identity have also shaped an argument that locates schism, 
shattering, and stuttering via the Symbolic Other and its capacities to impersonalise 
and metonymically displace gay desire in various ways.  
This chapter has set out to position a theoretical body of work and a conceptual 
framework in which the key issues of impersonality, desire, and jouissance can be 
understood and analysed through the nuances of personal and impersonal desire and 
metaphoric and metonymic positions in language.  This also sets up a framework in 
which the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ can be placed and as we shall see analysed in detail. In 
some ways, the third chapter turns the issues allied to impersonality, desire, and 
jouissance and the Symbolic  ‘Bodies that Stutter’  in on themselves as it moves 
towards a methodological and ethical interpretation of epistemological and 
(non)ontological accounts of gay masculinity, impersonality, and desire and 
jouissance.  Through this approach, it also goes on to discuss issues of gay subjectivity 
and identity in ways which may stutter when they are aligned to the Symbolic and 
jouissance in terms of a methodological, ethical, and analytical line of investigation. 
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Figure 2.1 – The Imaginary-Symbolic Scheme  
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Chapter 3: Mapping Modalities of Jouissance, ’Bodies that Stutter’ 
and Symbolic-Stuttering 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers a methodological approach to the questions of metonymy, 
impersonality, desire, and jouissance discussed in the previous chapter.  Here, these 
issues and their alignment to the concepts of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-
stuttering will be discussed in relation to the construction of gay male ontological and 
epistemological meaning.  It firstly considers how the ancient philosophical tropes of 
Thumos, Logos, and Eros relate to jouissance.  By doing so, this allows the 
psychoanalytic argument aligned to why gay male desire ‘stutters’ when it is 
Symbolically expressed as jouissance to problematise how the philosophical subject 
of ontological and epistemological discourse is established.  These considerations then 
allow the methodological approach to turn notions of epistemological truth and 
ontological validity in on themselves.  As the chapter oscillates between the 
psychoanalytical concept of jouissance and methodological claims of how such an 
abstract and difficult term can be subject to methodological justification and 
pragmatism, the methodology itself may begin to ‘methodologically stutter’.  This is 
because its aim is to present a way of resolutely disrupting ontological and 
epistemological instances of reason, actuality, and logic to facilitate a reading of 
impersonality and gay masculinity in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 that follow.   
In the next sections of this chapter, which link the work of Freud and Descartes to 
‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-stuttering, it is argued that the gay male 
subject/subjects of visual representation, psychoanalysis, or within the conceptual 
tropes of philosophical discourse are riven by a paradox that unites them through the 
contradictory paradigms of metaphor and metonymy,  personality and impersonality, 
identity and identification, sameness and difference.  This paradox also informs an 
argument that explores the tensions of singularity and universality through the 
exchanges between an Imaginary other and Symbolic Other that are always diffident 
and hesitant when met with questions of a perceptible gay ontological identity and/or 
gay epistemological truth.  At this stage it is useful to position this ontological identity 
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as something that has been cultivated via ‘an ethos of lesbian and gay identity [as] […] 
a basis for a political ontology and epistemology’ (Blasius, 2001, p.62).  In this setting 
gay ontology relies upon forms of ‘self-disclosure, a public creation of the self in 
coming out, and also the identification of ones freedom to do so’ (ibid).  This alliance 
of freedom to gay ontology may also be positioned (and undermined) in light of what 
Sedgwick (1990) identifies an epistemological ‘crisis of homo/heterosexual definition 
[that] has affected our culture through its ineffaceable marking particularly of the 
categories secrecy/disclosure, knowledge/ignorance, private/public, 
masculine/feminine, majority/minority, […] [etc.]’ (p. 11).   
At this stage and in dialogue with the binary foundations of ontology and epistemology 
listed above a more precarious and doubtful ontology and epistemology of gay male 
identity may be initially situated as that which Sedgwick goes on to identify as a ‘nonce 
taxonomy’ (ibid, p.23).  This undercuts the notion of gay ontology and epistemology 
as coherent or consistent in that it asks for ontological and epistemological locations 
to be shifted and reshaped.  A nonce taxonomy, as a predicate for queer identity and 
queer theory involves ‘the making and unmaking and remaking and redissolution of 
hundreds of old and new categorical imaginings concerning all the kinds it may take 
to make up the world’ (ibid). Through this, ontological identities yield the potential to 
collapse into an ongoing series of identifications, whilst epistemological systems of 
knowledge that count as personal are broken down through impersonal markers that 
are difficult to account for. We see that when alternative ontological and 
epistemological approaches such as the nonce taxonomy are marked out, the nuances 
of ’Bodies that Stutter’ detailed in Chapter 2 and the modes metonymy, impersonality, 
desire, and jouissance that inflect and locate them may be explored in more detail.  
In addition to this standpoint, this chapter and the thesis as a whole takes an often 
contradictory application of social scientific, arts and humanities, cultural and media 
studies, and clinical knowledge regimes to provides a justification of how a 
methodology that visually examines non-ontological and indefinite epistemes of ‘gay’ 
knowledge allied to the body and desire can work.  Central to this approach are the 
’Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-stuttering, which allow for the ontological 
dimensions of the gay male subject and, in turn, the epistemological strategies that are 
used to map out visual representations of subjectivity and desire to be reconsidered. 
Whilst addressing ethical and methodological concerns allied to an analysis of gay 
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male desire this project also recognises how ontologically positioned identities 
facilitate the epistemological possibilities of understanding the gay male-self in 
relation to the key psychoanalytic paradigms previously discussed in Chapter 2, as 
well as those that underpin the analytical approach used in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.    
This allows psychoanalysis and philosophy to align closely but antagonistically.  The 
final sections of the chapter develop these philosophical insights in relation to the 
detailed exploration of key contextual practices of online ‘personals’ communication 
on dudesnude.com, pornographic representation in Triga Films, and networked self-
representation online on tumblr.com.  Through each, it is argued that the connections 
and contradictions intrinsic to the visualisation of an Imaginary other and ego are 
embedded in the epistemological and ontological dimensions of a Symbolic Other.  
This ‘Other’ renders both gay and straight masculinity more diverse and difficult to 
locate than they may have been or still are in alternative historical and cultural 
contexts.  It is suggested that, whilst the signifying practices at work in the 
representation of gay male identity, desire, and sexuality are bound to metaphor and 
personality, they also manifest an ambivalent index of metonymic impersonality.  In 
turn, this alerts us to the potential of reconsidering ontological and epistemological 
positions and methodological approaches to investigating gay (and straight) male 
desire and sexuality. 
3.2 Ontologies of Analysis: Positioning Thumos, Logos, Eros, and Jouissance 
This section provides a consideration of the philosophical foundations that underpin 
the thesis.  Just as the work presents a psychoanalytical intervention that explores the 
mediation and expression of gay male desire through jouissance, this chapter identifies 
the three key areas of Thumos, Logos, and Eros that connect to and underpin how the 
subject of gay desire has been constructed.  It also discusses the tensions between 
epistemological and ontological positions of gay sexuality and identity that ensue 
when psychoanalysis is used as a methodological tool.  The epistemological and 
ontological dimensions of the thesis are imperative because they provide the 
philosophical basis for the methodological purpose and analytical engagement of the 
thesis.  The three tropes of Thumos, Logos, and Eros have been formed and 
discursively interpreted through the epistemology of ancient Greek philosophy and the 
centrality of meaning in the works of Plato and Aristotle.  Assembling them in relation 
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to jouissance offers a way to proceed and potentially to affirm that this project strives 
towards a process of ‘replacing, or reconceiving the ground or the place of the thus 
preserved activity of philosophising’ (Cavell, 1987, p.388), which Freudian and 
Lacanian psychoanalyses also suggest is possible.  More specifically, the consideration 
of Thumos, Logos, and Eros will inform the historical and methodological framing of 
how a psychoanalytic approach to gay male desire and subjectivity is informed by 
other dimensions of ontology and self-hood in epistemes of philosophical discourse.   
In the next three sub-sections, each of the terms is explored through the paradigms of 
jouissance outlined in Chapter 2.  It is the aim of this part of the chapter to provide a 
basis for later methodological considerations allied to the impersonality of desire, the 
ethics of engaging with sexually explicit imagery, and the potentials of using online, 
pornographic, and ‘personal’ contexts that may happen ‘unsystematically and 
serendipitously’ (Adams, 2011, p.162).  It is anticipated that this approach, along with 
psychoanalysis, will energise and guide issues of gay male desire both through and 
beyond the ethnographic, qualitative, and empirical contexts of research in the field.   
In the Platonic model, the ontological and epistemological dimensions of reason and 
desire’s association to identity and selfhood are primarily underpinned and dominated 
by Thumos, which, in Phaedrus (2009 [c 370 BC]) and, later, in The Republic (2008) 
[c 370 BC]), can be interpreted and positioned as both spiritedness or physical and 
bodily desire.  In relation to Logos and Eros, this also begins to suggest a triadic way 
to situate the ontological dimensions of desire that psychoanalysis attempts to excavate 
and examine through the unconscious.  The passions, urges, and drives bound up in 
the relationship between Eros and Thumos also attempt to articulate and locate 
themselves in the Logos; in other words, language attempts to hold and locate the 
conditionality, ambivalence, and impersonality implicit in desire, reason, and 
subjectivity.  Here, philosophy’s insistence on the ‘priority of grammar […] over both 
what we call mind and what we call the world’ (Cavell, 1987, p.388) positions Logos 
at its core, and ‘if we call grammar the Logos’ (ibid) then we may begin to unpack 
how both philosophy and Thumos, Logos, and Eros serve to reiterate the chasm 
between displacement and condensation, and conscious and unconscious life, whilst 
acknowledging why the conditional, contradictory, and (im)personal contexts of sex, 
gender, and identity command further analysis and philosophical thought.   
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For example, the ‘untying’ of the tongue in response to a particularly traumatic 
experience or arousing dream during an individual’s psychoanalysis may produce yet 
more speech and yet more writing.  In other words, and in relation to the three 
contextual instances of visual and online representation in photography, pornography, 
and networked media, we will see in each how the (gay male) bodily and psychological 
processes of schism, shattering, and stuttering, instigate an excessive form of 
displacement and metonymic desire in pursuit of jouissance.  A desire also 
underpinned by moments of waiting, anticipating, and lacking.  Here, any attempts at 
an articulation of Thumos, Logos, and Eros are dependent on speech and grammar 
which can be related back to Lacan’s assertion that the unconscious is structured like 
language.  At this stage it is also important to note that in this way the Lacanian line 
of argument undertaken in the thesis follows that ‘language is that which makes up the 
unconscious’ (Fink, 1995, p.8) and that ‘language, as it operates at an unconscious 
level, obeys a kind of grammar, that is, a set of rules that governs the transformation 
and slippage that goes on therein’ (ibid, pp.8-9). As in psychoanalysis and 
psychoanalytical methods, the refinements to the potentially interminable meanings of 
the unconscious and language, desire, and reason, are made within the context of the 
speech of the clinic.  To the degree that sexuality and the attendant problems of 
personal/social identity have always occupied a central place in the speech of the 
analysand, so psychoanalysis in its earliest clinics sees Freud listening to speech 
(Logos) that is marked by the complex rhetorics of sex, gender, and identity (Thumos 
and Eros).  However, these methodological conditions of subjectivity and identity and, 
more specifically, ontological and epistemological ambiguity and irresolution are not 
in themselves a discourse to indulge in.  Nor are they evidence that both Plato and 
Aristotle’s, or Freud and Lacan’s concepts are applicable or relevant to methodological 
approaches that deem to be queer, innovative, avant la lettre, poststructuralist, or 
postmodern. 
3.2.1 Thumos and Jouissance 
To position these interventions, it is useful to illustrate how Barbara Koziak 
summarises Platonic Thumos as ‘the first philosophical treatment of spiritedness as the 
middle part of the human soul between reason and appetite’ (1999, p.1069).  This 
chiasmic ‘middle-part’ or ‘between’ state may well be where jouissance stutters to be 
recognised in the Imaginary or where the Symbolic desire to desire is attempted in 
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language.  She also identifies Thumos via a Homeric pattern that precedes the Logos 
and Eros in Aristotle and Plato, and manages to suggest that, whilst ‘sometimes an 
emotion or a drive appropriately translates Thumos, more often Thumos is the site, 
location, the interior mental but quasi-physical part where emotions happen’ (ibid, 
p.1073).  Here, we could suggest that Thumos is in some ways quasi-corporeal – in 
other words, it ‘matters’ (Butler, 1993) – and because it matters it is connected to a 
body and ego that seem to practise and sustain how desire is rhetorically expressed.  
This notion of Thumos as a compound of both objective and subjective elements, and 
material and abstract forms, also aligns it to an ontological self who, as Koziak goes 
on to suggest, consists of ‘three important features’ (Koziak, p.1080).  In summary, 
these features of Thumos could be seen as firstly, ‘the place in which most emotions 
occur’; secondly, Thumos is positioned as ‘more an organ than a disposition’, yet also 
with ‘an indeterminate status, somewhere between flesh and air’; thirdly, it is ‘a 
medium of human motivation, desire and movement’ (ibid, p.1080).  Here, Thumos 
connects to the ways in which jouissance defies signification and meaning because it 
also exists and remains as ‘the part that has effects without signifying’ (Fink, 1995, 
p.119).  In turn, this causes ‘jouissance effects’ (ibid, p.119), which relate to a 
‘“jouissing” substance that gets off and enjoys’ (ibid).  This intangibility of jouissance, 
alongside the fact that its signification ‘exceeds its significatory role’ (ibid), allows the 
subject of Thumos and of jouissance to ‘stutter’ between forms of spoken/non-spoken, 
condensed/displaced, metaphoric/metonymic, and personal/impersonal desires.   
Aligning this approach to the formulation of (gay male) subjectivity, reason and desire 
are also revealed in the id, ego, and super-ego in the Freudian unconscious and the 
Lacanian registers of the R,S,I.  Within this topography of desire, we also see that 
Thumos, like jouissance, begins to (mis)guide and navigate the ontological gay male 
subject as a persistently transitional and impermanent form.  It is also important to note 
here that the use of these triadic formulas (and more specifically the R,S,I) align 
themselves to the ways in which the contexts of pornography, photography, and online 
media converge and intersect.  In all of these conceptual and visual paradigms, how 
desire is configured as both a useless and useful construct is always underpinned by 
Lacan’s emphasis on ‘the nonsensical nature of the signifier’ (Fink, 1995, p.119) and 
how it ‘exceeds its symbolic function’ (ibid).  In particular, Lacan sees the relationship 
between this claim balanced precariously between language (speech) and jouissance 
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(non-speech) or, as he also suggests, between law (droit) and jouissance, or utility and 
pleasure (Lacan, 1999, p.3).   
By situating desire between these locales, Lacan begins to question the claim that 
desire has no utilitarian or fully practical function or purpose of “Usufruct” – the law.  
As he states, ‘you can enjoy (jouir de) your means [your desires] but do not waste 
them’ (1999, ibid).  Through the contexts of this thesis, there is an underlying sense 
that, if desire in the Imaginary is signified egotistically, used too readily, or wasted 
unnecessarily, it slips into the excesses of jouissance, where pleasure overcomes 
pragmatism and the urgent stutters and aimless surpluses of desire have to be shored 
up and attributed to some form of Symbolic law, regulatory practice, or signifying 
purpose.  For instance, if heterosexual sex between a man and a woman has the 
capacity to be both (re)productive and pleasure bound, where does jouissance situate 
itself in this act?  Is it that heterosexual desire is concerned with the anaclitic jouissance 
of an Imaginary other; whilst the homosexual desire for non-reproductive pleasure or 
expenditure (Dyer, 1985, Champagne, 1995) is allied to how the jouissance of the 
Symbolic Other is articulated?  Within this thesis the remits of what Lacan sees as 
“Usufruct” are relevant because they emphasise that the potentiality for perversity and 
transgression are elided and reconciled through the Symbolic discourses of 
heterosexuality and reproductive sex.  For example, and in this way, we see in a 
medium such as gay pornography, that counter-reproductive forms of jouissance are 
articulated as ‘anti-interpretations, [that function as] attempts to thwart the lack that 
makes signification possible’ (Champagne, 1995, p.38).  Whilst Thumos and 
jouissance offer frameworks of unconscious subjectivity that attempt to express, 
repress, and subjugate this lack, they also present us with what Lacan terms ‘all sorts 
of affects that remain enigmatic’ (1999, p.139) – that is, ways of signifying and not 
signifying tropes of desire through the minds’ and bodies’ relation to language and 
representation.   
In relation to how jouissance may be negotiated through subjugation and lack, we can 
also see in the dialogue of Phaedrus that Plato examines the intersections between 
anger, love, desire, intimacy, and eroticism in relation to the epistemology of ‘real’ 
knowledge such as the   ‘law’ and the possibility of how an ontological self may strive 
to occupy and subjugate these desiring or emotional states between mind and body.  In 
Phaedrus, the exchanges and dialogues between the three speakers of Socrates, 
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Phaedrus, and Lysias serve to position both a discursive and rhetorical space where the 
ontological subject who desires can only articulate some of how that desire is formed 
or realised.  This space is one in which philosophical discourse has attempted and, 
more specifically Phaedrus has, as Bersani and Phillips (2008) suggest, unknotted ‘the 
opposition between active [lover/self] and passive [loved one/Other] by instituting a 
kind of reciprocal self-recognition in which the intimate opposition between sameness 
and difference becomes irrelevant as a structuring category of being’ (p.86).  As a way 
to position the contextual dimensions of this project and the significance of ‘Bodies 
that Stutter’, this problem of self and other also offers a way to decipher and unpack 
the visual representations, cultural discourses, and self-representations presented in the 
later chapters.  Issues such as splitting (ichspaltung), foreclosure (verwerfung), 
disavowal (verleugung), negation (verneinung), repression (verdrängung), and 
resistance (widerstand) (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, pp.499-504) suggest that, 
through psychoanalysis, subjects talk (of sex, of sexuality, of the body, of the past, of 
desire, of anxiety) on the basis of the Other or of what is and what is not said, of what 
is and is not made manifest.    
It can be argued that this process also goes some way towards illustrating how ‘Bodies 
that Stutter’ attempt and fail to express their jouissance.  This stuttering, which forges 
a gap (faille) in how desire is spoken and manifested, also gives an insight into desire 
itself.  More specifically, a desire that, if we imagine it in relation to a representation, 
is always located in the split (ichspaltung), the temporality of the moment, or exchange 
(instant) between the Symbolic Other’s desire and the subject’s own Imaginary sense 
of jouissance.  In this way, the Other may well be the representational image and/or 
fantasy the subject can never reach, the distant and intangible Other networked, 
screened, and contained within the pornographic and photographic image online.  It is 
because they cannot reach one another and because the gap in desire is constituted as 
desire that both the subject and the signifier stutter. In this setting, bodies also stutter 
through hesitant processes of impersonal representation and recognition that strive to 
alleviate this Symbolic-stuttering and fill the gap with a binary personalisation of 
Imaginary ‘otherness’, which also fails. 
This engagement with the failure of an Imaginary other and ego through the 
impersonality of a Symbolic Other can also be linked to Aristotle, where the 
conception of Thumos is aligned to ‘claims that in order to be a good citizen a person 
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must possess both spiritedness and reason’ (Koziak, 1999, p.1069).  Here, the ‘good’ 
human ‘being’ (that is, the subject with a personality and an ego) is embedded and 
ensnared by a Symbolic unravelling linked to desire and pleasure.  For example, 
Aristotle’s concept of eudaemonia, examined in The Nicomachean Ethics (2009 [350 
BC]), is related to the Platonic issue of Thumos aligned to reason and the ontological 
question of how to live and to fulfil one’s life.  The features that are connected to the 
soul, spirit, and, more specifically, masculine identity also connect to the issues 
associated with ontological experience seen in Aristotle’s De Anima, translated as On 
the Soul (1987 [350 BC]).  This work offers a way to conceptualise the form, essence, 
or force of human subjectivity.  Here, Thumos is allied to the ontological paradigms of 
manliness and masculinity and how these traits can be figuratively and symbolically 
positioned and realised through desire.  Connecting Thumos to the ego in 
psychoanalysis also begins to form the outline of a subject who is both ontologically 
and epistemologically bound to simultaneous and overlapping processes of rationality 
and desire in philosophy, for instance, Angela Hobbs observes that ‘the resemblances 
between the Thumos and Freud’s (un)conscious and ego-ideal are striking’ (2006, 
p.48).  This way of connecting Freud (and Lacan’s Imaginary-ego) to other dimensions 
of philosophic inquiry can be seen in the work of Alfred Tauber (2009), who also 
recognises that Freud’s position and the broader location of psychoanalysis in relation 
to ontology are rooted in a prior moment of philosophical ambiguity.  On the one hand, 
the ontological in Freud is understood through an epistemological tension between 
positivist tendencies that he understood as empirical.  On the other, it is aligned to a 
rejection of ‘philosophy’ or, as Tauber suggests, ‘more specifically Kantianism, 
because of the associated transcendental qualities of its epistemology’ (2009, p.1).   
 
This sort of approach indicates that it is necessary, in this thesis, to continue to map 
out and then unpack these conceptual places of the self, to begin to trace the divergent 
epistemologies of the gay male self in the contextual instances and, more specifically, 
their ontological relation to the notions of ‘Bodies that Stutter’, Symbolic-stuttering, 
and jouissance.  As the opening discussions have suggested, the field of philosophical 
work associated with reason and desire is far-reaching and there are both difficulties 
and potentials that come from connecting elements of philosophical work on reason, 
desire, and subjectivity to Freud’s and Lacan’s psychoanalyses.  Yet, as a way to 
navigate through these problems, it seems that Freud remains the ‘significant turning 
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point in an intellectual culture still committed to Descartes’ identification of the self 
with the rational processes of the conscious mind’ (Mansfield, 2000, p.26).  This 
transition is also crucial when accounting for the bias of a psychoanalytic method and 
its usefulness in reading and deconstructing visual images of gay male desire and 
sexual identity.   
 
3.2.2 Logos and Jouissance 
This navigation and negation of gay masculinity and desire may also be positioned in 
relation to Logos and its alignment in psychoanalysis to ‘the symbolic order as 
structured by the signifier of desire’ (Fink, 1995, p.113).  In philosophical paradigms, 
Logos originates in the ancient Greek work of Heraclitus and is furthered in Aristotle 
via the development of a theory and practice of a rationalised, ordered, reasoned, and 
discursive speech act.  To articulate ones desire through Logos is central to the ways 
in which the ontological subject is formed and how he is methodologically located in 
this thesis.  This is also relevant to a thesis which develops the concept of ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ using psychoanalysis, in that Logos alerts us to the way in which speech helps 
to (dis)locate desire around and beyond the patient’s stated object (of love, of sexual 
pleasure) and lay bare something of the polymorphous, perverse, and impersonal 
characteristics of what drives jouissance.   
In the psychoanalytic session, the desires, drives, and objects are spoken of in the 
speech of the analysis, adding further to the contingency and ambiguity of the 
analysand’s sense of reason and subjectivity in relation to their jouissance.  Writing of 
the (inverted) speech of the clinic, Lacan suggests that reason and communication in 
any psychoanalysis has to confront the ways in which ‘the sender receives his own 
message back from the receiver in an inverted form’ (2003, p.51).  This contention is 
also something that inflects the tensions between the ontological position of the gay 
male subject and jouissance examined in the contextual chapters.  The ontology of 
navigating through representational space (and, more recently, using and displaying 
the self through online space) involves processes of clicking the mouse, switching on 
the webcam, searching for the website, timing, waiting, and posing for a photograph 
to be captured, scrolling and scrubbing through clips, posting, editing and cropping 
images, and downloading new software to increase viewing speeds.  Here, the 
stuttering subject of jouissance relies upon Logos to disobey ‘the rules and procedures 
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of conscious rational thinking’ (Bersani, 2011 p.12) so that desire in the Symbolic 
order and Logos can only stutter because ‘language comes too late; it depends on 
distinctions and intervals of which the fundamental subject of psychoanalysis, as well 
as the psychoanalytic subject, are ignorant’ (ibid, p.13).   
This is both the ontological trap and pleasure of jouissance and its exchanges with both 
Thumos and Logos, in which ‘delay intensifies the pleasure’ (ibid).  It is also apparent 
that the gay male subject who is embedded in this practice could be aligned to the 
subject of psychoanalysis in that he is interminably ensnared and aroused by displaced, 
disavowed, and expectant desire.  Here, it is important to consider that a Logos of 
ontological reason (in this instance, the notion that we can locate, speak of, and 
represent a thing called gay desire) is also buttressed by the inherent complexities 
predicated by Symbolic-stuttering and ‘Bodies that Stutter’ online.  More specifically, 
Symbolic-stuttering destabilises an ontological self who is enabled by desire through 
the epistemological construction of that desire online.  This begins to form another 
theoretical layer in which psychoanalytic approaches to subjectivity and identification 
can also be situated in terms of how the ‘“jouissing” substance’ (Fink, 1995, p.119) of 
Thumos is articulated in the Logos of new media and the inter-sectional discourses of 
pornography, self-representation and gay (im)personality.    
Questions around the contingency of ontological reason inform this methodological 
position, which suggests that locating a ‘reasoned’ and ‘knowing’ ontological subject 
has, on the one hand, been the central concern of Logos in ancient and modern 
philosophy, while, on the other, the subject has also occupied the space of jouissance 
that is inherently ‘unreasonable’ and ‘unknowing’ in an attempt to traverse and move 
beyond rational mappings of ontological reason.  Also, questions that consider the 
relationship that Logos and jouissance have in terms of the ontology of individual and 
collective human experience, subjectivity, and otherness have been formed through 
the notion that a discourse such as ‘psychoanalysis is not an ontology’ (Zupancic, 
2012, p.3) defined by reasoned and rationalised speech acts, bodies, and personalities.  
As a non-ontological trope that rejects coherent identity, Logos is also subject to the 
unconfined potentials of jouissance, which has the capacity to steer the subjective 
individual towards an impersonal space where a transcendental ontology is possible or 
even permitted.   
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Yet, the representation of ontology (through signifiers that deem an identity to ‘be’ 
gay or straight) is fundamental to the issue of reason and reasoning in mind (Psyche) 
and/or speech (Logos).  Logos is also referred to by Carl Jung in his re-
conceptualisation of Eros and Logos in Aspects of the Masculine (1989).  In Jung, the 
foundation of Logos assigns its rational and structured character to the masculine, 
whilst Eros is assigned to the looser intuition of the feminine.  Naomi Goldenberg 
observes that, in Jung’s surmising of Logos and Eros, he was ‘forcing a mirror image 
where there was none’ (Goldenberg, 1976, p. 447) via the problems of using the ‘verbal 
handmaidens’ (ibid) of both to position an archetypal form of gendered and/or sexual 
desire.  The problems of using Eros and Logos to position an ontological gay self are 
evident because masculine and feminine subject positions combine and criss-cross. 
To support this, it is important to return to Lacan and note that, when he is discussing 
‘sex’, he is not discussing the processes and structures concerned with the biological 
and gendered nature of the ‘sexed’ person.  Rather, Lacan is concerned with the ways 
in which subjects can overlap and sway between sexual identities and orientations to 
attain jouissance via positions he conceptualises through his theory of Sexuation.  In 
this theory, ‘Lacan does not divide the sexes as homosexual or heterosexual, but in 
terms of epistemological places built up as masculine or feminine responses to lack 
and loss’ (Ragland, 2004, p.42).  This occupation of an ‘epistemological place’ 
happens at the level of gendered and sexed culture and is, thus, an issue of the 
Symbolic.  For Lacan, as for Ragland, the term Sexuation is a way of understanding 
men and women, and not sexuality per se.  Indeed, sexuality, sexual identity, sexual 
orientation, and gender are terms that Lacan does not really deploy – either in his 
essays or in the seminars.  Lacan himself speaks of these terms both confusingly (to 
the extent that they are confusing), and complexly (to the extent that sex, sexuality, 
and gender are terms which are not reducible to easily intelligible discourse).  In 
Lacan’s theory of Sexuation, the notion of sexuality and the subject’s experience of 
sexual difference is less to do with the ontological function of a Logos that ‘speaks’ of 
the materiality, corporeality, and biological functions of the subject, and more 
concerned with what lies in the meaning of the subject’s relation to both the other and 
the Other through jouissance.  Lacan is emphasising the ways in which there is nothing 
essential in human sexual subjectivity by which the sexual subjects can coherently 
situate themselves as masculine or feminine.  Here, the processes and formulation of 
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male and female are less connected with the signifiers of gender and sex, and, more 
so, constructed in terms of complexity, through exchanges and functions that distance 
and obscure any form of direct and unmediated exchange between gendered and sexed 
subjects (Barnard, 2002, p.10). 
 
By taking this into account, we see that methodological variables allied to a research 
subject, a respondent, a quantitative test, or even a qualitative sample collapse.  This 
is because the foundation of psychoanalytic research is grounded in an implicit 
ambiguity.  In this case, Barnard observes the ways in which any ontological notions 
of sex and gender are rarely used in Lacan’s own vernacular.  Sex is often referred to 
as ‘an Imaginary-Symbolic construct [….] to mark the subject as sexed or else to refer 
to concrete sexual acts’ (ibid) and gender is nothing more than ‘a function of 
identification with idealised norms regarding sex’ (ibid).  Thus, the notion that 
anatomical difference is only a contributory factor to the ways in which sex and gender 
are represented becomes an implicit feature of Lacan’s theories around sexual 
difference.  Taking into account the implication that sexual difference is configured 
via the subject’s relation to the other, Lacan designates this territory of ‘difference’ in 
terms of the signifier and, more specifically, the phallic signifier.  It is worth noting 
here that the use of ‘phallic’ has often been misconstrued as something that pertains to 
distinctly masculine, patriarchal, and dominant tropes.  In fact, the critical point, which 
Lacan was striving to emphasise, was that the phallic and the phallus are fragile and 
fallible (Fink, 2002, p.38).  As Fink observes, ‘one cannot take the failure out of the 
phallus’ (ibid, p.39), so that when this notion is plugged into how the signifier and 
jouissance are both theorised and articulated in terms of gay male ontology, something 
like the provisional and precarious nature of phallic ontology is exposed.   
 
It is also problematic when, prior to psychoanalytic discourse, philosophical 
interventions concerned with the interchanges and transmutations of reason, desire, 
speech, and subjectivity navigate towards a longing for ontological satisfaction and 
fulfilment.  Whilst Jungian analysis and psychology claims that it ‘use[s] Eros and 
Logos merely as conceptual aids to de-scribe the fact that woman’s consciousness is 
characterised more by the connective quality of Eros than by the discrimination and 
cognition associated with Logos’ (Jung cited in Goldenberg, 1976, p.445), we also see 
how Jungian binaries render the sexual subject as one who has particular, and thus 
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archetypal, personality and identity qualities associated with a specifically ontological 
position.  In contrast, Freudian and Lacanian interventions, related to desire, re-
negotiate the oppositional binaries of Logos/Eros and Masculine/Feminine through the 
collapse of the Imaginary-ego and the proliferation of jouissance.  This indicates that, 
in Jung’s analytical psychology, when the subjective Eros is situated as ‘the great 
binder and loosener’ (ibid) in relation to the ordered and structured Logos, there is a 
space opened up for a desiring subject who is placed between these two polarities.  
Yet, as Zupancic (2012) suggests, the subject positions of male and female share 
‘contradiction, or antagonism’, in fact, this is ‘what the two positions have in common’ 
(p.9).  Clear lines and categorisations are denied here and it could be claimed that the 
‘de-sexualisation of ontology (it is no longer being conceived of two “masculine” and 
“feminine” principles) coincides with the sexual appearing as the real/disruptive point 
of being’ (ibid); in turn, this disruptive point is also the Symbolic space of stuttering, 
which this thesis is attempting to examine.  If jouissance is allied to Thumos and Logos, 
we begin to see that it is always riven by Symbolic speech and Imaginary signifiers 
that attempt to facilitate it as Eros.  Lacan argues there is nothing in the psyche that 
allows the subject to situate him- or herself as male or female, and, in Freud, maleness 
and masculinity, and femaleness and femininity are psychical as much as they are 
physical attributes.  For Lacan, there is no ontology and no signifier that marks 
jouissance.  However, at the level of the Symbolic, Logos seems to allow jouissance 
to be realised.  In the next section, this concern is examined through jouissance’s 
relation to Eros and the ways in which psychoanalytic theory and praxis ‘further their 
analysands’ Eros’ (Fink, 1995, p.146), rather than containing and restricting it in terms 
of gender, sexuality and personality.  
 
3.2.3 Eros and Jouissance (and Freud) 
In The Resistances to Psycho-Analysis (1925), Freud aligns his view of sex and 
sexuality to Plato’s understanding of Eros in the Symposium (2008 [385-380 BC]).  
Here, Freud refers to sex and sexual instincts and drives through the myth of Eros, as 
it is articulated by Aristophanes, and recognises that, ultimately, the expression and 
representation of sex and sexuality bears a ‘resemblance to the all-inclusive and all-
preserving Eros of Plato’s Symposium’ (1925, p.218)   Here Freud’s alignment of sex 
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to instincts and drives is connected to Eros, yet not the Eros we have come to associate 
with love in the conventional sense. In terms of how Eros is being positioned and how 
it may connect to issues of jouissance and desire in this thesis it is useful to grasp that 
in Plato, the philosophical concept of Eros is positioned as a rhetorical and/or abstract 
trope, or a way to negotiate and strive towards a reasoned truth through desire or, more 
importantly, love of the other.  Moreover, K.J Dover (1966) identifies how 
Aristophanes’ speech in the Symposium locates the centrality and reciprocity of sexual 
desire, affection, and preference (p.48-49) through self and other, with allusions to 
homosexual love, desire, and relationships between men.  Judith Butler identifies the 
Eros myth in Plato, using Lacan, and states that ‘the primary separation or loss figured 
in Lacan recalls the loss of wings in Plato, the loss that inaugurates embodied desire.  
And such a founding separation, a structuring lack, can be found as well in the 
Aristophanic myth introduced in the Symposium’ (Butler, 1995, p.379).  This sense of 
lack or loss is also central to the location of ontological reason, which both defines and 
subjugates the desiring subject and the subject of desire.  Something of this loss also 
resonates through the process of Symbolic-stuttering and its attempts to grasp and 
express jouissance through the impersonal signifier.  Some of the more recent 
commentators in the field of Freudian and Lacanian criticism and analysis, among 
them Bersani (1986, 1987, 1995, 2008, 2011) and Dean (2000, 2001, 2002a, 2002b), 
and also Genevieve Morel (2002), Ellie Ragland (2004), and Colette Soler (2002), 
have underlined the importance attached to the intersectional operation of these 
philosophical, psychic, linguistic, and social paradigms of sexuality as impersonality 
and jouissance, and the shift towards gender and sexuality defined through loss of an 
identity and departure from a coherent sense of self and other.   
Whilst Freud does not abandon an interest in the biological and the anatomical, he 
convincingly evidences the ways sex and sexuality inform/are informed by and 
inflect/are inflected by speech, dialogue, the ordinary activities of urban life, and 
artistic and cultural representation.  The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), alongside 
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901) and, more so, Civilization and Its 
Discontents (1930), demonstrate just how far the process of being and existing through 
the mundane and the everyday were both sexualised and sensualised.  Dudesnude.com, 
Triga Films and tumblr.com are also examples of how ordinary social realities and 
extraordinary sexual fantasies intersect and potentially reposition established 
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meanings and interpretations of seemingly ‘ordinary’ self-representations and 
significations of sexual identity. More specially, it is worth noting that I selected these 
specific websites for investigation because they each deal with indexes of visual desire 
that conflate everyday identity with sexual identity, personal life, and pornographic 
performance, and ordinary and extraordinary tensions related to the precarious 
jouissance of self and other. As well as this they a connected to one another through 
simultaneously Symbolic and practical inter-sections allied to networked and digital 
media which fosters an emotive yet ephemeral dialogue of desire specific to its 
representational contingency as sexually explicit.  
The ‘sexualisation’ of everyday life, write Brown and Richards (1999), is the ‘most 
famous result of the psychoanalytic use of associative links to explore the underlying 
matrix of experience’ (p. 239).  Freud’s work with his patients also exposes how the 
precarious ontology of desire operates at a linguistic (in Lacan, this is allied to the 
Symbolic) as much as a bodily (and also Imaginary) level.  Moreover, Freud’s work 
serves to complicate, if not displace, any model of the intensity of human ontology and 
sexuality structured around the ideology of hetero- and homosexual desire and 
representation.  In Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality (1905) Freud considers 
how the movements of desire (understood now in relation to erotogenic zones) are 
connected to fantasies beyond the realm of the genital.  These may both supplement 
and exceed a theory of sexuality whose sole focus is centred on the range of coital 
relations between men and women or, more specifically, men and men.  This shift 
towards the erotogenic also fits with the nuances of a sexual subject that can only 
experience erotogenic stimulation as a series of erotogenic stutters that rely on a 
metonymic impersonality of desire to experience jouissance.   
How these ontological positions on reason, subjectivity, and desire pre-ordain and 
connect to psychoanalysis is most explicit in the ‘Three Essays’.  This is Freud’s most 
important and possibly most original contribution to the understanding of the psyche 
in relation to the study and theorisation of human sexualities.  Together with The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1900), ‘Three Essays’ has been viewed as one of the most 
far-reaching, innovative, and contentious of Freud’s early writings.  However, the text, 
which is nuanced with philosophical observations on reason, subjectivity, and desire, 
was written on the threefold-basis of, and in relation to, (a) Freud’s own meta-
psychological and theoretical speculations; (b) existing sexological research; and (c) 
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Freud’s work with patients.  This triangulated methodological approach toward the 
study of human sexuality is a tendency that runs through psychoanalytic praxis and 
also allows Freud to connect to, and move away from, the continuous problem of an 
ontological (sexual) identity.  For example, illness (usually considered in relation to 
psycho-somatic disorder, obsession, hysteria, and neurosis), sex, sexuality, and human 
relations were viewed as radical, ground-breaking, and if not precarious then certainly 
controversial ways to conceive of an ontological subject.    
At this point, what is interesting for the broader scope of the thesis is Freud’s attention 
to masculinity. It is described as a characteristic, something that is associated with 
male bodies; but note how the work of Lacan, discussed earlier, and the associated 
concepts of psychoanalysis allied to desire and particularly jouissance can affirm that 
masculinity is not the defining substance which makes one a man.  Freud is forced to 
address the degree to which masculinity and femininity are characteristics that are 
available to male and female bodies, yet he argues about a ‘compromise’ (Freud, 1905, 
p.56), in that ‘there is, as it were, a compromise between an impulse that seeks for a 
man and one that seeks for a woman, while it remains a paramount condition that the 
object’s body (i.e. its genitals) shall be masculine’ (ibid).  Here, Freud is surely 
imprecise or incorrect because he metaphorically positions the genitals (masculine) of 
the object to the body.  If we think about this metonymically through the three terms 
‘masculine’, ‘man’, and ‘male’, we see that they are not terms which are inter-
changeable and they are not synonyms.  For instance, the term masculinity ‘extend[s] 
far beyond the male body’ (Halberstam, 1998, p.13) to position masculinity as 
‘multiple, and that “far from being about men, the idea of masculinity engages, inflects 
and shapes everyone”’ (Berger, Wallis, and Watson p.7, cited in ibid, p.14).  To the 
degree that masculine and feminine, male and female, can pre-modify or post-modify 
the other term (as in ‘female masculinity’ or ‘male femininity’), then male or man’s, 
as opposed to masculine genitals would be a far more accurate and, in many ways, 
offer a ‘Lacanian’ classification of the point Freud is trying to make.    
The footnotes added to a section of the ‘Three Essays’ in 1910, 1915 and 1920 (pp.56-
59) see Freud both qualify and modify his terms; ‘man’ is no longer used to denote 
‘masculine’ in the same way as 1905 (p.56); and homosexuals are not to be understood 
as separate from ‘the rest of mankind’ (pp.56-7).  Radically and controversially, Freud 
actually suggests that the unconscious is the location of the metonymic impersonality 
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discussed in this thesis and it knows no final sexual position or ontological reason.  
‘All human beings’, contends Freud, ‘are capable of making a homosexual object-
choice and have in fact made one in their unconscious’ (p.56).  With Sandor Ferenczi, 
Freud insists that homosexuality and inversion concern two different theoretical 
trajectories; and he refuses to homogenise or categorise as rigidly as some of his 
contemporaries what homosexuality might mean.  Radically, he also distinguishes 
between homoeroticism and homosexuality, something of an advance, for the time, on 
theories of sexuality, identity, and desire. 
Freud also conceives that the social construction of homosexual desire is something 
that is understood as metaphoric, that is equivalent or comparative to something or 
someone.  In Freud’s discussion, this concerns morality and perversion.  Both of these 
terms have become synonymous with the discourse of homosexuality as a starting 
point for empirical and identity-led methodologies that rely upon the gay male subject 
having to ‘be’ interpreted, instated, and understood through the powerful trope of the 
metaphor.   Yet note, too, how the notion of a metaphorically condensed, essential, or 
congenital sexual instinct also marks, for Freud, a new point of departure, 
problematised by the suggestion that ‘the sexual instinct itself must be something put 
together from various factors, and that in the perversions it falls apart … into its 
components’ (p.156).  Here the powerful and disruptive nature of metonymic 
identification as perversion abates the metaphoric identity of homosexuality as 
perverse.  Moving away from a metaphoric focus on the body and, specifically, the 
genitals – and thus complicating how we might figure the sexual relation away from 
an over-reliance on gender or binary thinking – Freud insists that the metonymic 
excitation, pleasure, and displaced satisfaction relate to the ‘erotogenic zones’ and, 
thus, to ‘any part of the skin and…any organ. […], the sexual instinct is not unified [it] 
is at first without an object, that is, auto-erotic’ (ibid, p.157; emphasis original).      
In his work on sexuality, Freud objectifies various arguments in a language that 
distances itself from his own psychoanalytic terms and direction.  This is a writer who 
is careful but also uncertain.  As a way to position what is salient about images of 
contemporary gay masculinity, sexuality, and desire in relation to Freud’s work, it is 
necessary to consider the level of contradiction and complication – if not 
deconstruction – of the specificity of identity and sexual ontology in the images.  In 
all of the contextual instances discussed later, we see that gay and straight male 
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paradigms continually intersect and overlap and, at some points, even seem to 
obliterate and shatter any claims of ‘gay’ or ‘straight’ sexual recognition, identity, and 
personality.  Alongside his commitment to something that is both complexly universal 
and subject to possibility and limitation, Freud’s argument is also one that does not 
posit (homo)sexuality as a fixed category of methodological enquiry, but something 
that, akin to drives and desires, is never consistent and stabilised.  Just as Freud is 
singularly unable to define quite what sex and sexuality are, it is within this implicit 
ambivalence that sex and sexuality and thus sexual desire must be positioned and 
considered as contingent, ambiguous, and even incoherent. 
More broadly, psychoanalysis lays bare desire through the ambivalence and disruptive 
influence of sexual pleasure and jouissance, so that idealistic notions of wisdom, 
reason, truth and enlightenment through Eros are disrupted and dispersed by the desire 
for sexual satisfaction and gratification.  If Thumos, Logos, and Eros offer a way to 
position jouissance, they do so in relation to speech/language and their relation to 
desire and subjectivity.  These crucial features are also part of how the sexual self in 
psychoanalysis opens up a space in which philosophical interventions that pre-date 
Freudian thought are useful in positioning how the ontological dimensions of 
contemporary gay male desire owes some degree of epistemological and ontological 
specificity to the philosophical subject of both ancient and enlightenment philosophy.   
The key methodological approach that informs the how and why of using Freudian 
and Lacanian psychoanalysis to read gay male representation and self-representation 
may come from a re-consolidation of the ontological fault-lines, which, at their most 
extreme, eschew in a ‘non-ontology’ of psychoanalytic theory and the psychoanalytic 
subject.  As Zupancic (2012) observes, the tensions between Freudian and Lacanian 
approaches to ontology reveal ‘the point of ontological inconsistency, which as such, 
is irreducible’ to the essentialist politics of a body or an identity (p.3).  It is also 
psychoanalysis that enables a non-ontological reading of desire ‘as the out-of-
beingness of being’ (ibid, p.8).  More so, this is what ‘psychoanalysis brings out and 
insists upon’ rather than ‘falling in the trap of providing grounds for ontological 
consistency’ (ibid).  This drive towards alternatives to ontology and/or non-ontological 
positions are both methodologically and theoretically problematised when 
psychoanalysis through Freud and Lacan is aligned to the work of Descartes.  In the 
next section, the modes of philosophic enquiry understood as Cartesian, which are 
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related to questions of reason and desire, are examined.  This also allows for an 
opportunity to discuss how Cartesian approaches to the inter-sectionality of mind and 
body intersect with one another to proliferate the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ of this project 
which are formed through the operations of metonymy, impersonality, desire, and 
jouissance in psychoanalysis.   
3.3 ‘I’ think therefore ‘I am n-n-n-not’ 
The philosophical importance of how ontological reason is both inflected and 
abstracted by epistemology is implicit to forming and situating the ontological position 
and argument within the thesis.  Situating reason in relation to desire and the 
philosophy of desire is also foundational in attempting to position the ontological and 
epistemological traps, ambiguities, and paradoxes inherent in taking on a 
psychoanalytic critique of how gay male desire is visually represented in Chapters 4, 
5, and 6. Psychoanalysis and the intricate tensions between an Imaginary other and 
Symbolic Other dramatise how and why reason and sexuality are subject to complex 
exchanges of self-reflexive, self-effacing, self-disciplinary, and also self-analysing 
forms of identification and desire.  The ontological and/or psychological problem that 
the positions of the analyst and the analysand are transferable and, thus, intersectional 
also goes towards identifying how there is a rupture or gap which overarches the 
ontology of the gay male sexual subject not only in psychoanalysis but more 
importantly through the contextual examples of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ examined in the 
next three chapters.   
To help understand and to situate the arcane and disparate range of ontological 
positions available to both Freud and Lacan, and relate them to the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ 
in the thesis, it may be useful to think of psychoanalysis as in some way “replacing” 
(Cavell, 1987, p.388) philosophy as a way to position and interpret subjectivity and 
sexuality.  In turn, this also seems to reflect how the unconscious and those operations 
of impersonality, displacement, and metonymy in psychoanalysis can be used as a 
backdrop to position how jouissance is tacitly scupperedand exasperated.  Using the 
(dis)connections between psychoanalysis and its available relation to rationalism, 
empiricism, the enlightenment, idealism/transcendental idealism, and modernism is a 
way to unwrap and unpack how philosophical discourse can (and cannot) be used to 
examine how ‘the fate to philosophise to undo philosophising are located as radical, 
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twin features of the human’ (p.389).  As this thesis continues to evolve it also allows 
for the potential to unpack questions of how an ontological (sexual) subject is 
conceptualised using philosophy but, more importantly, displaced through the ethics 
of a non-ontological psychoanalysis. 
The metaphysical and teleological tensions between the rhetoric of reason and desire 
in philosophy can be located in Western discourse and cultural practice through 
Descartes’ claim of ‘Cogito Ergo Sum’ or ‘I think, therefore I am’ (1998 [1637]).  In 
Descartes, the ontological self, who ‘thinks’, ‘reasons’, and ‘desires’, is always 
influenced by self-doubt when that self is thought to be a ‘thinking-thing’.  At the root 
of the ‘Cogito’ formula is the issue of selfhood and self-definition via the Cartesian 
notion that to think is to offer a degree of certainty and proof to and of the self in 
relation to others and the representations of those others.  In this way, and following a 
Cartesian line of enquiry that privileges ‘the conscious processes of thought over every 
other impulse or sensation’ (Mansfield, 2000, p.15), the subject is positioned as a 
subject through the fact that he has a level of self-awareness.  In Descartes, 
consciousness is aligned to reason and its power to decipher, choose, control, know, 
and judge; ‘I think, therefore I am’ is bound to consciously realising and reasoning 
with your own sense of selfhood and the world around you.   
 
Psychoanalysis, and its connections to Symbolic structures and topographies of 
jouissance, yields the power to destabilise Descartes reason and reasoning so that they 
slip into spheres of the unfathomable, vacillating, uncontrollable, unknowing, and 
mistaken.  Just as Freud suggests in both his structural differentiations between 
conscious and unconscious, condensation and displacement, and in his topography of 
id, ego, and superego, it is the unreasonable nature of the unconscious that maps the 
consciousness.  At this point, an inverted view of subjectivity, reason, and desire, 
which embeds itself in a specifically Freudian approach, also points to the potentiality 
of considering that ‘certain forms of human thought and behaviour’ (Deigh, 2001, 
p.1248).  and, in this case, desire and reason can be ‘explained by unconscious 
emotions’ (ibid).  As a consequence of this rejection of ‘conscious states of mind as 
the model for all unconscious states’ (ibid), both an epistemological and ontological 
‘break […] with the Cartesian conception’ (ibid) allows the unconscious to subvert 
and topple the dependability of conscious reason and self-hood, self-reason, and self-
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control.  This ‘toppling’ of reason also helps to locate the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ of this 
thesis as well as frame to what extent  impersonality and jouissance simultaneously 
allow and impede how subjects articulate and realise those desires. 
 
In his attempt to critique the essential nature of the Cartesian ‘I’ and the ontology of 
‘being’, Lacan resituates existence and language so that the speech act or act of 
speaking (dire) “ex-sists” (ex-sister au dit) as opposed to “exists” (1999, pp. 21-22). 
In the English translation, the hyphenation and additional ‘s’ implies that this existing 
is partial and that, whilst something has been interjected into the word, this has also 
caused a form of displacement or Symbolic-stuttering to occur.  In his dense footnote 
to Lacan’s French expression, Fink identifies that the word does not have a root 
meaning and that Lacan has appropriated from incongruent sources, such as Greek and 
German translations, and also Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, which questioned 
the clear meaning of the word itself.  Fink interprets Heidegger’s use of the word to 
mean “standing outside” or “stepping outside of oneself” (Lacan, 1999, p.22), and 
suggests that Lacan uses it to situate existence as something aside or apart; rather than 
being intimate and close to the subject, it is impersonally distanced or “extimate” 
(ibid).  Fink also identifies that, in Greek, it relates to ‘the removal or displacement of 
something’ (ibid).  This removal may also be applied to ‘states of mind we would now 
call “ecstatic”’ (ibid).  Here, the act of taking something away or to stand outside of 
the body may be allied to the precarious ontological processes of jouissance, stuttering, 
and “ex-sisting” which allow the subject to learn more of desire because it cannot 
speak or enunciate itself as an ‘I’.  In a thesis which uses psychoanalytic approaches 
to desire, any attempts to use Descartes’ Cogito to locate and position homosexuality 
as an ontological fact of existing or existence are almost impossible from the outset.  
Lacan’s “Ex-sisting” guarantees that any individual consciously stating that, ‘I am 
gay’, does so through hesitancy and uncertainty.  Here, self-definition and self-hood, 
as ways to contain, possess, and secure a ‘gay’ identity, are also condemned to failure.  
In this way, if only epistemological traces of reason and of desire are left through the 
unconscious and ‘to think is to not know’, then both the (homo)sexual and the 
psychoanalytic subject invert and allow the Cartesian ‘I’ to “ex-sist” and stutter (as in 
“I-I-I-I…, a-a-a-am, n-n-n-not”).   
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More recently, Bersani (2011) has appropriated Foucault’s term, ‘The Cartesian 
Moment’, as the historical marker that prioritises ‘knowledge to the detriment of what 
Foucault designates as “care of the self” or spirituality’ (p.2).  This suggests that, in 
Descartes, the interrelatedness of thinking, reflecting, and being strives towards an 
ontological and epistemological moment ‘of willed identity of knowledge and being’ 
(ibid, p.8).  More so, in an examination of the correlation between Descartes, Proust, 
and Freud, Bersani goes on to suggest that the aim of all three is not only knowledge 
but, more pertinently, ‘introspection itself, both in its procedures and as an adventure’ 
(ibid).  Through the convergence of psychoanalysis, language, and philosophy, the 
active pursuit, processes, and procedures of subjective solitude, isolation, and 
seclusion are realised.  Ruses of the ‘I’, the mind, the ego, and the unconscious transect 
and overlap with one another so that, in Bersani’s troika, the paradoxical gaps between 
these forms are where an ‘absolutely unique individuality is, at the same time, the key 
to a universal being: the thinking thing that is all men in Descartes, the shared 
singularity that art reveals and that is hidden behind particular singularities in Proust, 
and the universal mental functions obscured by the subterfuges of everyday conscious 
life in Freud’ (ibid).  In this thesis’ consideration and application of Lacan, we see that 
this ‘space’ may also be realised through ’Bodies that Stutter’ which displace any 
assurance in thinking and knowing the self as an ontology, identity, and ego.   In the 
next section of this chapter, this stuttering is repositioned through a discussion of the 
ethical and methodological approaches (and challenges) allied to the three key 
contextual and analytical chapters of the thesis.  This section explores some of the 
ethical contentions that have to be methodologically considered in light of using 
Lacanian psychoanalysis to examine online, publicly available, yet, often 
anonymously posted visual images which may be considered sexually explicit and/or 
pornographic. It also goes some way to justifying the decision in chapters 4 and 6 to 
excise the inclusion of many of the personal profiles and the selfies I had examined in 
my visual research and to construct and present the analysis of gay male desire as 
‘psychoanalytically textual’. In this way the analytical methods I have employed in the 
thesis are allied to and complimented by the key concepts I am using to scrutinise gay 
male desire and jouissance. It could also be claimed that the analytical chapters as 
empirical evidence of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ also stutter, hesitate, displace, and 
impersonalise the Imaginary and/or metaphoric dimensions of visual representation 
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through the Symbolic thrust of metonymy and its power to underpin and undermine 
desire. 
 
3.4 Locating an ethics and a method to investigate Impersonality, Desire, and 
Jouissance 
Whilst the last sections have demonstrated how both philosophical and Freudian 
approaches form a useful methodological basis to this thesis, it is the predominance of 
Lacanian theory to interrogate aspects of the contemporary gay male subject that 
implies there is ‘an on-going construction of a reflective/constructive/disruptive layer 
that feeds while growing alongside the life it seeks to portray’ (Brown and Heggs, 
2010, p.295).  This also reflects something of the challenges allied to engaging with 
empirical contexts in the analysis chapters that deal with online and networked 
representations of gay desire and identity that ‘inevitably involve[s] the renegotiation 
of the boundaries between personal and public’ (Chambers, 2013, p.62) as well as 
recognising that the significance of these networked publics utilise networks to share 
information with imagined others and to display their bodies in ways which demand 
that they be looked at and seen. From the outset and by using these objective 
approaches alongside of philosophical concepts and psychoanalysis as methodological 
tools to participate in reflecting, (de)constructing, and disrupting the gay sexual self 
proves challenging in that it raises questions allied to how to proceed as a theoretical 
researcher.  Using theory as the foundation meant that there was no point in the thesis 
where I felt the need to embark on a method to analyse this networked and 
representational ‘self’ through qualitatively defined samples or ethnographic pieces of 
data using specific respondents and/or demographically selected research subjects.  
Rather, and as the next part of this section considers the key was in locating an 
appropriate ethical and methodological bedrock whilst allowing the conceptual tools 
and vocabulary of psychoanalysis and philosophical enquiry to position how 
jouissance and its alliance to ‘Bodies that Stutter’ informed and permeated the 
analytical elements.  
Recent work in the field of psychoanalysis, such as Justin Clemens Psychoanalysis is 
an Antiphilosophy (2013), positions its analytical power as ‘an impossible practice 
[…] to catch something that would otherwise be indiscernible’ (p.42).  Through this 
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type of assertion the constraints of methodological and ethical approaches that accept 
or attempt to capture tropes of identity, desire, and representation as categorical and 
identifiable serve to limit the potentials of psychoanalysis as an anti-methodology 
‘dedicated to creating ever-renovated means of […] a subject’s relation to their own 
speech, and the reinventing of new ways to enable the subject to transform that 
relationship through speech itself’ (ibid, p.43). Just as a methodological orthodoxy 
allied to psychoanalysis remains both impossible and injurious, we also see that 
working within the field of visual analysis something like an ethics of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is just as problematic to pinpoint and articulate.  Fink (1995) asserts 
this problem and emphasises that psychoanalysis ‘is not pragmatic in its [ethical] aims’ 
(p.146), in that it defies and subverts ‘compliance with social, economic, and political 
norms and realities’ (ibid).  In a thesis that undertakes a psychoanalytic study of gay 
masculinity and representations of gay male desire, a conceptually inflected 
‘(un)ethical ethics’ and ‘(non)methodological method’ allied to a ‘praxis of jouissance’ 
(ibid)  has to be assembled alongside of far more regulated and practical issues of 
ethics and methods per se. In turn, this also repositions and attempts to address the 
dyadic relationship between the ‘adherence to’ and ‘transgression of’ accepted ethical 
and methodological frameworks related to how sexual desires are represented and read 
using psychoanalysis.  For instance the politics of using and analysing specific images 
such as the selfie and the personals profile had to acknowledge the fact that ‘once in 
the public realm, participants and researchers have no control over how images are 
read and will struggle to prevent them being used for different purposes by 
others’(Clark, 2012, p.23).  
In other words the informed consent and willing contribution / permission to the use 
of a specific users profile and/or selfie created a set of ‘visual and ethical anxieties’ 
(ibid, p.18) which in the end only the concepts allied to psychoanalysis could address 
and arguably overcome. At this stage it is important to underline that within this project 
the only visual material that was visually included was allied to officially copyrighted 
material (for example the browsing pages on dudesnude.com, the images from Triga 
films) and that the anonymity and/or confidentiality of gay men using personal sites 
and/or posting selfies was guaranteed. This was possible because the exploration of 
the empirical contexts was undertaken by using a psychoanalytic lexicon as a 
methodology which allowed for the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ to be conceptualised rather 
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than ethnographically and qualitatively scrutinised.  In this way, the research uses the 
conceptual vitality of psychoanalysis and the rhetoric of ‘representational practices’ to 
examine gay male desire in online personals, pornography and selfies. In turn, this 
meant that rather than having to pursue an extended process of informed consent 
connected to the regulation and legality of the ownership and display of sexually 
explicit images online through contextual codes of online practice (ibid, p.22-30) no 
formal consent had to be sought and a conceptual analysis in lieu of specific images 
formed the crux of the analytical argument.  
For instance, it is through a concept such as jouissance and the potentials in re-
conceptualising how ethical and methodological positions are realised and carried 
forward that the ways in which ‘jouissance is anything but practical’ (Fink, 1995, 
p.146) can be used prolifically.  It is because ‘the techniques that psychoanalysts must 
use to deal with jouissance wreak havoc’ (ibid) that psychoanalysis is able continually 
to re-evaluate and re-position the discursive rubric of methodological and ethical 
approaches to sexual desire and signification.  Bersani (2011) sums this up in the 
stately claim that ‘the heroically impossible project of psychoanalysis is to theorise an 
untheorisable psyche’ (p.13), which, through both Freud and Lacan, allows 
‘unreadable pressures to infiltrate the readable, thus creating a type of readability at 
odds with how we have been taught to read’ (ibid).  Here, the impossibility of 
psychoanalysis as a methodological or ethical doxa is expressed in how it ‘performs 
the blockages, the mergings, the incoherence inherent in the discipline Freud invented’ 
(ibid).  It is also through these impasses in language, and through the Symbolic-
stuttering that psychoanalysis makes possible, that some of the problems allied to 
working with sexually explicit and graphic images are raised.  Rather than 
extinguishing the possibilities of an effective visual analysis the tensions between the 
non-methodological and the methodological as well as the ‘unethical’ issue of ethics 
navigate the research in a new direction. 
John Champagne’s (1995) examination of gay ethics, marginality, and pornography, 
and his formation of an ethical/methodological identity as a ‘bricoleur’ side-steps 
Lacanian and Freudian approaches by assimilating Derrida, but still goes some way 
towards opening ‘up the possibility of thinking differently about pornography’ (p.36).  
It does so because Champagne ‘uses ‘the means at hand’ – that is ‘the instruments he 
finds at his disposition around him, those which are already there, which had not been 
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especially conceived with an eye to the operation for which they are to be used and to 
which one tries by trial and error to adapt them’ (p.36).  As a gay man who has worked 
on this thesis between the ages of 27 and 35, these means at hand constitute forms of 
media I have used and incorporated into my own daily life.  They also reflect my 
position as a Symbolic subject of a neo-liberal and capitalist economy in which the 
commodification of an Imaginary gay ego/identity has been both consolidated and 
complicated through pornography, online media, and online systems of personal and 
social communication.  During the course of this research project, the contextual 
instances as ‘representational practices’ have evolved and emerged as the ‘means at 
hand’, whilst also impelling both my own subjectivity and reflexivity towards the 
constitutive nature and contingency of sexually explicit / gay male signification.  Since 
this research project began the visual barrage of online sexual imagery that is self-
submitted and self-captured on social networks of exchange and commodity, such as 
dudesnude.com and tumblr.com, have realigned how methodological and ethical 
conventions allied to pornographic material are considered.  In other words many 
online researchers working with ‘visual images of unknowing individuals in public’ 
(Clark, 2012, p.20) find that they are ‘reliant on consent being obtained by participants 
acting as ethical mediators, as well as data–producers’ (ibid) and this this in itself 
proliferates questions allied to ‘the recognition of agency in our own [research-led] 
‘mediators’, but also the need to understand mediation and immediacy in the everyday 
life of the people we study’ (Ardevol, 2012, p.87).  
Whilst this is something that researchers as visual ethnographers and/or social-
scientists may face I have already discussed that this is something that psychoanalysis 
as a methodological tool has allowed me to overcome. Some broader concerns about 
methodological approaches such as these, and the ethics of how they are associated 
with pornographic representation, also raise questions that need to be addressed.  
Susanna Paasonen (2011) suggests that, within the academic study of sexually explicit 
imagery and pornography, ‘by choosing particular examples to study, it is possible to 
justify one’s premises concerning the meanings, forms, and implications of things 
pornographic’ (p, 4).  More specifically, and definitely in chapter 5 where officially 
copyrighted visual images from Triga films are used to investigate gay pornography 
that often uses straight male tropes as a vehicle for jouissance, the ethical dimensions 
of this project attempts to ‘focus on the freely and openly accessible’ (ibid, p.6) 
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nuances of pornographic representation and the potential of ‘seeing’ pornography as 
an integral part of gay (and straight) male ethics, through both Imaginary and Symbolic 
forms.  For instance,  and in addition to the politics of informed consent, anonymity, 
and confidentiality allied to sexually explicit imagery that we might see the sexual 
subject of the selfie through, we can also position them as one that has the potential to 
reposition an Imaginary ethics of pornographic representation and, more so, personal 
representation online, into [a Symbolic] ethics that ‘implies [the] consideration of 
others’ feelings and wishes as well as one’s own’ (Albury, 2003, p.208) impersonally.  
Just as the personalities and selves of the personals profile, pornographic film, and 
selfies may want to be seen beyond the unethical ‘notions of risk and filth’ (Paasonen, 
2011, p.234), they are (a lot like the researcher) also ensnared as subjects who have to 
be ethically positioned through these tropes because they are sexualised. 
    
3.5 Contextual Instances 
A substitution or re-engagement with some of these ethical terms and methodological 
concepts also serves to provide an insight into how the visual politics of gay male 
desire has been perceived in relation to the methodological possibilities of 
psychoanalysis and the formation of jouissance.  As a result, the ancient philosophical 
terms, such as Thumos, Logos, and Eros, need to be relocated to understand how and 
why the gay male subject of contemporary representation and self-expression has also 
evolved and can be contextualised as a psychoanalytic subject of desire.  The three key 
visual and representational instances of the personals website, dudesnude.com, in 
Chapter 4; the porn studio, Triga Films, in Chapter 5; and the social network / blogging 
site, tumblr.com, in Chapter 6, have been selected due to the conditionality, vacillation, 
and impersonality embedded in their visual rhetoric of gay male sexual and erotic 
desire.  The emergence of new regimes of visuality and, in particular, the 
democratisation of self-representation due to innovations in new media, such as digital 
cameras, web-cams, and mobile phones, has enabled the discourse of same-sex desire 
to be produced, represented, and consumed in a way that realigns how all 
representations of same-sex desire are subject to definition through the epistemological 
and ontological discourses of identity and personality.  As a researcher, the dialogue 
that I had with the contexts and the justification for selecting them relied upon the 
dialectic between the conceptual nature of the research project and practical issues 
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allied to ethics and methods discussed in the previous section. I have attempted to 
consider and position both approaches and the processes of elimination and 
justification to offer an insight into my choices detailed below.  
These contexts have been chosen because they suggest that, when an identity is subject 
to multiple identifications through a process of representation, then the personal 
desires of the Imaginary-ego are destabilised through the impersonality of that 
Symbolic representation.  In all of the instances, it is neither sexual difference nor 
sameness that can be used to ground sexual desire and identity.  When this is subject 
to sexual representation in the output I have selected, attempts to both contain and 
negate sexuality (and gender) are raised through identifications in the gap between this 
similarity and differentiation.  It is also important to note that I am isolating several 
‘instances’ within each contextual chapter to position critically and analytically in 
relation to broader trends aligned to gay male culture, desire, and representation 
examined throughout the thesis.  On tumblr.com, three key blogs and their key visual 
features / representational pratices are utilised in the contextual analysis; several key 
films produced by Triga and scenes from within those films are examined; and, on 
dudesnude.com several features of the website are examined and discussed analytically 
to shape and frame the key points raised.  In the next three sub-sections, each 
contextual instance is configured and defined to illustrate both how and why they may 
be useful in a psychoanalytic reading of the gay male subject of desire and the move 
towards ’Bodies that Stutter’  that are expressed through the jouissance of the ‘Other’. 
They also continue to account for methodological and ethical concerns which have 
assisted in the  evolution of the thesis’s conceptual and analytical argument based on 
the claim that conflicts and contrasts between metaphoric/metonymic and 
personal/impersonal modes of identity/identification eventually allow for something 
of jouissance to be articulated and represented in the dissonance of ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’.  
In addition to these concerns and approaches, it is also important to the research to 
emphasise that the three contextual chapters are not positioned and read as qualitative 
case studies or conventional visual analyses that ‘seek to identify and describe before 
trying to analyse and theorise’ (Stark and Torrance in Somekh and Lewin, 2005, p.33).  
Additionally, this thesis is neither a self-reflective nor a self-reflexive process of visual 
research, in that it follows a methodological approach that critically addresses the 
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pragmatics of an ethical approach whilst critically developing ontology and 
psychoanalysis to address ‘an on-going dialectic based on the tension between inter-
subjectivity and individuality in relational life (and therefore in thinking and action)’ 
(Holloway, 2008, p, 4-5).  If the gay male self (myself) holds as a critical self, then 
that self is also framed in ‘an evolving perspective, resulting from successive 
encapsulations […] created within the research process’ (Brown and Teggs, 2010, 
p.296).  This methodological and the ethical approach also acknowledges the issue of 
gay male self-reflexivity in the research and, more specifically in this instance, the 
problems of the research becoming an explicit exercise in psychoanalytic meta-
analysis, obscure theoretical rhetoric, or anecdotal deconstruction.  This also indicates 
that there needs to be distancing of the researcher from this excessive form of 
methodological reflexivity, in terms of how an epistemological and ontological gay 
male self and gay male desire are captured and expressed.   
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Confessions (1996 [1781]), which underline ‘a complete, 
uninhibited and unapologetic representation of himself’ (Mansfield, 2000, p.16), 
highlight this contention.  The confessional or diaristic space through which the 
individual writes, speaks, and represents allows for the anecdotal, abstract, and 
ultimately subjective expression of desire to occur.  Using this line of enquiry, a gay 
male researcher, like Tony E. Adams (2011), positions his work as ‘auto-ethnography’.  
This is work that is intentionally nuanced and interrupted with personal recollection, 
interviews, oral histories and analytical observation related to same-sex attraction in 
media representation.  This approach is too close to a process of self-analysis and the 
use of jouissance emphasised throughout the thesis and, thus, connected to identity 
and identification, personality and impersonality, and metaphor and metonym are 
evidence for this. 
Mary Thomas’ work examines the use of psychoanalysis in the qualitative data 
analysis of interviews and practically suggests how Freudian approaches may 
transform what she sees as ‘the ontology of psychoanalysis for approaching 
identification processes’ (Thomas, 2007, p.539).  Yet, if the unconscious processes of 
desire are in some way brought to bear in the research process, they need to be aligned 
to how the ambivalences riven through gay masculinity are ontologically displayed 
and displaced through regulated modes of gendered and sexualised identification.   
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Yet, as a researcher using methodological approaches that may offend or shock, the 
potential originality of the research is also its trap or limitation, in that philosophical, 
psychoanalytical, ethical, and cultural enquiry ‘is full of muddy ambiguity and 
multiple trails as researchers negotiate the swamp of interminable deconstructions, 
self-analysis and self-disclosure’ (Finlay, 2002, p.209).  Freud’s and Lacan's writings 
achieve a great deal through psychoanalysis in ‘positing’ and 'returning' the opaque 
and murky to a field in which the vacillation of personal and impersonal practices of 
desire and politics are made clearer yet never established as an orthodoxy.  Yet the 
ongoing dialogues  
 
3.5.1 Personal Websites and Jouissance - dudesnude.com 
The first contextual instance is the website dudesnude.com.  Established in 2002, it 
currently has in the region of 510,000 members and ranks 12,240 in the Alexa global 
online traffic rankings, having received 72 million hits in 2012 (March, 2013).  Whilst 
it is owned and operated by the London based software company Invades Ltd, it holds 
a fairly unique position in terms of its global market in that it facilitates global searches 
of men and is used and interfaced in ways that differentiate it from more popular sites, 
such as gaydar.com, and applications (apps), such as Grindr.com.  Yet, the logic of 
selecting dudesnude.com lies in the way it prescribes that its users adhere to a specific 
personality/identity (straight-acting, young, old, muscular, chubby, etc.) through a 
series of self-representations.  Identities are compartmentalised into designated 
‘groups’ that are intended to signify and characterise the nature of gay male desire, 
yetas a result, perpetuate an illusory politics bound to both gayness and maleness.  
Identities that seem to be coherent are open to an endless process of disruption and 
displacement via how they are posted and viewed.  Users also have to upload 
photographs of themselves and at least one of these must be unclothed (the site rules 
there is a requirement to have the user’s ‘shirt off’).  It presents and shifts gay sex and 
sexuality as the key factor of gay male desire and, thus, gay male identity.  In Figure 
3.1, ‘our (un)dress code’, and Figure 3.2, ‘about dudesnude’, the discourse of the 
website is framed and presented to its users.  Thus, dudesnude.com poses a central 
ambiguity in that it both assumes there is a type of gay man who uses and accesses the 
site, whilst producing and facilitating a space where all types of men who do not 
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conform or recognise themselves in terms of ‘gay’ can communicate anonymously 
with other men from all over the world.   
The politics that circulate around all identity claims make the metaphorical assertions 
and the metonymic potentials, also embedded in this thesis, all the more resonant and 
problematic.  This strand of the thesis will examine dudesnude.com to position how 
and why impersonal forms of representation and desire are formed on the basis of a 
personal identity politics; in this instance, secured and validated through identification 
and intimacy at a distance with other users.  For example, on dudesnude.com, ‘I’ can 
freely (without subscribing and without having a profile myself) begin my search by 
finding guys who are rated the ‘most viewed’, ‘most hot listed’, ‘newest’ or ‘recently 
updated’.  Also, and by navigating and selecting through a series of check-lists and 
fields, I am asked; 
To search the database and to choose whether I am looking for profiles, pictures, or 
video clips.   
I then have to select the content type ‘I want to see’ – the choices here can be left 
unticked to bring back everything, all ticked, or ticked in a series of ways.  The choices 
the user is given are ‘face’, ‘body (clothes on)’, ‘body (clothes off)’, ‘underwear’, 
‘butt’, cock, “action”, ‘Duo/Group’. 
Next, I choose a location from a drop down box – here I am asked to select from every 
country in the world and, once I have done this, I get to select the state, province, 
territory, county etc. and then city/town/village.  If I leave this field blank, it searches 
all locations. 
I am then asked to tick who I want to look at and ‘to show guys belonging to’ groups 
I am asked to tick.  At present, there are ten groups 1. Dude next door, 2. Fit Jock 
Dude, 3. Big Muscle Dude, 4. Bear, 5. Chub, 6. Leatherman, 7. Daddy Men, 8. SexPig, 
9. Couples, 10. POZ dude (designates an HIV+ user).  
This is followed by being asked to choose an age range – this is down to me, as the 
user, to type in a minimum and then a maximum. 
The site gives me the option to search for key words – this allows me to enter any word 
that I might want to associate with another potential user.  
Then, I can limit the results to guys online now, guys with VERIFIED profiles and 
supporters (guys who support the site). 
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I can also decide if I want to find new ‘stuff’ and show ‘stuff’ added. 
Finally, I can order results in terms of a ‘hotlist’ and/or most viewed’ – this enables 
me to see ‘stuff’ first that I most desire. 
 
By investigating online personals websites, the ways in which gay male identities are 
represented through image and text attend to how ‘gay sexuality’, ‘identity’, and 
‘desire’ ‘stutter’ when they function as evidence and/or markers for the impersonality 
of these terms.  Dudesnude.com is also ambiguous in terms of how it presents itself. 
On the one hand it functions as a gay social network/porn/personals website that is part 
of a vast body of online traffic that emphasises the agency and autonomy of gay male 
desire and the gay male body in representation.  On the other, the scope and breadth 
of images that are added, cropped, edited, and taken away on these sites means that the 
representations shift and move in incongruous ways.  This is also a feature of 
tumblr.com, in which links embedded in the other user’s blog name redirect to a 
particular post, so that image/text/link can then be re-blogged.  Explicitly defined and 
desire-led profiles and images contain an ‘open mesh of possibilities, overlaps, 
dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning’ (Sedgwick, 1994, pp.8-
9) and, within all of these visual spaces, the politics and scopic regimes of vision and 
visuality squabble, falter, and oscillate, so there is a perpetual rift in representations of 
desire.  This thesis suggests that the rift, the fissure, or the aperture in the representation 
is defined by an impersonality embedded in psychoanalytic discourse and the 
unconscious desires that destabilise the personal and ontologically ‘certain’ 
constructions of desire.  The thesis argues that all three instances encapsulate ‘Bodies 
that Stutter’ because they uneasily navigate their subjects, users, and audiences into a 
cathexis of ‘muttering’ personalities, sexualities, genders, identities, geographies, and 
lifestyles whilst also aligning them to particular epistemological paradigms of bodies 
that ‘matter’ (Butler, 1993).  These ‘Bodies that Stutter’ are formed through a 
‘combination-axis’ of muttering/metonymic, and mattering/metaphorical (Dean, 2000, 
p.184) representations and desires that occur in an endless circulation of imagined 
realities manifested as Symbolic and ‘Otherly’.  Here, both identity and identification 
(dis)embody the tensions seen in personal and impersonal, conscious and unconscious 
expressions of jouissance.  
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3.5.2 Pornographic Jouissance - Triga Films 
London based Triga Films was established in 1997 by Jamie Carlyle to strategically 
brand and market an alternative to mainstream instances of US studio pornography.  
All releases are rated ‘R’ and are mainly available to the consumer via Triga’s website, 
which markets itself as ‘The original British filth factory since 1997’.  For example, 
the DVD cover notes for British Bad Lads UK (2009) state: ‘Only Triga finds British 
Bad Lads like these.  But be warned, they might cum a lot but they certainly do not 
come easy! We have done all the hard work for you, chatted the lads up, got ‘em pissed 
and paid ‘em some cash and then served them up on a plate!  8 choice prime scenes of 
British meat, featuring real British Bad Lads from local street style Scallies, Sports 
fuckin’ Slags, Horned Up Squaddies hard at it, and fuckin’ filthy decorators pasting 
up more than wallpaper up each other’s arses!’.  Whilst much of gay male pornography 
uses a ‘trenchant version of heterosexual masculinity’ (Nixon, 2003. p.6), to elicit gay 
desire, the dominant rhetoric and discursive feature of Triga is the construction of 
identities based on an abstruse form of heterosexual and homosexual desire and 
identity.  These are marketed and produced in line with the specificity of gay sexual 
desires and fantasies, branded and endorsed by Triga Films as a pornographic 
commodity and niche commodity.  Here, the combination of the orgy or group sex 
scenario and the ‘straight’ or hyper-male participants also form an ontological and 
epistemological feature of gay male desire, representation, and sexually explicit 
output.  The key feature and index of desire in all of these productions are formulated 
and constructed on the premise of what may happen if straight masculinity/men are 
encouraged, subverted, tempted, and seduced into performing, displaying, and 
enjoying sex with both ‘straight’ and ‘gay’ men.   
In the gay pornography that Triga Films produce, the constructions associated with 
problems of identity and identification, personal and impersonal modes of desire, and 
hetero/homo masculinity both distort and serve to emphasise how binaries and 
polarities between the two collapse through the construction of the representations.  
Alternatively phrased: In a discourse like Triga, how do we see the psychoanalytic 
difference, which is a difference of/in sexuality, in that which is the same?  
Pornography refers to the social and cultural representations and performances 
associated with sexual bodies and seditious bodily acts and representations, even 
though, as the work of Lacan shows, there is never a simple (expressive or gestural) 
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truth to the body.  It is neither difference nor sameness, therefore, that can be used to 
ground sexual identity; and when this is subject to sexual representation in 
pornographic output such as this, which attempts to both contain and negate gay, 
straight, and masculine sexuality (and gender), the complexities are raised through 
identifications in the gap between similarity and differentiation.    
These inconsistencies and dense debates seem to culminate more in Triga, with its 
desire to present close-up, raw, and authentic sex, and, more broadly, in pornography, 
than in any other discourse.  This is reflected in the way that the pornographic image, 
scene, actor, and act spans and connects across photographic, filmic, and online media.  
Due to developments through the Internet and digital technology, gay men are 
producing and using pornography more than at any other time in history.   A number 
of American and European porn studios and companies similar to Triga have also been 
set up with the aim of constructing, marketing and dealing in the ‘real’ homo-
sexualisation of sub-cultural, working class, and homophobic male identities for gay 
male consumption.  These often refer to the geographical, cultural, and visual 
specificity of desire in a particular context, so that, in Germany, Cazzo-Films use neo-
fascism, sex orgies in straight techno clubs, and manual workers fucking on the 
subway as central motifs of their films, whilst the French company, Citebeur.com, take 
‘beur raciaille’ or thuggish Arab boys, living in the working class suburbs around Paris 
and Marseille, as the central objects of desire.  In the USA, pornography studios and 
websites, such as Fratmen.tv and realmenexposed.com are aligned to a similar index 
of gay male representation and identification that Triga Films evidences.  Yet, the 
resolution to use Triga Films is justified in that they offer an insight into ways in which 
gay male desire is reliant on impersonal identifications.  This shows how 
simultaneously restrictive and diverse gay male sexuality can be, as ‘an alibi for gay 
labour, a set of discursive gambits that mark cultural production as wrought by 
homosexual hands even while that mark is strenuously concealed’ (Villarejo, 2004, 
p.88).  Triga nuances this technique by using low quality camera equipment and 
pornographic actors who are often uncredited and unnamed, as well as self-consciously 
represented through a series of class-based, gender-based, and sexuality-based 
stereo/archetypes.  For example, Joanna Brewis and Gavin Jack (2010) suggest that 
the identity (and identification) of the chav in porn is something that involves ‘a 
commodification of same-sex desire via a particular articulation of working-class 
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identity’ (p.253).  They also link it, in this instance, to Slavoj Zizek’s notion of 
multiculturalism (ibid) and the appropriation of difference as a commodified form of 
otherness, Triga is central to the notion that pornography both symbolically ‘generates 
a surplus value’ or, more pertinently, ‘becomes an ultimately unattainable commodity’ 
(ibid, p.261) through its initiating and presentation of desire as a form of voyeuristic 
consumerism.   
 
3.5.3 Social Media and  Jouissance  – tumblr.com 
Tumblr.com was launched in February 2007 by David Karp and Marco Arment.  It is 
branded and marketed as a micro-blog platform and/or social networking website.  As 
this, it enables its users to post and view multi-media text, image, and sound files 
through the process of blogging.  This practice also allows users to post content, view 
other users’ content, inter-connect images and text, and, thus, navigate, combine, and 
link them to others users’ pages where their blog-posts can also appear.  As a vast 
global platform and mode of visual communication and representation, as of January 
31st 2014, tumblr.com contains 169.1 million blogs and 75.2 billion posts.  Each blog 
is centrally routed from the users’ personalised ‘dashboard’ and a user’s name/identity 
is traced and, thus, embedded in other users’ profiles when they view, like, or re-blog 
visual and textual information.  From the central dashboard, they can navigate through 
a series of conventional functions, such as mail, help, and settings and, beneath that, 
on their interface, seven ways of uploading content are also available.  Here, the user 
can summit ‘text’, ‘photo’, ‘quote’, link’, ‘chat’, ‘audio’ and ‘video’.  Tumblr.com 
offers a similar platform to other global social networks or ‘sharing’ communities, 
such as YouTube (launched February 2005), Facebook (launched February 2004), 
Twitter (launched July 2006), and Instagram (launched October 2010), in that it allows 
for small fragments (or micro-posts) to be micro-blogged from within a larger 
conventional blog and blogging site.  In this thesis, tumblr.com was selected as an 
analytic context because it was the   SNS / networked platform where the most sexually 
explicit and pornographically driven visual material was produced, shared, and 
consumed. The gradual emergence and popularity of how micro-blogs allied to gay 
male desire appeared and indicated that in line with the other two contexts tumblr.com 
would be a particularly useful discourse in terms of its methodological and analytical 
potential because its users have the agency to post images of gay male identity, desire, 
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and sexuality that they subjectively connect to broader personal, pornographic, and, 
thus, cultural associations and dislocations, posted online by fellow users of the site 
and/or user account.   
By considering how and why both heterosexuality and homosexuality have been 
historically and culturally constructed and regulated, the research uses and positions 
tumblr.com to critique the epistemology and, in turn, the ontology and, therefore, ontic 
nature of a definitively gay and male sexual identity online.  The analysis of 
tumblr.com identifies the impersonality of gay male desire manifested through a 
process of seemingly personal user-posts and, thus, user-identifications.  By 
addressing how the vast landscape of blogs in which both ‘gay’ and ‘straight’ men 
construct modes of identification linked to a simultaneously consistent and 
inconsistent index of visual desire and pleasure, this chapter also aims to position how, 
and in what ways, both homo- and heterosexual object-choice and desire are 
problematic when configured via the psychoanalytical unconscious.  The social and 
cultural representations of gender and sexuality that have been coherently, yet 
mistakenly, positioned as masculine/feminine, gay/straight will be critically discussed 
in relation to the ways in which these subjects are continually and perpetually 
displaced, disavowed, and attached through dudesnude.com, Triga Films, and 
tumblr.com and how these empirical instances relate to and problematise the concept 
of ‘Bodies that Stutter’  
Tumblr.com also links to the two other key visual examples of used in this thesis, of 
dudesnude.com and Triga Films, in that it appears to facilitate (through the 
representational space of the website as a social network/micro-blog) an online 
discourse of identity and personality that articulates and represents identifiable strands 
of gay male history, desire, community, and sensibility.  However, this level of 
identification with symbolically personalising texts, images, and tropes is always 
underpinned by impersonalising modes of engagement, recognition, and desire.  
Accounting for this, the tumblr.com blogs that have been selected to examine are; 
http://homo-magazine.tumblr.com/ also available as http://homo-online.com/  
http://actionrigger.tumblr.com/ 
http://nakedgayguys.tumblr.com/  
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The imagery that is continuously posted and re-blogged through tumblr.com is formed 
and assembled via a potentially limitless ebb and flow of representations.  In turn, these 
images reiterate and reinscribe established meanings and boundaries of pornographic, 
photographic, reality, and mediated discourse.  The interdependency of sexual and/or 
erotic ‘self-representation’ and ‘representation as construction’ which predominates 
through the selfie on tumblr.com also positions the gay and straight male body as one 
that stutters because it can only partially express its jouissance in terms of a Symbolic 
Other.  For example, the ontological potentials of how a self-representational image or 
‘selfie’  is ‘cropped’ and how the gay male body is (re)presented, using imagery which 
has been discovered and is then inter-connected to other tumblr.com accounts, blogs, 
and users through prior searches, is also evidence of both the personal and impersonal 
dimensions of desire.  The huge increase in the number of images of men taking self-
objectifying photographs of themselves, using the iPhone/android phone to capture 
their image in the mirror, or reversing the lens of the camera-phone so they see the 
lens as a mirror image is a key analytic aspect of this chapter.  In this way, the ‘selfie’ 
as an image-making practice instils an incoherence and transposition of meaning, and 
also offers up a new potential whereby the signifier unfetters itself from its 
significatory meaning and, quite literally, ‘exceeds its symbolic function, to signify’ 
(Fink in Lacan, 1999, p, 19, n12).   
 
Using Lacan, it could be is argued that a cultural paradigm such as the ‘selfie’ indicates 
that there is no truth or meaning except that which the subject attempts to structure in 
the associated chains of signifiers; in this instance, the continuous self-representations, 
bloggings and re-bloggings of gay male imagery aligned to sexual desire.  Saying that, 
the signifier still needs to be emphasised and examined (hence the three specific blogs 
that have been listed) because it underpins the Symbolic order, which, in turn, is a 
foundational aspect of Lacanian psychoanalysis.  Yet, just as Lacan remains uneasy 
and sceptical about the importance of the signifier, and just as discourses of ethics and 
more so informed consent underpin a project such as this, all of the visual instances 
examined in all three chapters attempt to dismantle the cogent signification of gay male 
personality, identity and desire.  This also unseats the signifier as a possessive form, 
and the Cartesian axiom of ‘I think, therefore, I am’ discussed earlier continues to 
splinter because of the signifier’s place in the Symbolic unconscious of psychoanalytic 
discourse.  Thus, the ontological and/or ethical subject of a master discourse that seeks 
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to claim their space in the social and hierarchical order of that discourse is displaced; 
as Lacan states, ‘this formulation totally changes the function of the subject as existing’ 
(1999, p.21) and, thus, exposes the subject as a ‘Body that Stutters’ through a setting 
which remains impersonal and vulnerable to the influence of jouissance. 
 
In all three of the following chapaters, the configuration and positioning of the gay 
male subject is constructed via the Symbolic space of language, where language is not 
a natural or innate feature but an unstable discourse that simultaneously binds and 
separates self and other.  Thus, language reflects how the representational contexts are 
inflected by the unconscious in that it does not form a logical and clearly stated way 
of communicating; rather the subject (whether he is self-represented or 
representationally manipulated) is the one who stammers, hesitates, makes slips of the 
tongue, speaks out of turn, and, as Lacan goes onto state, ‘utters stupidities’ (1999, 
p.22).  This is reinforced when desire forms as a series of sexual or erotic 
representations through language and vice versa and, in the Lacanian clinic, we see 
that the analyst himself must acknowledge that the analytic session is a spoken set of 
subjective stupidities, which are metonymically formed and structured in the Symbolic 
unconscious.  Through this approach, the displaced visual formations of gay male 
desire, personality/impersonality and identity/identification that are represented also 
go some way to reflecting the exigent nature of tumblr.com’s temporal and spatial 
fluidity.  Each of the blogs are presented as ambiguous spaces in which images of the 
gay male body, sexuality, and desire are simultaneously identifiable and visible 
because their subjective and discursive meanings and interpretation continually shift 
and converge at all times.  They also represent a broader trend across millions of 
tumblr.com blogs, pornographic productions, and gay male personals/self-
representations in that they rely upon established ontological and epistemological 
concepts of gay/straight identity and personality.  The ways in which all three of the 
contextual instances traverse is clear when they are considered in relation to one 
another and, more specifically, through the ontological dimensions of the 
personal/impersonal and the epistemological constructions of identity/identification.  
A working example of this could be identified through the fact that Triga Films has an 
officially endorsed ‘unseen picture’ blog on tumblr.com 
(http://Trigafilms.tumblr.com/), which is connected to many of the profiles that appear 
on dudesnude.com and, in turn, many of the users on dudesnude.com state that you can 
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connect to them in more ‘personal’ ways through their own individual tumblr.com 
blogs.   
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The potentiality that comes from ethically and methodologically ‘plugging in’ and 
‘connecting’ psychoanalytic approaches to other philosophical traditions, such as the 
ones presented here, emphasises how ‘the relationship of psychoanalysis [an non-
ontology] to philosophy (as ontology) remains much more interesting and intricate’ 
(Zupancic, 2012, p.3) when it is used to (re)think desire, sexuality and (gay) 
subjectivity.  By mapping out psychoanalysis’ relationship to aspects of ancient Greek 
and enlightenment philosophy in Aristotle, Plato, and Descartes, the methodology and 
ethical challenges of the project have underscored the ambiguities and contingencies 
of what it means to ‘be’ a subject and how this relates empirically to ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ in pursuit of jouissance and the subsequent signification of Symbolic-
stuttering.  Just as features of the Freudian and Lacanian unconscious allied to the roles 
of condensation and displacement and metaphor and metonymy have their ontological 
roots in enlightenment notions of autonomy, subjectivity, and reason, we also see that 
the subject who is formed under these conditions is a one transformed further through 
the concept of stuttering.  It is in the next chapters and through the analysis of ‘Bodies 
that Stutter’ that this stuttering is repositioned and examined as a core feature of gay 
male representation.    
It is clear that, as pornographic, photographic, and online media converge through 
SNS, they present to gay men visual documents as visual evidence of a sexual self who 
is both self-represented and subject to a complex process of representational practices 
that represent him.  Each of the instances selected considers how and why a potentially 
endless combination of sexual identities and identifications manage to determine gay 
male desire through cultural signifiers that are associated with a Symbolic 
‘pornography of male masculinity’ (Rambuss, 2011, p.202).  Just as Linda Williams 
specifically recognised that pornography was, in some way, linked to ‘the principle of 
maximum visibility’ (1989, p.48), there is also space here to suggest that discourses of 
online representation such as dudesnude.com, Triga Films, and tumblr.com are 
Symbolically bound to particular aspects of gay male fantasy and lived experience that 
involve volitionally revealing, displaying, and strategising sexual desires and 
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identifications to an unknown audience.  Pornography satisfies the urge and desire ‘to 
show and see what cannot be shown and seen’ (Dyer, 2002, p.191) and it seems that 
these three interconnected spaces allow for this ‘pornography’ of looking and being 
looked at to inflect, sustain, and undermine various scenarios in which images of 
gay/homosexual desire are constructed within the conventions of a ‘mythology of 
homosexual desire’ (Mercer, 2004, p.156).  These are often based on the subversion 
and assimilation of heterosexual and hyper-masculine sexual stereotypes engaged in 
sexual and/or erotic exchange.  In many of the instances, the aspiration to reiterate, 
embody, or encapsulate heterosexuality also occurs through the signification of a 
‘straight’ identification or a ‘straight-acting’ Imaginary-ego and other.   
Each of the three instances emphasises the representation of gay masculinity as a form 
of ‘performatively enacted signification’ (Butler, 1990, p.33) but, more specifically, 
they also align gay male representation to the Symbolic forms of jouissance linked to 
practices of  imitating straight men, self-representing the body, and reifying the sexual 
self as other.  In turn, this suggests that gay desire and gay identity stutter in relation 
to ‘the myth of a stable [straight male] self [as] pre-existing cultural codes or signifying 
systems’ (Hennessy, 2000.  p.117).  It is through the three inter-related visual indices, 
and the ways in which they triangulate, overlap, and contradict one another, that the 
representation of a conscious gay body and metaphoric personality will be considered 
as inseparable from a subjective, unconscious, and metonymically impersonal one.  
Whilst countless images in gay male pornography, photography, and online discourse 
subvert these epistemological constructs and ontological conventions of how to depict 
gay sex, gay culture, gay life, and gay identity as recognisably ‘gay’ or ‘straight’, it is 
perhaps when the visual forms that attempt to represent both intersect that new links 
and disjuncture between established boundaries of ‘gay’ and ‘straight’ male 
signification are extracted and revealed through Symbolic-stuttering. In the next 
chapter which examines dudesnude.com these interventions are presented and 
contextualised so that ’Bodies that Stutter’ become more apparent and connect to the 
lines of argument and investigation presented here.  
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   Figure 3.1 - ‘our (un)dress code’ - http://dudesnude.com/#undresscode  
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Figure 3.2 - ‘about dudesnude - http://dudesnude.com/about.php  
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Figure 3.2 - ‘about dudesnude - http://dudesnude.com/about.php  
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Chapter 4: DudesNude.com: Jouissance, ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and 
Impersonal Identification Online 
4.1 Introduction 
Building on the terminology and concepts developed in chapters 2 and 3 the ’Bodies 
that Stutter’ examined in this thesis have so far been located through exchanges that 
occur between the Imaginary other and Symbolic Other of metonymy, desire, 
impersonality, and jouissance. These bodies and their role as signifiers of gay desire 
have also been positioned in relation to the tensions that are amplified when the 
operations of personal and impersonal / metaphor and metonym converge. These 
conceptual instances will now be repositioned in context and applied to a reading of 
the gay subject online, and in this chapter gay male subjects both using and viewing 
the social networking/personals website dudesnude.com.  Dudenude.com is marketed 
as an online ‘personals’ space that facilitates ‘picture, video, and profile sharing’ for 
‘men who like sex with men’. On this premise, this site presents the visual discourses 
of the pornographic and the photographic as fundamental to a gay subject’s ‘personal’ 
male subjectivity and the pursuit of sexual representation and gratification through the 
metaphors of an Imaginary other.  Yet, and as this chapter argues, this process of men 
seeking out other men ‘personally’ relies on the power of a Symbolic Other allied to 
modes of metonymic impersonality.  
This is played out through the Symbolic structure of dudesnude.com and in this chapter 
it is examined in relation to the key contexts of the dudesnude.com homepage, 
welcome/search page, users, groups and the contexts of how it users post and exchange 
sexually explicit imagery. The chapter also engages with strands of queer theory and 
paradigms of the post-queer or ‘after-queer’ (see Ruffolo, 2009; Halley and Parker, 
2011), as well as theories of gay masculinity and online media (O’Riordan and Phillips 
2007; Mowlabocus, 2010; Cooper and Pullen 2012) which are allied to but may also 
jar with the psychoanalytic terms set out in the previous chapter. This jarring also 
emphasises how psychoanalysis, like the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ in this thesis, is not 
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governed by straightforward beginnings, middles, or ends. In this way it is suggested 
that psychoanalysis, stuttering, and the complex representational formations explored 
later in this chapter which relate to jouissance on dudesnude.com operate and proceed 
on the basis of hesitation, anticipation, exigency, and abstruseness.    
The first part of this chapter examines how the user primarily encounters 
dudesnude.com as an online space that seems to allow them to construct and control 
how gay desire is presented both by them and to them. It discusses the notion of 
identity construction and what this means in light of queer and online theorisations 
around desire. It also examines how the homepage and the welcome/search page offer 
a way of navigating the site so that both the users and groups of dudesnude.com and 
the site itself alert us to the Imaginary and Symbolic strains that give way to bodies 
that stutter. The next section probes deeper into the complex nuances of the website 
by examining how it is used to generate representational practices that users position 
as ‘personal’ through their construction of gay identity in relation to an Imaginary 
other and Symbolic Other. It then uses this construction of gay identity which 
manipulates aspects of metaphoric association to analyse the website in terms of its 
impersonal and Symbolic content.  This will also allow for the practices of 
members/users (i.e. the ‘dudes’ who are ‘nude’) to be discussed in relation to 
designated communities and groups that attempt to schematise something of their gay 
male ego, body, identity, desire, and subjectivity online.  Through this the implications 
of positioning, networking, and self-presenting pornographic and photographic images 
and information through personal profiles as impersonal forms of jouissance can also 
be situated and explored.   
 
In all of the examples that are addressed here, it is suggested that the dimensions of 
how Imaginary and Symbolic relations are realised on a gay male personals site can 
be better understood through their impersonal dimensions.  The extant literature allied 
to critical trajectories of queer theory and theories dealing with gay/queer identity in 
cyber, digital, new media, and online cultures strive simultaneously to present and 
displace specifically ‘gay male’ identities, which are (self) represented online as 
having the capacity to ideologically ‘open [...] up spaces through which to view, 
through which to pass, and through which to encounter and enact fluid sexualities’ 
(Pramaggiore, 1996, p.3).  Yet, this traversal of sexual identity often works through 
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the centrality of the Imaginary other as both body and ego, and thus fails to account 
for the dimensions of what queer studies and cyber, digital, new media, and online 
cultural theory can explore if they are connected to a Symbolic Other. In this context 
it is useful to refer back to the Symbolic Other discussed as that force which makes 
the ‘rules that I follow [and] meanings that haunt me’ (Zizek, 2006a, p.9). In this way 
and on dudesnude.com we see that the Symbolic Other could be understood as the 
scope and the constraints of language and representation that locates gay desire 
through the discourse of gay personals. In this way dudesnude.com may be allied to, 
or positioned as a Symbolic Other that allows and encourages gay men to 
(mis)recognise and doubt what ‘gay’ and ’male’ desire may mean in language.  In the 
following section, which looks at the homepage and the welcome/search page on 
dudesnude.com, we see that it is through the metaphorical construction of gay identity 
as a deceptive essence of gay desire that this occurs.  Here, we see that, on the one 
hand, there are tensions between significations of the Imaginary other presented in 
terms of a metaphorically gay personality and/or identity, and on the other, the power 
of the Symbolic Other and its capacity to position gay male identity as an impersonal 
and metonymic signifier of jouissance through displaced identifications with an 
Imaginary counterpart. 
4.2 Homepage, Welcome/Search Page, Users, and Groups on dudesnude.com  
Both queer theory and the discourse of online media are, in part, concerned with the 
contradictory, obtuse, or eccentric dimensions of identity and sexuality.  Yet, in this 
chapter it is not within queer or online media theory itself, but rather, via an 
engagement with psychoanalysis where the possibilities of querying desire and 
exploring jouissance is revealed. More specifically, and in a strand of the thesis that 
examines how gay male personals and, thus, gay male personalities and ‘personal’ 
sexual desires are both constructed and represented online, psychoanalysis 
productively fails to resolve the problem of gay identity, sexual or otherwise, yet 
continues to open up the possibilities of new identifications every time we re-engage 
with it.  In furthering how we understand Imaginary and Symbolic exchanges, desire, 
and stuttering in relation to jouissance and how it is used to closely analyse several 
aspects of dudesnude.com, we might also suggest that it is in the coming together of 
work in queer, online, and psychoanalytic theory that sexual identity may be pulled 
apart.  In this chapter and more so this project, this may also allow for an analysis of 
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jouissance that underscores and captures its Symbolically impersonal, oblique, but 
also futural dimensions.   
Output that has dealt with the analysis of specifically gay male sexuality and online 
media either emphasises and/or valorises how identity and the body are marked by 
fluidity, ambiguity, and confusion.  Sherry Turkle’s work (1984, 1995, 2005, 2011) is 
nuanced with elements of psychoanalysis and is, perhaps, the closest to a 
psychoanalytic examination of online and queer identity; whilst David F. Shaw’s ‘Gay 
Men and Computer Communication’ (1997) offers the first scholarly examination of 
how gay desire and identity are articulated online.  Along with John Edward 
Campbell’s Getting it Online (2004), a study of three gay internet relay chat (ICR) 
communities (namely ‘gaymuscle’, ‘gaymusclebears’ and ‘gaychub’), these texts 
suggest several critical issues related to the formation of gay male bodies, identities, 
and communities online but, in the end, they seem prone to accounts of online desire 
in which identities are reciprocated and not complicated through the Symbolic Other 
and jouissance addressed in the first three chapters of the thesis.  
More recent work specific to queer/LGBT media, by Kate O’Riordan and David 
Phillips (2007), Sharif Mowlabocus (2010), and Margaret Cooper and Christopher 
Pullen (2012), combine sociological approaches and thematic deconstructions to 
explore specifically queer and/or gay male subcultures online.  These works detail 
particular practices and do so in rigorous ways, but they do not fully address how the 
psychoanalytic dimensions of identity, sexuality, and desire are called into question 
through the Symbolic Other in language rather than transgressively expressed in the 
Imaginary.  O’Riordan and Philips’ edited collection, Queer Online (2007), engages 
with a structure that seeks to rethink, reformulate, and relocate queer identity and the 
queer subject online, yet does so on the basis of the earlier premises of queer theory, 
which privilege ‘the centrality of the question of identity’ (Phelan, 1997, p.2) and the 
Imaginary body over the Symbolic unconscious and the processes of identification 
which seem to underpin online communication and representation addressed here. In 
this way this chapter uses identity and the above work as a point of departure. By 
accounting for the approaches to issues of gay male desire posed in the first three 
chapters it may be more apt to locate its argument in line with post-queer theorists 
(Dean, 2009; Esteban Munoz, 2009; Halley and Parker, 2011; Halperin and Traub, 
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2010) who seek a way out of the bind of identity and queer identity politics.  In so 
doing they attempt to draw on a vocabulary which allows for a way to move beyond a 
politics of identity, gender, and the body as ‘other’.  Locating desire through the 
Symbolic ‘Other’ may also allow for a mode of (queer) theorising that continually 
que(e)ries the terms that seem to locate, define, and confine it as queer.   
In Gaydar Culture: Gay Men, Technology and Embodiment in the Digital Age 
Mowlabocus (2010) observes that users and members of the gay personals website 
Gaydar ‘are involved in complex processes of identity construction’ (p.102), aligning 
this to those metaphoric processes of building an online identity and profile that seem 
to unify the user to their sexual identity, selfhood, and specific desires.  Yet, 
Mowlabocus goes on to state that the processes of constructing an identity are insecure 
and also ‘dismantle the body of the user and create a fragmented and unbounded sexual 
“body-in-bits”’ (ibid).  In light of this and as a way into the investigation of 
dudenude.com we begin to see that the construction of an online sexual identity (both 
in dialogue with other users and through the edifice of a personal profile) can only 
constitute and humanise the other through depersonalised and dehumanised processes 
of impersonality expedited by the Other.  It is here that the metaphoric body is riven 
by the Symbolic and the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ discussed in the previous chapters begin 
to find their signification in the splits, ruptures, and jerks of metonymic identification 
online. In this way, it could be argued that the construction of an online sexual identity 
is established and sustained through the users metonymic stuttering or ‘bittiness’ 
(ibid). If this is the main constituent of how sexual desire expresses itself online then 
we can also suggest that from the outset the user’s desire and pursuit of jouissance 
may well be staged through the Imaginary other, but can only occur because the 
Symbolic Other has located it for them.    
Through the power of the Symbolic, the website dudesnude.com organises, 
personalises, and identifies for the user the dimensions and scope of how their 
jouissance can be Symbolically exercised.  The Symbolic Other of dudesnude.com is 
transformed into the Imaginary other of a ‘dude’ who is ‘nude’.  Here, the ontological 
(dude) and corporeal (nude) tropes of identity metaphorically personalise and 
momentarily dislodge the Symbolic Other and the metonymy that allows the website 
to function as ‘dudesnude.com’.  Through the personalisation and possession of a 
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profile, and because others also have profiles, it is suggested that whilst the user feels 
an inordinate sense of their identity in the Imaginary they also feel as if they get to 
control who sees their image in the Symbolic. However, it is might also be the case 
that the Imaginary register allows the user a lack of control and signals towards the 
potential of letting go and a proliferation of possibilities in the Symbolic. To add 
complexity to this exchange between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, it could be 
further argued that the Symbolic Other  is undermined by the power of the Imaginary 
other, yet, in a defiant twist of fate, it is still the Symbolic (functioning as 
dudesnude.com) that remains the chief agent of jouissance because the Imaginary 
other, as both the user with a personal profile and the viewer looking at other personal 
profiles on dudesnude.com, requires the Symbolic Other of dudesnude.com the website 
to be in place for that jouissance to be expressed or, rather, for it to Symbolically-
stutter something of what has formed it as jouissance.      
 
Of course and via a first encounter with dudesnude.com this is not immediately clear 
because it presents gay identity and desire at the level of the Imaginary. We see this 
when we first come to encounter the site via the homepage (Figure 4.1), where the 
signification of desire is expressed through an image of a slim and toned young gay 
man, in the most literal and intersubjective of terms – i.e. a ‘dude’ we see as ‘nude’.  
His head is tilted back and the image is cropped so that his chest is the key marker of 
identification.  Yet, immediately, the young, toned, defined, muscular, and Caucasian 
gay male body is presented as a fragment, something and someone we do not fully see 
and, more specifically, a representation that we can only view as a metonymic piece 
of desire.  Within this image, the pleasure that comes from looking is derived from the 
image’s metonymic power.  It yields this power by way of the model standing in the 
Symbolic place of all the other users and viewers of the site who both have and do not 
have personal profiles. Yet, in this image, the construction of metonymic desire is also 
metaphorically facilitated, in that the subject’s chest is displayed as a marker and index 
of the Imaginary user’s jouissance.  Thus, the image both contains and displaces what 
it is claiming to signify. The body is signified through a duplicitous index of similarity 
and difference, which, in turn, allies it to the problem of how gay male desire is 
expressed through the Imaginary-ego and sexual representations that rely on the body. 
If this body on dudesnude.com is the first signifier that the user of the website sees, 
they have to deal with the tensions between a body, that is simultaneously positioned 
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as ‘some-body’, ‘any-body’, ‘every-body’, and ‘no-body’, vis-à-vis its location as ‘the’ 
Imaginary body, as well as a Symbolic ‘body that stutters’, because it remains beyond 
and outside of the user’s control and understanding.  
 
This body as someone (‘I’) is photographed as something (‘it’) that the user is meant 
to sexually desire and presumably be familiar with.  However, his sexual organs or an 
excessively sexual pose are elided in favour of an image that aligns itself to an index 
of homo-eroticism that lends itself to aesthetic tropes of gay male youth, muscularity, 
and desire.  At this level, we see that, whilst his identity as the Imaginary other is 
seductively metaphoric, it is also undercut by the metonymic part (the chest) that 
stands in for the metaphoric whole (a desirable, sexual, loveable, gay man).  More 
specifically, the image itself is connected to the impersonal Othering of jouissance, 
which the site both instigates and sustains.  This is an image that has been positioned 
on the homepage for thousands of gay men to identify with, personally and 
individually, on the basis of cultural conventions, markers, and signifiers aligned to 
(gay) masculinity, desire, and the body.  Yet, the construction of it does not speak 
personally to the user as other; instead, it uses the Other’s impersonality and the 
imperceptible or anonymous eroticism of the signifier to imagine how gay male desire 
and its jouissance should be expressed.  This is emphasised further in the sites 
‘(un)dress code’ disclaimer (Figure 4.2  and also Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3) and the 
language of an ‘Other’ who both speaks for and prescribes how desire is perceived, 
expressed, and realised.  As a feature and rule of joining the online communities within 
the site identified as ‘Fit Jock dude’ and/or ‘Big Muscle dude’, it states that: ‘a fit and 
muscular body will need to be visible in the picture.  As a yardstick, the bod on the 
front page of the site is ‘fit jock dude’.  Appreciably less fit?  Select another 
community.  (Big muscle dude needs to be bigger)’.  
 
Here, the model in Figure 4.1 is referred to as a ‘bod’, who is then displaced to become 
the ‘fit jock dude’ and, on this, we are instructed that the model in the photograph ‘is’ 
this identity and that this ‘yardstick’ is an indicative rule and, thus, the implicit essence 
within the groups, communities, members, and users of what gay men allied to those 
categories ought to ‘be’.  Slavoj Zizek uses this term ‘yardstick’ to discuss the 
Symbolic Other by stating that, ‘the symbolic space acts like a yardstick against which 
I measure myself.  This is why the big Other can be personified or reified as a single 
121 
 
agent: the ‘God’ who watches over me from beyond, and over all real individual[s]’ 
(2006, p.9).  Here, this ‘God’ is the invisible, impenetrable, and always distant Other 
who, in this instance, is impersonally dictating and deciding in what ways gay desire 
and jouissance are positioned.  This ‘yardstick’, both as a rhetorical concept and a 
discursive way of maintaining impersonal control through language, advocates that a 
Symbolic Other undercuts the Imaginary other from the outset.  In so doing, we see 
that the dudesnude.com user and his desires are both negotiated and negated by the 
Symbolic and its power over the Imaginary.  This occurs in ways that simultaneously 
allow and obstruct desire, ways that may also be allied to Symbolic-stuttering and the 
stutter of language discussed later in this chapter.   
 
The welcome/search page (Figure 4.3) of dudesnude.com is also good example of how 
these issues and the articulation of Symbolic-stuttering occur in response to a set of 
pre-defined and designated sexual and social practices, associated with the gay sexual 
body and its Imaginary location in relation to gay male history, ontology, 
epistemology, and community. On the dudesnude.com welcome/search page users are 
‘welcomed’ and ‘introduced’ to the website, signposted by attractive content and 
persuasive language, such as, ‘check out 1 click hotstuff if you can't be bothered to fill 
in search forms’. As of January 2014, the site itself had ‘155,088 member profiles 
containing 1,261,802 pictures and 43,196 videoclips!’. This is significantly less than 
its market competitors, Gaydar.co.uk and Grindr.com, yet it categorises and filters gay 
masculinity in specific ways that adapt to and enable its users and viewers to consider 
that they are ‘in control’ of navigating the website as a sexual image bank, forum, 
network, and social space.  As users actively move the mouse to click, grab, save, 
copy, paste, and scroll through each page and each profile, processes of Symbolic 
access and obstruction also have to be negotiated and understood.  This relates to the 
notion of the personal profile or website as a paradoxical space for ‘identity play and 
multiple identities’ (Gudelunas, 2005, p. 22) as well as concerns that ‘personal ads online 
do their best to solidify, via questionnaires and profiles, the very identities that are thought 
to be fluid’ (ibid). These processes of personalising and constructing an online identity 
are most usefully addressed in work of Mowlabocus (2010) although several other 
studies related to language and love (Groom and Pennebaker, 2005), risk and disease 
(Bolding et al, 2005) and self-generated sexual content (Van Doorn, 2009) examine 
elements of gay male identity in the personal profile or advertisement online.  
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The language of the site wavers between tropes of Imaginary inclusion and Symbolic 
exclusion in that to ‘belong’ to one of the designated user groups discussed later in this 
section you have to conform, prove, and demonstrate particular types of corporeal, 
masculine, and sexual credentials.  In this way, jouissance and the desire to expose, 
display, and validate power and auto-erotic pleasure as jouissance, is a key part of the 
site’s popularity.  The site encourages its users to post pictures and construct their 
profiles on the basis of ‘checking out guys and/or showing themselves off’ and that ‘at 
the very least you should have your shirt off’.  Whilst these instructional elements of 
dudesnude.com are again allied to the Symbolic Other, it is through the subterfuge of 
language that users are able to continue constructing, signifying, and interpreting 
desire at the level of the Imaginary other.  We also see that, whilst the construction of 
an identity online involves the personal and metaphoric ‘choice of username, the 
images selected, the selection of information to be included (and excluded)’ 
(Mowlabocus, 2010, p.90), it also ‘raise[s] questions regarding the representation of 
subjectivity online’ (ibid) expressed through metonymic impersonality and Symbolic-
stuttering.   
However, the capacity to control your identity online and, thus, to restrict what is 
available to the other users is partnered with the possibility and desire to engage with 
those users.  On dudesnude.com, one of the central features is that ‘all member pictures 
are categorised according to what they contain’, so that ‘using the site’s powerful 
search facilities you can locate not just the kind of guys you like but also the type of 
content you’d like to see in their pics’.  As a result of this scope and availability of 
other gay men, the searches for the content of the image are allied to the type of gay 
man the user is searching for. In this way, and in pursuit of the metaphoric other he 
hopes will fulfil his jouissance, the user finds only the metonymic Other that impels 
him to keep on searching for that jouissance. When and if the search for content and 
user is fulfilled, then jouissance is extinguished and desire ceases to be desire because 
it has been temporarily satisfied.  This is neither preferable for the Imaginary other or 
the Symbolic Other, so we find that online ‘we move in never ending circles; [so that] 
we construct our technologies, and our technologies construct us’ (Turkle, 1995, p.46).    
At this stage it can also be argued that dudesnude.com Symbolically-stutters on the 
basis of amateur photographic (and video) media that the users upload. Alongside 
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elements of pornography, we see that desire is circulated through an interminable 
rhetoric of ‘gay’ and/or ‘queer’ personality and identity representation.  This occurs 
because the Symbolic Other sanctions and maintains personal identity and ensures that 
the users who are simultaneously posting, watching, downloading and sharing do not 
have to be overly concerned about transferential, non-verbal, and unconscious 
behaviour in the same way as they would in a tangible or ‘real-life’ encounter.  Here, 
these users become ‘bodies that stutter’ because they can present and manage 
jouissance through signifiers. Whilst this process seems to allow the user and the 
viewer a fluid way of enacting and pursuing jouissance it does so it ways which may 
also be subject to hesitancy and delay. Managing an online identity and viewing gay 
men on gay personals sites also involves processes and practices of waiting (Kielty, 
2012, p.5) allied to the crux that ‘while the Internet promises immediate gratification, 
the interface […] necessitates delays: logging on, […] scrolling up and down/left and 
right, opening and closing windows, clicking, forward/backward, and pushing the 
refresh button’ (ibid).   
Personal profiles also allow their users to manage and perform an Imaginary identity 
in more strategic and ostensibly impersonal ways than they might be able to in a 
personal face-to-face encounter, where bodies often speak yet, also, fail to 
communicate their desires. Mowlabocus also observes that the fundamental way of 
gay men using online media involves the initial process of creating a gay personals 
profile that ‘is reassuringly simple’ (2010, p.88), and that, on Gaydar.com ‘you do not 
need to act or speak gay, you can simply be gay’ (ibid, p.93). This also applies to the 
construction of a profile on dudesnude.com, yet when this ‘being gay’ (which could 
be located at the level of the Imaginary other) is undercut by the Symbolic Other, it is 
also met with some problems.  Just as the Imaginary other lures us into believing that 
‘to look at a profile, is to see the subject from his own position’ (ibid, p.92), the 
Symbolic blocks something of this ‘seeing’.  It does so as the user attempts to engage 
in processes of jouissance that involve processes of ‘looking and being looked at – of 
identification and objectification’ (ibid, p.91), which never fully articulate who that 
user is, where he is, and how his ‘being’ (gay or otherwise) is expressed.  In this 
instance, we see that users are seduced and duped by the Imaginary other into believing 
that, because they are ‘both the producer and consumer of the text’ (ibid, p.92), they 
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have the agency to post, self-represent, share, or block the texts and images that 
establish ‘an externalising of the interior’ (ibid) of their Imaginary-ego.   
 
Here, the online formation of an external identity functions through the precarious 
nature of internal subjectivities that traverse across the welcome/search page to locate 
a range of communities, groups, members, users, and search fields on dudesnude.com 
(Figure 5.4).  This also forms a central feature of how Imaginary and Symbolic, 
metaphoric and metonymic, and personal and impersonal tensions are displayed on 
dudesnude.com.  Its users must check a series of tick boxes to search for profiles, 
images, and clips and, to do so, they must also ‘belong’ to at least one of these gay 
groups or communities.  Just as Mowlabocus states that the user on Gaydar.com is 
positioned as ‘an object to be browsed’ (ibid, p.90), it is through this objectification 
that the user is also situated as the browser or, more specifically, ‘the discerning 
consumer, whose ideal image we as browsers must fit in order to succeed’ (ibid, p.91).  
This dynamic between the browser and the browsed or the ‘consumer/consumed 
dichotomy’ (ibid) is also allied to the exchanges between the Imaginary other and the 
Symbolic Other.  It is between them that we see ‘the multiple acts of spectatorship 
involved within the user profile’ (ibid) expressed through metonymic and impersonal 
modes of jouissance and Symbolic-stuttering.  
 
The personal profile of the user of dudesnude.com has to be connected to or searched 
for through a user-group. This also emphasises the ways in which Imaginary and 
Symbolic tensions are threaded into the user’s identity in their personal profiles 
addressed in section 5.3. Here, the users identity only becomes meaningful on the basis 
of how it is positioned and thus viewed through prior modes of metonymic 
identification within these user groups.  In the list below (which is also discussed in 
the Chapter 4) there is a summary of the available identities I can use to search for 
other users. The ten groups are; 
 
1. Dude next door  
2. Fit Jock Dude  
3. Big Muscle Dude 
4. Bear 
125 
 
5. Chub  
6. Leatherman 
7. Daddy Men 
8. SexPig 
9. Couples 
10. POZ dude (designates an HIV+ user) 
 
Within the ten groups that are listed the user’s sense of agency or volitional 
participation on the site and their pursuit of jouissance are designated for them in the 
Symbolic.  However, Imaginary forms of representation and designation seem to 
sustain an unambiguous sense of gay male ego, desire, and identity as an identity type. 
When users are searching and constructing their own profiles they are asked to tick, or 
leave un-ticked, men from these ten groups. Yet, this means that when they are 
searching for other users, and when other users see their profile, their subjective ideas 
represented through Imaginary and otherly jouissance will only be grasped as 
impersonal because they are located as a Symbolic Other.  
 
It is interesting to note that these ten groups are presented in an order that ascends in 
relation to the metaphoric conventions of desirability in line with the gay male body 
or body type that the site legitimates in Figure 4.1.  The ‘Dude next door’, ‘Fit Jock 
Dude’, and ‘Big Muscle Dude’ are the first types to be listed, whilst the ‘POZ dude’ is 
the last.  The searches that users can perform via the welcome/search page, which will 
return the ‘most viewed’ or ‘the most hot-listed’ users of the site, consistently return 
back the first three categories, so its most popular profiles (and thus users) are 
configured through the metaphoric notion that the user is an Imaginary other associated 
with fitness, muscularity, and youth.  In broad searches, where boxes remain un-ticked, 
this predominates and indicates that here, the kernel of gay desire and identity is 
manifested through signifiers that attempt to locate and validate jouissance as 
something we can rate and recognise. Yet we also see that jouissance is difficult (if 
not impossible) to locate or rate as ‘desirable’ because online ‘desire is fundamentally 
caught up in a dialectical movement of one signifier to the next and is diametrically 
opposed to fixation’ (Fink, 1995, p.90).  Nonetheless, and from this point on, and as 
‘I’ continue to search through the groups, ‘I’ am confronted and become aware of the 
fact there are now associations with the gay male user as less muscular (Bear, Chub), 
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sexually perverse or deviant (Leatherman, Sex Pig), older (Daddy men), and infected 
(POZ dude).   
These divergent groupings demonstrate something of the breadth of how gay male 
jouissance can be represented when these men are organised through metaphoric 
identities and Imaginary identification.  Yet, interestingly, these metaphors are also 
ones that are only understood because of the metonymic capacity of the search method.  
In effect, the reciprocal or cohesive identities that are ‘grouped’ have the potential to 
splinter and overlap through alternative identifications.  If I leave all of the groups ‘un-
ticked’ then all of the search results are brought back and my desire is less specific.  
However, if I select a series of ticks across a number of the search fields then my desire 
is condensed down and it becomes more preferential and precise.  Here, the rule being 
that the fewer boxes I tick, the broader my search will be and my desires will remain 
unspecific and expansive.  The user is asked to combine ticks and un-ticks to return 
profiles of men who he imagines are metaphorically aligned to his own identity.  Yet, 
due to the ways in which ticking and un-ticking can be combined, and because search 
results will vary across content and user type, we find that the process of searching 
itself is transposed into an exercise in metonymic identification and Symbolic-
stuttering bound to indeterminacy and capriciousness.   
By ticking and un-ticking, the user feels he is able to identify with the causes of his 
jouissance yet these causes are already in place for him to choose.  In the metaphorical 
pursuit of the Imaginary other, the subject must select (that is tick or untick) and, thus, 
pre-empt the thrill of jouissance at the level of the Symbolic Other.  The user must 
engage with a Symbolic form of jouissance and an impersonal Other to begin to 
articulate desire.  The ‘subject to other’ relationship on dudesnude.com (regardless of 
the ‘type’ of user) is wrought with uncertainty, yet this is organised through the 
interface of the Other in ways that manage, categorise, and filter desire in terms of an 
‘other’.  This functions as a way for the’ subject to other’ dynamic to both placate and 
entrench desire through a metaphoric relation with that ‘other’.  In this way the ‘user 
to user’ relation on dudesnude.com relies on an Imaginary ego to posit the other as a 
personality and an identity ‘I’ can fantasise over, contact, communicate with, and also 
meet and have sex with.  Yet, this can only occur on the basis of that other’s Symbolic-
stuttering of language and imagery.  This stuttering relies upon a metonymic axis of 
identification, which retains an impersonal edge because all of the imagery, ways of 
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searching, communicating, and verifying are subject to a Symbolic force of Othering 
which regulates, sanctions, and organises the user’s jouissance for them.  The user is 
tricked by the Imaginary other into metaphoric relations with bodies and egos they will 
never fully personalise or identify, whilst also being deceived by the Symbolic Other 
into thinking that these signifiers of metonymic impersonality are the crux or 
demonstration of gay male desire and sexual identity.   
Within the user content of the thousands of personal profiles on dudesnude.com, the 
tensions between personality and impersonality, metonymy and metaphor, identity and 
identification, and the Imaginary to Symbolic formation are also evident. More 
specifically, the personal profile draws attention to the ways in which an interactive 
presence of online users requires an emphasis on their visibility through self-
presentation that relies upon precarious processes of metaphoric recognition.  Yet the 
changing innovations of many online contexts (in-built links to social networks and 
micro-blogs, the functions of uploading content) also requires the users to work 
consciously on the self being shared, creating a metonymic barrier between the 
unconscious patterns and processes that exceed the individual ego, towards a more 
‘nuanced account of what connects a text to the world beyond itself’ (Dean, 2000, 
pg.184).  
 
4.3 Impersonal Profiles and Personal Desire on dudesnude.com    
In terms of the networked personal profile on gay personal sites such as 
dudesnude.com the possibilities that could range from the searches and how they can 
be carried out are potentially immeasurable. The search combinations of ‘Who’ can be 
isolated (i.e. ‘Couples’ and the very broad connotations of what that may mean in terms 
of non-monogamy, group-sex, sex parties, fidelity/infidelity, orgies etc.) or combined 
(i.e. ‘Chub’ and ‘Bear’ who may be aligned to one another through the metaphors of 
similarity, signified through the ‘Chubby’ or ‘Bearish’ body, facial features (such as a 
beard), sexual preferences allied to BDSM, sexual fetishes, the construction of a 
‘straight-acting’ identity  etc.) can retrieve and return either the same user profile or a 
type of user profile that is allied through popular content with that type of gay identity 
and/or personality. 
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The popularity and ‘hotness’ stakes on dudesnude.com are both arbitrary and 
systematic.  In any of the searches and the combinations of ticking and un-ticking 
content and/or group preferences, alongside the drop down options of how you find 
users (most viewed, hot-listed, newest etc.), all of the returns are changeable and 
irregular and this seems to reflect the nature of online profiles that ‘rely on hyperbole, 
or re-position […] identification regularly’ (Gudelunas, 2005, p. 22). This is also due 
to the fact that user content (that is, the images and text located as desire in the 
Imaginary other) changes all the time (because the Symbolic Other allows it to do so) 
and, thus, affects the outcome of how jouissance of the user is situated and pursued.  
Whilst this thesis does not seek to analyse particular trends, demographics, and/or 
socio-cultural formations of users on dudesnude.com, at this stage it is useful to use 
the table and the hypotheses of the searches carried out to consider them in relation to 
the more detailed examination of specific profiles and their relation to impersonality 
and the intricacies of Imaginary other and Symbolic Other on dudesnude.com.   
If ‘I’ (in the position of the user) search for the most ‘hot-listed’ profiles across all of 
the user-groups, I find profiles that engage the other at the level of the Imaginary-ego 
and seem to conform to the typicality of a ‘fit jock dude’ who (as the Symbolic Other 
informs us both through language and visual representation) is mostly Caucasian, 
muscular, young, handsome, well-endowed, virile, and sexually confident.  Just as the 
representational practices allied to selfies on tumblr.com (examined in Chapter 6) 
attempt to repeat and reiterate the conformity and recognisability of this type of gay 
body and identity through the Imaginary-ego, we also begin to see that on 
dudesnude.com, the Symbolic ensures that this other is categorised and available.  The 
gay male other that is privileged, validated, and legitimated as the ‘hottest’ and the 
most popular (rated in terms of how many ‘others’ have been viewing the subject’s 
profile) evidences that, despite the impersonal capabilities of jouissance, the gay male 
body seems to fall back into the ego and the personalisation of desire again.  It can be 
suggested that the users, ‘see’ these bodies, and are seduced into personalising them 
to get aroused, to masturbate, to ejaculate, and then, perhaps, return to see them again 
at a later date and time.  Yet, this visibility is staged through an index of seeing that 
only occurs through the impersonality of the signifier in that desire can only be 
triggered, expressed, and realised through images and representations of desire which 
in turn come to both locate and manifest something of that desire itself.  The 
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excitement and jolt of jouissance on dudesnude.com relies upon illimitable 
representations that stutter and, as such, permit the Imaginary other to bask in the 
stimulus of ‘seeing’ gay male identity, sexuality, and the body in personalised ways.  
Yet, this personalised index of desire always remains impersonal to us because 
‘seeing’ the other can only be constituted through a series of representations.  On 
dudesnude.com, the other will only exist through the signifier and this continually 
returns them to the place of a Symbolic Other within an impersonal domain 
irretrievably outside of, and exterior to, our own and the other’s personal identity.     
Users who choose to construct a profile on dudesnude.com have to do so with both 
text and imagery. They have to conform to visual tropes of the dudesnude.com 
‘(un)dress code’ (see Figure 4.2), which states that ‘membership requires at least 1 
picture where your shirt is off (pants/trousers and underwear remain optional)….that’s 
why we’re called dudesNUDE, right?’, yet, for non-members, there is also the option 
of looking at all of the images and the profiles anonymously.  In the section of the 
website ‘about dudesnude’ (Figure 4.4 and also available as Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3) 
it states that ‘if you don’t want to upload your own pictures, you don’t need a profile 
– just search the database for pictures and video clips instead’.  Here, the subjects who 
do have profiles and appear ‘NUDE’ volunteer to do so, and whilst there are 
disclaimers associated with the protection of images, which state that ‘you can restrict 
who sees your pictures’ through the fact that the site provides coding and encryption 
to ‘make it difficult for anyone to circumvent the site access mechanism and download 
your pictures directly’ they are publicly available for anyone who has agreed to the 
terms of the site to see.  As well as this, the site also allows users to disable right-
clicking on the images they have uploaded and, thus, prevents people from saving 
images on their computers and devices.  Here, we could suggest that dudesnude.com 
occupies the space of a Symbolic Other that both regulates and maintains the user’s 
desires and their anxieties; it acts both as protector and dictator so that jouissance can 
be either restricted or realised through the others personal image/profile.   
All individual profiles are contained within and configured through the ten user 
groups, and the individual identity of the user is reliant upon, and also subsumed by, 
the impersonal identifications inherent in the groups and their members.  Profiles are 
located through the specific (and unspecific) searches for the other that the subject 
must participate in and their searches rely upon the pursuit of Symbolic jouissance, in 
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that they are aligned to a pre-existent set of search terms and groupings.  They are also 
assembled in terms of an Imaginary and, thus, bodily ego, which the gay male user or 
‘dude’ is encouraged to believe exists and applies to other ‘dudes’, their own identity 
as a ‘dude’, and how this is in some way represented as ‘nude’.  The intersubjective 
illusion of these community groups ambiguously positions the dudes and their pursuit 
of jouissance as complicit and persuasively connected to other dudes as both personal 
and identity-led.  Yet, through a Symbolic Other and the capacity that these groups 
and groupings have to elide and destabilise Symbolic modes of jouissance into any 
number of arbitrary and convergent groups, we also see how the impersonal 
dimensions of that jouissance can only ever occur through a series of identifications 
underpinned by the Symbolic. 
When the user searches for profiles by browsing the welcome page (see Figure 4.5) 
and in any of the searches that ‘I’ participate in, ‘I’ am able to select and combine the 
media type (profile, pictures, video clips), content, location, group, age range, 
associative key words, verification, newest, most hot-listed, and most viewed 
credentials of the user.  This works to seductively personalise other users so the 
metaphoric dimensions of desire seem to both negotiate and overcome the metonymic 
dimensions of dudesnude.com the website as an impersonal Other that is actually 
controlling the search.  Yet, the isolation of other factors, such as location, group, and 
age range, would illustrate the complexity of how the profiles and the user content of 
those profiles is always metonymically realised.  They remain outside of the others’ 
control because they are always located and therefore belong within the domain of 
dudesnude.com as the Symbolic Other.  The searches are retrieved and returned by the 
search engine and facility on dudesnude.com and, at any one time, a number of 
unpredictable and even arbitrary results would be returned.  In the same way that 
tumblr.com (examined in Chapter 6) constantly evolves and changes its significatory 
meaning because its users are posting, deleting, sharing, blogging, and re-blogging, 
we also see these processes of exchange and signification on dudesnude.com.  Here 
the vast scope and series of combinations that could be entered into a search for an 
‘other’ indicate that, from the outset, the location of desire is never clear.  Whilst the 
user profiles and the processes of ticking and un-ticking categories and content allow 
the user and the other to negotiate their desire through the metaphorical and Imaginary 
other (the other users), it is only the metonymic and Symbolic Other (dudesnude.com) 
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that is both capable and also responsible for how that desire Symbolically-stutters 
when it is attained, expressed, and momentarily satisfied as a form of jouissance in the 
Symbolic.  
Online ‘dudes’ (users) have the potential to connect, share via other social networks, 
and verify profiles with other dudesnude.com users, whose identities may be revealed 
or remain anonymous.  Many of the users are porn-stars and link or embed their 
personal profiles with imagery and footage from studio-based productions alongside 
amateur footage of themselves and, in many cases, selfies they have taken.  In this 
case, the dudes are never affiliated with a coherent ‘I’, ‘we’, ‘our’, or ‘us’; rather, the 
identity (‘dude’) and the identification (‘nude’) combine to form an alignment that 
crosses over the established boundaries of language agreement, Symbolic 
communication, and Imaginary constructions of identity and ego.  Whilst any user can 
browse the profiles, the level of personal access and communication with other users 
of dudesnude.com requires a case-sensitive password and/or verification code, 
privileging only certain users from particular online types and communities to ‘log on’ 
to see information.  If this is not the case, you are told as you click on a member’s 
profile that ‘this profile is disabled, the person's web site/profile settings are preventing 
you from seeing it or you have been logged out of the site’.  This introduces an implicit 
ambivalence that, although we supposedly identify with the potential of other ‘dudes 
nude’ and/or ‘nude dudes’ via the screened interface, we may still remain impersonal 
– rendered anonymous, blocked, and removed from other users on that network and 
vice versa.  This complex interplay is linked through the relationship between the 
possibilities, as well as complexities, that arise in relation to Symbolic identification 
through the displacement and disavowal of Imaginary subjectivities and desires.   
Once specific profiles have been located through the complexity of the search options, 
the Symbolic Other continues its power by urging the Imaginary other to click on that 
particular personal profile to view the content of the user.  In this setting the profile 
content is always inconsistent and riven by contradiction.  In most of the profiles on 
the site we see that the users sexualise their identity and personalise the profile through 
the metaphoric discourse of gay sex.  Here the sexual interests they might list and the 
images they post connect their gay identity to a gay Imaginary other that is sexually 
audacious, available, and stimulating.  Often users position the imagery on their 
profiles with sexually explicit language and statements in an attempt to arrange their 
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jouissance according to a range of specifically gay and male sexual desires and also 
preferences that the other must have a prior Symbolic knowledge of to begin to 
understand and, thus, feel aroused by.  The index of sexual desire is condensed down 
by the user so that his own desire for an intersubjective and Imaginary other is 
transitorily satisfied and personalised – both for himself and for the user.  Yet, because 
the profile remains outside of the users’ control and because anyone can view it, we 
see that the singular personality of the subject to other (every other user of 
dudesnude.com) relationship is subsumed by a much more potent blend of 
impersonality, sustained because the nuances of dudesnude.com as the Symbolic Other 
are connected to modes of Symbolic Othering in language.  This impersonality occurs 
on the basis of the user’s reliance on dudesnude.com as the Symbolic Other as well as 
the broader dimensions of how the Symbolic Other can be located in relation to gay 
desire and identity to articulate their jouissance as Symbolic-stuttering.  In this way 
the user’s bodies stutter because they are formed through modes of representation that 
simultaneously locate and displace jouissance.  In the Symbolic domain, the Imaginary 
other is ripped apart by the user’s reliance on the Symbolic and its ability to 
metonymically rupture his ‘personal identity’ through a series of ‘impersonal 
identifications’ or Symbolic-stutters of the Other.   
Still, the profile invites the user into believing that they manage the Symbolic Other to 
locate their Imaginary other, and that this other will pleasure, fulfil, and reciprocate 
their own Imaginary jouissance.  Here, the gay male subject suggests an identity 
through signification, and both uses and ‘controls’ the profile as an apparatus in which 
to express desire through an Imaginary-ego.  This is why the profile, which over-states 
and excessively presents the gay male subject as a signifier of sexual desire, fosters a 
body that stutters on dudesnude.com.  In many personal profiles the signification of 
desire is understood through the rhetoric of sexually explicit language and the 
centrality of images which present others users engaged in ‘sexual action’, holding an 
erect penis, stretching the anus open, the cum-shot etc. Again and in this context the 
visual rhetoric of these images is utilised and positioned as the substance of the user’s 
sexual identity.  For instance many users post video in which they open their sphincter 
to the camera and play with sex toys and dildos to widen it; self-suck their own penis 
and/or pose in full naked body shots; suck and fuck other men.  Here, the sexual 
identity of the user overlaps with his personality as a gay man through the power of 
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metaphor.  Yet, the various sexual acts he performs and the sexual interests he lists are 
only ever established through a metonymic part of his identity and its signification as 
a profile on dudesnude.com.  Here these metonymic aspects of his identity are 
assembled and connected together through condensed signifiers which seem to 
construct the metaphoric core of him. Yet, when these metonymic pieces are viewed 
we could also suggest that they displace his identity in the profile so that it now 
occupies the impersonal place of desire where bodies stutter in their attempts to speak 
their desire.  By using the Symbolic Other to catalyse and stimulate the imaginary 
other as personal the sexually explicit profile signals in a combination of stutters that 
falter, vacillate, and, ultimately, fail to encapsulate the users jouissance.   
The user only comes to detect his Imaginary ego and the Imaginary other through the 
signifiers that deceive him to act as ‘substance [that] is actual only in so far as 
individuals believe in it and act accordingly’ (Zizek, 2006, p.10).  As well as this, the 
accordance and association of sexual jouissance with the wider dimensions of 
gay/queer cultural life also serve to humanise and personalise them in the Imaginary.  
User profiles both repeat and reflect the indices of Symbolic jouissance and 
metonymic impersonality manifested in the visual rhetoric and repetitiveness of of the 
‘selfie in the mirror’ shot, the close up shot of a erect penis, as well as images that 
locate the user through discourses of leisure and pleasure; namely, shots of them on 
holiday, in the sunshine, or other settings where they look at their best (at a social 
event, on a night out etc.).  In all of these images, the user only manages to capture 
metonymically an aspect of the life and lifestyle he metaphorically positions as an 
essence of himself in the written part of the profile.  Yet, between the written and the 
visual components, the signifiers of his body begin to stutter and energise his identity 
into Symbolically-stuttering because they fail to fully account for his personality as 
the Imaginary other. This leaves a gap in the Imaginary-Symbolic, and the signifier to 
signified relation, through the nuances of how desire online may be interpreted as 
personal or impersonal.   
In Seminar XX, Lacan alludes to this gap between the signifier and the signified as 
something that is ‘stupid (betise)’ (1999, p.20) or, more specifically, he asserts that 
‘stupidity […] is a way of collectivising the signifier’ (ibid) because ‘The signifier is 
stupid’ (ibid).  This stupidity is also the nub of how the Imaginary ego dupes itself into 
expressing desire through processes of Symbolic-stuttering. In the personal profile we 
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see that users succumb to the tricks and repeats that the language of metaphoric desire 
entices them into repeating. Their  repetitively ‘stupid’  collectivisation of the signifier 
occurs by way of the image making practices mentioned above (the ‘selfie in the 
mirror’ shot, the close up shot of a erect penis, and images that locate the user through 
discourses of leisure and pleasure) that place him in a conventional position as an 
Imaginary other and in relation to Imaginary others. Here his Imaginary-ego works 
towards self-representing and personalising his desire through signifiers of that desire 
for other users and his own ego to be absorbed by. Yet, because the Imaginary ego 
fails to see how it has been duped and how its practices of personal representation are 
formed through impersonal and Symbolic means it begins to stutter. In this way the 
images that are assembled in his profile function towards Symbolically-stuttering and 
an abstruse form of jouissance rather than a clear expression of desire.  On 
dudesnude.com, if all of the users are in some way ‘stupid’, they fall into the trap of 
endlessly, repetitively, and unsatisfactorily stuttering their jouissance through the 
impersonality of the other stupid signifiers.  It may be argued that it is the personal 
profiles and the images therein that occupy the place of this stupidity and it is here that 
bodies stutter.  This is because the allure and thrust of jouissance at an Imaginary level 
is made so stupidly palpable and enticing by the user for other users to see.   
When these levels of ‘stupidity’ proliferated by the Imaginary intersect with the 
paradigms of jouissance, Bodies that Stutter and Symbolic-stuttering we could suggest 
that the Symbolic Other of dudesnude.com allows me to indulge my Imaginary ego so 
that the ‘dude’ that ‘I’ search for can be as specific or as indiscriminate as ‘I’ require 
it and my jouissance to be.  For instance, factors, such as location, age, and whether or 
not the user is verified, may or may not configure in my search.  Here, the Symbolic 
Other gives the Imaginary other who both posts and views profiles and their content 
some scope and some flexibility.  The content of the personal profiles that amount to 
the most viewed and most hot-listed across the entire site also indicate how the 
Symbolic impersonality of the website as well as the metonymic dimensions of 
jouissance and stuttering allow for the Imaginary other to resituate itself in an unfixed 
and transient location.   
Some of the most viewed personal profiles on the entire site and the most hot-listed 
are allied to porn-star users and their representation / self-representation as a 
commodified brand of gay sexual desire.  Many of them also present   information on 
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their profiles using other social networks where they accessible (Instagram.com, 
Facebook.com, and Twitter.com).  This indicates to other users that they are 
individually viewing, have the agency to privately message, and, thus, can view the 
sexually explicit images of a porn-star they may recognise and desire from other 
representations they have seen in movies and online content.  Just as the porn-stars 
identity is personalised through the profile the user feels a sense of intimacy with the 
Imaginary other because the Symbolic Other has constructed an identity for them.  Yet 
here, the public appropriation and availability of the porn-star as a signifier of 
jouissance serves to impersonalise him because his identity moves beyond his 
corporeal and bodily materiality.  As a way to maintain and to sustain his Imaginary 
ego, he has attempted to personalise his identity by stating that this ‘verified’ profile 
on the website provides evidence of his true identity, yet he has done so using the tools 
and the means that are only ever facilitated by the Symbolic Other, in this case 
dudesnude.com.  The metaphoric substance of the porn-star as user and the 
pornographic presentation of his sexual identity will always remain impersonally 
metonymic because they are contained within a Symbolic structure of signification.  
The images we see as the ‘other’ act as traces of jouissance and imprudently stutter 
because they rely upon a Symbolic language that we can never full grasp or maintain.   
Images which are positioned as pornographic to stimulate and arouse gay male desire 
remain fixed and confined to the Symbolic as images because that is all they amount 
to.  Bodies within them stutter because they are confined by the metonymic, 
impersonal, and Symbolic features of language.  Just as non-pornographic actors as 
users ‘stupidly’ repeat and reiterate their gay identity those understood as porn-stars 
do the same.  They present themselves as pornographic actors, posed in pornographic 
ways, and their bodies must be signified in relation to pornographic modes of desire 
such as movie stills, photo-sets, and also selfies. Yet as markers of personal identity 
and desire they fail to fully satisfy and metaphorically reflect the personality and 
identity of their initiator and, thus, function perfectly as’ Bodies that Stutter’ that coax 
the Imaginary other into processes of Symbolic-stuttering in light of jouissance.  Here, 
the Symbolic manages to trap the Imaginary, in that it allows users who want to 
masturbate and fantasise over porn-actors, contact them, or, indeed, steal their images 
and present them as their own to do so.  Yet, when the images of the pornographic 
other have served their purpose for the user as jouissance and the Imaginary other’s 
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jouissance has been momentarily terminated (although there is always the guarantee 
that he will be back for more), it is the website as a powerful and in some respects 
persistent Symbolic Other that remains.  As a result, porn-stars are only recognisable 
and only exist through a repetitive set of impersonal signifiers that attempt to condense 
their personality and identity into significations of those signifiers.  In this way we see 
that Symbolic-stuttering and ‘Bodies that Stutter’ operate on two planes. On the first 
the porn-star as the user stutters because he fails to articulate the dimensions of his 
jouissance to other users and on the second the images which are shared and viewed 
stutter because they fail to fully articulate that user as an identity to the viewers who 
engage with them.  
These profiles and the images within them are riven by the power that the website 
yields when it is positioned as the Symbolic Other. Through this power it has the 
capacity to persuade its users that by adopting a personal identity online via a profile 
their Imaginary ego and the Imaginary other relation will fulfil their desire. In this way 
the users of dudesnude.com who post images and text to their own profiles, yet also 
view the profiles of users doing the similar things are both seduced and ensnared in an 
on-going tension with the Symbolic Other that oversees how their desire is articulated. 
In this way the Symbolic Other is the force that gives rise to ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and 
more so Symbolic-stuttering.  As we have seen, elements of the site offer inclusion 
and exclusion from groups and personalised searches through a vast rhetoric of 
signifiers allied to how jouissance can and cannot be articulated.  This paradox of 
being able to self-represent your sexual identity and your personality as a gay man can 
only be achieved through the technicalities and/or systematics of the site (and the 
internet more generally), and it is this fact that tethers the personalisation of desire and 
jouissance to the metonymic and impersonal identification with a functional device 
that the user must grasp to be involved, embedded, and, thus, interpreted from within 
dudesnude.com.  Here the proliferation and construction of an impersonality of desire 
is facilitated by the Symbolic apparatus of the website itself and the ways in which it 
enables users to personalise their desire vis-à-vis impersonal tools of use. In this way 
the website as a Symbolic Other becomes more complex in that it is consolidated as 
this Symbolic Other via of a series of Imaginary others and Imaginary relations.  Here 
the Symbolic authority of the Other and in this case the Symbolic language of the 
website are reliant on the processes of Imaginary transference that occur through the 
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construction and viewing of profiles and the dynamics of the user to viewer / viewer 
to user  relationship within.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Just as ‘Bodies that Stutter’, Symbolic-stuttering, and jouissance may offer a way to 
dismantle the Imaginary-ego of the subject of a personal profile and/or the viewer of 
that profile, and potentially the confines of gay identity, this way of reading desire 
online is not intended to undermine, celebrate, or legitimate either a psychoanalytic or, 
indeed, a post-queer trajectory of these concepts and their theoretical potential. Yet, 
what is clear is that, by using this approach, the Symbolic features of dudesnude.com 
convey and construct users and viewers who are not possessed of a liberated identity 
and/or empowered egos and bodies of much recent queer and online media theory.  
Rather, the problematisation of gay identity when it is configured through the user as 
viewer, and the viewer as user, and when it is positioned in terms of a body and/or ego, 
allows for an examination of how jouissance splinters both the user and viewer through 
identifications that both rely on language for an identity and are rendered 
metonymically impersonal because of it and its stuttering.  It is in the very fault-lines 
or gaps that productive and critical inquiry can continue to work with these fissures to 
investigate the gay male subject and, more precisely, the gay male subject online.  It 
is also through the convergence of pornographic, photographic, and online media that 
these tensions appear; identities become more mobile, problematic, cathartic, 
antithetical, and antagonistic through their egotistic sexual presentation.  Aspects of 
queer and online discourse seemingly position the user/viewer subject as an agent of 
sexual expression, possibility, and desire; yet, in so doing, the articulation of sex and 
sexuality fails, and, in many instances across online social and personals media (and 
the individual profiles therein), we see the subject shored up by impersonalising 
systems that attempt to contain their jouissance but always fail to do so. 
Joan Copjec states that, ‘Everything implied by the psychoanalytic engagement with 
human behaviour indicates not that meaning reflects the sexual, but that it makes up 
for it. Sex is the stumbling-block of sense…Sex is produced by the internal limit, the 
failure of signification’ (Copjec, 1994, p.18).  Gay sex online is, then, the impossibility 
of language completing meaning, not a meaning that is incomplete or unstable in 
language.  Alternatively, it could be argued that online sex and the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ 
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and Symbolically-stutter both form and are formed through the structural gap (faille) 
and incompleteness of language; not that sex is itself incomplete, for sex is not an 
incomplete entity here, but a totally empty one – i.e. it is one to which no predicate can 
be attached.  As Copjec continues, ‘Sex serves no other function than to limit reason, 
to remove the subject from the realm of possible experience or pure understanding’ 
(ibid, p.20-21).  Surely queer and online discourse allows this (gay) subject to realise, 
but also to reach, its limits in this breach, due to its failure to make coherent the 
unconscious expressions of jouissance through language and in representation.   
Lacanian theorisations of sexuality are interesting in terms of their gaps or points at 
which the formulas and the theories seem unable to resolve some of the key problems 
of sex, sexuality, gender, and identity.  On that premise, Lacan either complicates, 
refuses, or coaxes the reader, listener, or, in this instance, the user into the application 
of sexual or representational context.  Whilst queer work that engages with Lacan has 
traditionally been understood in terms of a pluralisation of sexual identities, there is 
no analysis of photographic, pornographic, or, indeed, online identity by Lacan 
himself.  Thus, from the outset, his work is better understood in terms of its signalling 
of metonymic and impersonal modes of sexual identification.  This stress on 
impersonal identification attempts to underline the processes and routes of desires via 
jouissance rather than through the instincts or identities from which jouissance is 
thought to result.  Thus, as the internet has evolved, our sexually personalising and 
corporeally alienating relationship with an Imaginary other has been transformed 
through ambivalently personal and impersonal experiences and interactions associated 
with sex and sexuality that catalyse ‘Bodies that Stutter’ to do so symbolically.  In the 
next chapter, which examines pornography and jouissance in the output of UK 
Company Triga Films, the stuttering and impersonality discussed here are resituated 
through the convergence of straight and gay male identity in gay pornography.   
Triga Films is the most pertinent example of British gay porn that combines techniques 
associated with amateurism and discourses of self-representation also prevalent on 
personals websites, such as dudesnude.com.  This captures something of how a gay 
male audiences desire for ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ paradigms of an Imaginary heterosexual 
‘other’ are allied to a working class or under-classed ‘other’, elements of race, and 
more specifically the resonances of how a ‘dirty whiteness’ circulates Symbolically.  
By analysing several scenes and aspects of Triga Films, Chapter 5 argues that when 
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encounters and exchanges between men who are identified as neither ‘straight’ nor 
‘gay’ slide into one another they are embedded in modes of Symbolic-stuttering, 
‘Bodies that Stutter’, and jouissance specific to gay pornography but, more so, an 
index of impersonal identification that is particular to Triga Films.  Alongside this, the 
next chapter aims to address the commodification of the ‘disgusting’ figure of the chav 
which gay men visually desire and consume in terms of ‘Bodies that Stutter’.  It also 
argues that Triga Films forms an ambivalent dialogue of identification with the chav, 
which relies on this straight, under-classed, and ‘dirty white other’ as a simultaneously 
abject and desirable figure.  Just as Joanna Brewis and Gavin Jack (2010) understand 
this through the discursive construction of ‘gay chavinism’, which, in its broadest 
form, relates to ‘a growing appetite amongst gay men for seemingly downwardly 
mobile sexual experiences’ (ibid, p.252), the next chapter suggests that it is also a key 
mode of Symbolic-stuttering and ‘Bodies that Stutter’in Triga Films but also gay 
pornography more generally.   
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Figure 4.1 - http://dudesnude.com/  
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 Figure 4.2 - ‘our (un)dress code’ http://dudesnude.com/#undresscode 
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Figure 4.3 - http://dudesnude.com/search  
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Figure 4.4 - ‘about dudesnude - http://dudesnude.com/about.php  
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Figure 4.5 - The Browser / Welcome Page - http://dudesnude.com/browse.php  
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Chapter 5:  Triga  Films: Impersonality, Jouissance and ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ in Gay Pornography  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The focus of this chapter is on gay pornography and representations which are 
positioned and understood as ‘pornographic’ and ‘gay’. Yet this positioning is 
problematised by the chapters’ contextual focus on UK gay pornography company 
Triga films where the signifiers associated with gay sex and desire are allied to straight 
masculinity. There is scope to suggest that it is within the paradox of straight men 
having gay sex, and its signification as pornographic, that bodies stutter. It is argued 
here that they stutter through processes of jouissance that can only occur within 
Symbolic representations of sex which both enable and antagonise the ways in which 
a gay and/or straight identity, personality, and subjectivity are articulated as Imaginary. 
By examining the discourse of gay pornography and evaluating how gay and straight 
male identities are constructed in porn and as pornographic this chapter suggests that 
the body that stutters is an integral element of gay pornography that represents straight 
men engaging and participating in homosexual sex. It does this through a close analysis 
of Triga Films, and in the later sections of the chapter, through an analysis of the 
commodification of the straight chav as a marker of gay male jouissance and ‘Bodies 
that Stutter’.   
In its analysis of Triga Films this part of the thesis will continue to explore the tensions 
that are traded between the Imaginary other and the Symbolic Other, and more 
specifically will examine how the construction of representations built around the 
notion of straight men having gay sex move towards a way of articulating ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’. The chapter will suggest that straight male identity acts as both a catalyst and 
container for gay male desire and in so doing cultivates a form of jouissance that 
Symbolically stutters. This intervention also focuses on the paradoxes between 
heterosexual identity and homosexual identification to suggest that the personalising 
metaphors associated with straight identity in gay pornography are displaced by 
contiguous forms of metonymic jouissance that stutter when they are revealed as gay. 
In turn, this renders them as impersonal and metonymic traces of 
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jouissance which only partially account for gay and straight identity and/or personality 
through a shifting chain of signifiers.     
The first section of this chapter contextualises both the discourse of pornography and 
porn studies and allows for the key themes of gay desire, straight masculinity, and the 
chav to be positioned in relation to the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ in the next sections. These 
sections of the chapter look at several aspects of Triga films in detail and do so by 
examining the material and cultural tropes allied to gay desire via an Imaginary other, 
as well as an ‘othering’ that relies upon and commodifies forms of straight masculinity 
associated with violence, homophobia, hyper-masculinity, and British working class 
identity. Reflecting on this¸ pornography such as Triga which is consumed by gay men 
allows the homo-sexualisation of heterosexual tropes to function in terms of a double-
take. Here, Triga depends upon and positions the binaries of straight and gay 
masculinity as oppositional whilst producing films which subvert, displace, and 
realign systems of heterosexual/heterosexist patriarchy, homophobia, and ultimately 
hetero/homo-normativity. In this way, gay desire and the spurs of gay male jouissance 
in Triga Films are also subject to systematic images of straight and homophobic 
hegemony that are embedded in consumer capitalism and commodification. This 
suggests that straight men in gay porn are visually represented according to 
conventional mass and sub-cultural models connected to the notion that straight male 
identity is both threatening and desirable to gay men. Yet the ‘threat’ of straight 
identity as an Imaginary other and ‘personality’ in porn is simultaneously appropriated, 
assimilated, and subverted through the lens of gay male jouissance which holds the 
capacity to render it far more inviting than it initially seems. In light of this, the chapter 
remains alert to the ways in which the Imaginary register of identity can only occur 
under conditions tethered to a Symbolic Other, and the issue that both straight and gay 
bodies stutter and continue to shift when they are sexualised and signified in relation 
to jouissance.  
In this way the Symbolic Other holds the power to cultivate an impersonality of desire 
via images allied to masculine identities such as the chav and associated forms of 
heterosexual masculinity in gay pornography. On that premise this part of the thesis 
continues to build on the contextual analyses in Chapter 4 to reinforce the idea that it 
is only when sexual identity falters in its search for jouissance that identity in the 
Imaginary is questioned and an impersonality of identifications in the Symbolic draw 
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us closer to the ways in which contemporary gay desire is expressed. This chapter also 
suggests that as jouissance is precariously articulated across a continuum of ‘gay’ and 
‘straight’ signifiers in Triga Films (and in gay pornography more generally) we see 
that it reveals an insecure and impersonal representational space where neither gay or 
straight identity and/or identification are attached to representational, psychic, and 
ideological systems which are coherent.  It is therefore the aim of this part of the thesis 
to examine theoretical and contextual instances which complicate the exchanges 
between these gay/straight binaries to understand how the personal and impersonal 
dimensions of gay male desire can be re-read through the construction of straight 
masculinity as both a metaphor of identity and metonymic form of identification in 
pornography. In turn, this chapter will also suggest that meaning in gay pornography 
lies in the axis of impersonality that continuously dislodges the subject of desire and 
more specifically the subject of pornographic desire through Symbolic-stuttering.  
5.2 Contextualising Gay Pornography and Porn Studies 
 
Interventions in porn studies which address the specific questions of straight desire in 
gay pornography remain less prevalent than work which addresses gay identity per se. 
Much of the work in the field also seems to circumvent the question of impersonal 
identification with a Symbolic Other in favour of the analysis of an Imaginary other 
constituted through specifically gay male bodies, stereotypes, and identities. In other 
words, the emphasis on identity, the body, and the egotism of gay masculinity in gay 
porn seems to do away with the potentiality of desire and more specifically jouissance 
which can work beyond these Imaginary forms of representation. Work which 
examines the history of gay male pornography such as Thomas Waugh’s Hard to 
Imagine: Gay Male Eroticism in Photography and Film from their Beginnings to 
Stonewall (1996) accounts for the role that pornographic representation played in 
relation to gay culture, the body, and identity in the period before 1969 understood as 
pre-Stonewall. It is however, work published in the period after Stonewall that has 
positioned how and why gay pornography has been shaped and informed by the 
cultural, historical, and political circumstances associated with the nature of its 
construction and interpretation, and why this has conditioned how gay male sexuality 
is represented and read in relation to gay male self-hood and personality.  
Output such as this uses theoretical work on sexuality and desire expressed through 
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gay studies and queer theory to deliberately question the stability and/or specificity of 
gay male identity. John Stoltenberg writing as a gay man within the paradigm of 
feminist anti-porn in ‘Pornography, Homophobia and Male Supremacy’ (1992) argues 
that the world of gay male pornography is comprised of close-ups of erect penises, sex 
between strangers, isolation  in terms of how an orgasm feels and ‘a studied 
impassivity that goes beyond amateur acting’ (p.157), and asserts that ‘The blankness 
of the faces...suggests an unrelatedess not only between partners but also within each 
partner’s body’ (ibid). Stoltenberg alludes to the juxtaposition of personal and 
impersonal features in gay male pornography in that he asks what satisfaction and/or 
pleasure gay men watching pornography are deriving from a ‘disembodied spurt of 
fluid to certify the sex is real’ (ibid). This illustrates that just as there is a tendency to 
read gay male pornography via the gay male body and the embodiment of gay male 
identity, there is also a way of considering pornography through the disembodiment of 
identity and the disconnected modes of impersonality that only pornography can 
contain.   
Richard Dyer also addresses some of these concerns in his essay ‘Coming to Terms’ 
(1985) by stating that gay male pornography has a narrative structure which 
corresponds to the Imaginary construction of male sexuality, identity, and gay male 
sexual practice per se. Examining a ‘conventional’ fuck-scene between two men Dyer 
presupposes that what is structured in the text is transferred to the viewer via six stages 
in the scenario – 1. the arrival on the scene of the fuck;  2. establishing contact (through 
greetings and recognition, or through a quickly established eye-contact agreement to 
fuck); 3. Undressing; 4. Exploring various parts of the body; 5. Coming; 6. Parting 
(p.28). Yet amidst the metaphoric expectations and excessive spectacle of the 
Imaginary-ego in gay male pornography the ‘porn-scene’ is in fact formed through a 
more significant Symbolic Other which oversees the conventional narrative so that the 
moments of revelation, ejaculation, orgasm, erection, and extreme close-up only ever 
offer metonymic displacement through the ways in which they articulate a need for the 
metaphorical whole of desire through an expression of the metonymic part as 
jouissance.   
Addressing these paradoxes within pornography more broadly we may suggest that 
pornography is both an ‘exceptionally ambiguous yet emotive term’ (Weeks, 1985, 
p.232). Using Rosalind Cowards claims that ‘pornography can have no intrinsic 
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meaning’ and that it is fundamentally ‘a regime of representations’ (1982, p.11) 
pornography is also a ‘contradictory phenomenon, riven by ambiguities’ (ibid, p.235). 
This in turn positions the producer, participant, and consumer of gay male porn (or any 
type of porn) as ultimately subjective and unpredictable in terms of what sexually 
explicit representation, meaning, and interpretation constitute in relation to sexual 
desire. This precarious contingency can also be seen in the tensions played out between 
Imaginary and Symbolic forms of representation in pornography. The strains between 
them shape a gap between what we imagine the sexual identity or act is (an 
identification with the other at an Imaginary level), and the Other indices of 
representations that come to both bear (hold, contain) and lay bare (expose, reveal) 
sexual desire as pornographic desire in Symbolic ways. These claims associated with 
the Imaginary to Symbolic relation alongside of the issue that ‘we are still learning a 
proper pedagogy of pornography’ (Williams, 2004a, p.21) are also allied to the 
advance of pornography as a scholarly discourse and particularly how porn studies 
within academia has been circulated, linked, and exchanged as something that 
‘addresses a veritable explosion of sexually explicit materials that cry out for better 
understanding’ (ibid, p.1).  
The study of porn may be best understood through three spheres of enquiry; 1. The 
radical feminist anti-porn debates which critically use both Marxism and 
psychoanalysis to situate male dominance and female subordination. 2. Porn studies 
and the popularisation of ‘transgressive ontologies’ as discursive paradigms. 3. 
Responses within gay studies / queer theory. Whilst, problematically liked, this critical 
body examines popular media and capitalism as conditions through which the gay and 
male pornographic text, pornographic consumer, porn-star, and pornographer as 
commodity come to ambiguously construct gay and/or straight masculinity as 
desirable. In the 1970’s responses from radical second wave feminism / anti-
pornography feminists and their political use of Lacanian and Freudian psychoanalytic 
terms carved out a position for the (anti) pornographic in terms of a feminist identity. 
Yet, within epistemological notions of the pornographic that have polarised ontologies 
as feminine/masculine, dominant/subordinate, active/passive as well as 
personal/impersonal there is an indication of something not revealed in the binary. In 
this gap the production and consumption of pornography opens up new ways of 
interpreting its prurience. Just as psychoanalytical discourse complicates desire, we 
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also see that the arbitrary discourse of pornography offers no coherent epistemology 
or chronological history to its own meaning. Joseph W. Slade’s Pornography and 
Sexual Representation: A Reference Guide (2001) is a vast contemporary resource 
which determines and locates pornographic discourse but issues allied to pornographic 
desire are chronologically and thematically organised as a reference book / 
encyclopaedic resource biased to American definitions of pornography. Whereas 
Foucault’s three volumes of The History of Sexuality (2002) proficiently deals with 
sexuality as a discourse it does not address the epistemological discourse of 
pornography in any clear detail. 
Over the last 25 years scholars in queer, gay, gender, and sexuality studies (Burston 
and Richardson 1995; Feasey, 2008; McNair, 2002; Medhurst and Munt, 1997; 
Sanderson, 1995; Sinfield, 1994, 1998) have examined how intersections and 
ambiguities in mass and sub-cultural representation have both facilitated and 
problematised the meaning of gay male identity in media. Recent work in the field of 
porn studies has also scrutinised the potential overlaps between the construction of 
subversive gay male identities and identifications (Attwood, 2009; Boyle, 2010; Cante 
and Restivo, 2004; Escoffier, 2003;  Mowlabocus, 2010), whilst work related to 
documenting how tropes of gay male identity such as coming out (Plummer, 1995; 
Weeks, 1977) effeminacy (Bergling, 2001; Sinfield, 1994, 1998;), and camp (Cleto 
1999; Meyer, 1994) are ambiguously linked to mediated images of gay desire and 
identity. In turn, the discourse of gay visibility and sociality seems to distance 
politically affirmative, public, subversive, and manifestly ‘gay’ modes of identity and 
identification from those associated with aspects of gay male sexual desire reliant on 
straight masculinity in pornographic representation such as Triga Films. 
Paradoxically, this also suggests that whilst sexual desire has intensified in terms of 
how it is expressed, it has also become less dissident and itinerant through paradigms 
of pornographic representation in capitalism (Hennessey, 2000, p.109). This, in turn, 
may also be a significant feature of porn studies itself which has to deal with the 
tensions between pornography as conventional and subversive, articulate and 
inarticulate, personal and impersonal.   
Some of these concerns aligned to pornography as a part of ‘capitals insidious and 
relentless expansion’ (ibid), are emblematic of some radical second wave feminist 
work often referred to as ‘anti-porn’ which investigates the nature of pornography as 
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a violation of women’s civil rights in capitalist societies.  The work of Andrea Dworkin 
in Woman Hating: A Radical Look at Sexuality (1974) Pornography: Men Possessing 
Women (1981) and Intercourse (1987) critiques pornographic output through the 
production of masculine power and discourse. Dworkin argues that it is only in the 
fundamental abjuration and disavowal of masculine power, oppression, and 
dominance (disguised as the eroticisation of capitalist and patriarchal power in 
pornography) that women can realise their own subjective sexual liberation. Whilst the 
output allied to these issues is vast it is Dworkin’s stance on feminine subordination 
read through hierarchy, objectification, submission, and violence (1987, pp. 29-32) 
which is provocative when considering how the articulation of a Symbolic 
impersonality in porn and also porn studies, alongside of gay identifications undermine 
the anti-porn standpoint.  As Dworkin positions these concerns as central to masculine 
domination over women, what becomes clear is that if they are transposed and re-
positioned in terms of a heterosexual masculine dominance over homosexuality these 
elements collapse and reform as intrinsic to the representational complexities of 
impersonal desire discussed in this chapter. 
Work which moves beyond the confines of Dworkin’s resistance such as Lynne 
Segal’s and Mary McIntosh’s Sex Exposed: Sexuality and the Pornography Debate, 
(1992) Pamela Church Gibson’s two volume Dirty Looks (1993) and More Dirty Looks 
(2004) and Linda William’s Hardcore: Power, Pleasure and the “frenzy” of the visible 
(1989) and Porn Studies (2004) realign many of the debates put forward by this earlier 
feminist effort in the field. It does so by using an epistemological identity politics 
connected to transgression and insubordination, yet it also struggles to move beyond 
the reiteration of discursive norms within the discourse and the identity bound 
ontological constraints of the body, gender, and sexuality which an engagement with 
a discourse such as psychoanalysis, or more precisely the Imaginary and Symbolic, 
may have the capacity to fragment.  Collections such as Lyn Hunt’s The Invention of 
Pornography: Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity 1500-1800 (1996) also use 
cultural materialism, essentialist / constructionist debates, and ontological theories of 
the body, desire and sexuality to position pornography as a historical discourse and in 
turn implicate ‘a history of porn’. Other critical exegesis dealing with pornographic 
identities and representations in media have addressed the ‘pornographication’ of 
culture (Esch and Mayer, 2008; Nikunen, et al. 2008; Smith 2010) and the implication 
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that this has on the production of sexual epistemology and ontological distinctions 
between the metonymy of impersonality and the metaphors of porn as a personalised 
experience. These tensions between the personality and the impersonality both ‘in’ and 
‘of’ pornography draws us closer to how ‘the trajectory of pornography has always 
been towards the vanishing point of this distinction’ (Hardy, 2009, p.3). In this instance 
porn is once more positioned in the discursive gap between personal identities and 
impersonal identifications. Yet we also see that when the inversions and 
inconsistencies in pornographic representation engage with the possibility of the 
impersonal they are also ensnared by the commodification of pornography and identity 
politics in capitalism, which in turn, becomes a defining feature of pornography and 
potentially porn studies itself.  
In McNair’s Striptease Culture: Sex, Media and the Democratisation of Desire (2002) 
this is determined through the normalisation of gay transgression and resistance. He 
discusses the mainstreaming of gayness by locating it chronologically and also by 
assuming that there is an operational legitimacy and evolution of gay identity in media 
and culture. In other words gay sexual identity is only validated in a discourse like 
pornography so gay desire can be imagined as both ‘speaking to’ and ‘for’ gay male 
identity. Yet porn also offers up a space in which gay identity is transformed through 
the ontological categories intimately associated with straight male identity and 
personality into far more indistinct and difficult paradigms of impersonal 
identification. In this way pornography is also a discourse allied to the motivation for 
‘gay visibility aimed at producing new and potentially lucrative markets’ (Hennessey, 
2000, p.112), and it is argued that gay desire is ultimately defined and produced as 
both a niche and impersonal commodity. For example, the Imaginary signification of 
something like a straight working class man is only enabled in porn because the 
pornographic text has been created through processes of impersonal and Symbolic 
cultural productions. This is a practice that Hennessey also suggests can be linked to 
the broader commodification of sexual identity and ‘a process that invariably depends 
on the lives and labour of invisible others’ (ibid, p.111).  
For instance, in Triga Films the ideological paradigms of heterosexuality associated 
with geography, race, class, and work based identities are assembled to privilege the 
Imaginary identity of the straight male other through metaphors of personality 
associated with that other. Yet, this also positions the discourse of heterosexuality in 
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Triga (and any other gay pornographic output that espouses heterosexual power and 
straight masculinity as the key facilitator of jouissance) Symbolically and 
impersonally. This is because straight (and gay) masculinity is always mediated 
through the Symbolic Other and the impersonal dimensions of identification allied to 
that Other. In gay pornography which advocates straight men having gay sex, the 
signification of straight masculinity relies upon the Imaginary other, but can only do 
so through ‘the symbolic efficiency of the big Other’ (Taylor, 2010, p.71) and its 
ability to produce and sustain ‘an ultra-efficient transmission of hyper-real signs’ 
(ibid).  
We see in Figure 5.1 that the Triga porn-star Danny Evans is represented in terms of 
this efficacy. Here his identity has been assembled and signified through a series of 
associations rooted in Imaginary metaphors of personality. His tracksuit bottoms and 
erect cock casually revealed from just beneath their waistband, his heavy gold 
necklace, tattoo, bottle of Budweiser, the Union-Jack flag, and the way in which he 
‘gives the finger’ to the viewer all work toward guaranteeing his personality as a 
straight working class subject. Yet this construction of an identity and its appeal to gay 
desire can only occur through the Symbolic nuances of signification which work at an 
impersonal level. When we begin to identify with him as a straight ‘lad’ or ‘chav’ in 
gay porn and when the Imaginary metaphors are read through the lens of gay desire 
the image of Evans can only appear through metonymic modes of transposition and 
his alliance to objects and images that construct him as ‘Danny Evans’. At the level of 
an Imaginary other this image may seem to locate the signifiers as in some way 
personal and associative to Evans and his ‘laddish’ or ‘chavvy’ persona, yet these are 
only possible because the Symbolic Other has located them as markers of gay desire 
that are situated in a prior moment of impersonal identification that occurs through its 
signification.    
In an image like this the visual index of how Evans is signified takes on a series of 
meanings in light of gay male desire and it’s relation to straight masculinity. In this 
way, one of the key ways that gay desire is articulated is through the pursuit of 
jouissance for straight masculine identities and tropes of straight male identification. 
Here the politics of a gendered / sexual difference contained through straight / gay 
binaries also needs to be understood as both contextual and contingent because both 
gay and straight sexual identities complicate and buttress the rhetoric of gay and 
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straight representation via the dynamics of an Imaginary other and Symbolic Other. 
Nonetheless, this visual effectiveness also intercedes and governs how jouissance is 
expressed as desire through the intrinsically Symbolic dimensions of porn and its 
impersonal nature as a metonym and commodity. Here the over-arching presence of 
the Symbolic commodity of pornography itself ensures that the subject (in this case 
Danny Evans, but any producer, actor, or user / consumer) of porn can never realise 
their jouissance and personalise their identity in relation to that desire. As detailed in 
the analysis of stars, scenarios, and screen-shots from Triga Films in the next parts of 
this chapter, it is often in the Imaginary others attempt to do so (by way of participating 
in pornography and also consuming it) that pornographic representations only ever 
endure as Symbolic traces of desire which never sustain or fulfil the urgency of the 
jouissance allied to them. We initially see this in Figure 5.1 but it is also something 
that haunts the other representational instances of this chapter and arguably this thesis.  
5.3 Gay and Straight? Locating Identity in Triga Films  
John Mercer’s work claims that one of the central features in gay pornography is the 
discourse of the ‘heterosexual scenario’ (2004, p.157-8).  He suggests that the 
construction of situations in which straight men succumb or accede to gay sex involve 
‘straight men being inducted into the joys of gay sex’ (ibid, p.157) or straight men 
‘using the opportunity of gay sex as an outlet for […] uncontrollable sexual urges’ 
(ibid).  Whilst Mercer claims that the homophobic specificity of these sorts of 
representations ‘celebrate[s] and affirm hegemonic masculinity by eroticising the 
heterosexual male and his milieu’ (ibid), they also have the power to Symbolically 
construct representations of straight men having gay sex that are disruptive to this 
hegemony. Still, this disruptive element and its subversive and/or transgressive 
capacities also create new boundaries of desire because porn is situated as ‘a genre 
within the capitalist system of production and consumption’ (ibid, p.155) which 
paradoxically ‘challenges the dominant, heterosexual ideology that underpins 
capitalism, through its celebration and articulation of desires and sexualities that are 
widely regarded as taboo’ (ibid). This conflict is also connected to the idea that gay 
porn is ‘normative and concerned with repetition’ (ibid, p.154), in that it seduces 
consumers and users into identifying recognisably gay and straight identities whilst 
also containing the potential to express desire through ambiguous identifications.  
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Richard Rambuss (2011) has also  observed that ‘...whether it’s for better or worse, 
gay men learn a lot about gay desire from gay porn – it’s that the indicatively male 
forms its core’ (p.202).  Here he suggests that the signifiers associated with an essential 
and unwavering heterosexuality are part of the Symbolic ‘pornography of male 
masculinity’ (ibid) and the ‘Otherly’ power of porn which is representationally 
intensified through the Imaginary other of straight masculinity and the Imaginary 
metaphors of gay pornography itself; He states,  
Gay male porn is dick and muscles; it’s hairy or shaved chests and butts. It’s jockstraps, 
briefs, and boxers. It’s a male fantasia of desirable and desiring men, some staged solo, 
most in couples, still others as multiples erotically charged erotically choreographed 
into group scenes. [....] the gym and the locker room, the barnyard and the construction 
site remain classic situational turn-ons. So do law enforcement and military scenes... 
(ibid)   
Here there is an emphasis placed on issues such as ‘transgression, the eroticisation of 
inequality and a valorisation of masculinity’ (Edwards, 1994, p.86). In gay porn, and 
especially in Triga Films these are organised and produced as repetitive metaphors of 
heterosexuality and/or hyper-masculinity. As Mercer also suggests this discourse of 
the heterosexual or hyper-male in gay pornography is concerned with ‘the all male 
environment [that] posits scenarios where the restrictions of the heterosexual world no 
longer apply, where, in absence of females as objects of sexual desire and release, men 
are compelled to use each other as substitutes, or where men’s true sexual desires for 
each other can be articulated’ (2004, p.156). This becomes the central metaphor in gay 
pornography understood as ‘normative and concerned with repetition’ (ibid, p.154) 
because the Imaginary-ego of both the gay and the straight subject relies upon and is 
embedded in Symbolic systems of consumer-capital.  
 
In gay porn such as Triga  films which utilises this ambivalence we see that the subjects 
and objects of gay porn are effectively compartmentalised into designated ‘groups’ 
which are meant to epistemologically signify and characterise the ontological thrust of 
both gay and straight male desire but as a result only perpetuate an erroneous refraction 
of desire, gayness and maleness. In this way then, the (mis)use of signifiers 
manipulated and re-represented by gay men that have been culturally positioned, 
sexualised, and signified as ‘straight’ such as army uniforms, scally boys, hooligans, 
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skinheads, bouncers, and working men, metonymically stand in for desire. In Figure 
5.2 which is taken from the feature The Sparky’s Apprentice (2011) the notion of a 
straight male identity is connected to discourses of manual work and the impersonal 
objects that ally straight men to an Imaginary identity as both a ‘Sparky’ and 
‘Apprentice’. In this case the four men in the image are positioned as electricians or 
more specifically ‘Sparky’s’. Here the dynamics between the apprentice electricians 
and the electricians that are instructing them are allied to metaphors of manual work 
and/or hyper-masculinity. Yet, the four actors identities as ‘Sparky’s’ are assembled 
in relation a system of impersonal objects and settings. The torn and paint splattered 
overalls, drills, tool-boxes, protective masks, and spaces such as the basement or the 
cellar initially catalyse an Imaginary space of masculine labour and the associations 
that are metaphorically potent in light of the electricians identities as both straight and 
working class. However, the personalities of the electricians are only consistent or 
indeed recognisable on the basis of metonymic impersonality. Their bodies are only 
understood as those of electricians and ‘Sparky’s’ because they have been constructed 
and in some ways excessively signified as ‘Sparky’s. Here a series of Imaginary 
metaphors are reliant on a set of Symbolic cues that tether the Sparky’s to the 
impersonal objects they are surrounded with and within this homosocial situation. As 
a consequence, the pornographic nature of the image and the broader discourse of the 
film itself seduce, stimulate, and dupe its audience into a rhetoric of what straight 
electricians would look like if they engaged in gay sex.  
Examples such as this indicate that it is through the affirmation of heterosexuality as a 
key catalyst for gay male jouissance that heterosexuality and its representation in 
‘heterosexual scenario’s’ (Mercer, 2004, pp.157-8) act as a central energiser of gay 
male desire. As these examples suggest, the transposition, adaption, or conversion of 
heterosexual masculinity into forms of homosexual desire rely upon the ways in which 
both straight and gay male identities stutter when they are expressed through the modes 
of the Symbolic and jouissance. In any instance of pornographic output understood 
through the Symbolic and the associations of metonymy and impersonality it is also 
through metonymic modes of a ‘gay and/or straight personality’ that desire is 
expressed. Yet, Triga Films are organised through the metaphorical ‘logic’ of straight 
male typicality associated with homosocial and homophobic paradigms which are then 
subverted, slip beyond, or chaotically develop into atypical sex acts between men who 
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are either labelled as straight or curious but very rarely positioned and identified as 
gay. Most of Triga’s productions follow aspects of an amateur aesthetic and do not 
credit the actors, reveal the locations, and in some cases the date of production. At this 
level we see that tropes of both identification and impersonality may underpin Triga 
in multiple ways. Despite Triga’s appearance on social media platforms such as 
tumblr.com (http://trigafilms.tumblr.com/), Twitter.com 
(http://Trigafilms.twitter.com/), and Facebook.com 
(https://www.facebook.com/#!/Trigafilms) most of the personnel and the actors 
remain anonymous and nameless, which serves to impersonalise them as Imaginary 
others and as a result add to their enigmatic presence as Symbolic reagents of 
jouissance .  
 
In Triga Films this index of anonymity is a key visual and discursive motif and it 
serves to displace the notion of a coherent gay ego / identity. The emphasis on 
identifications with sports kit, workman’s tools and overalls, institutional uniforms, 
sub-cultural dress-codes, binge-drinking of particular drinks, smoking, taking 
recreational drugs, manual labour, criminality, regional dialect, and social class are all 
used to identify an Imaginary hetero-sexed subject so that he can then be Symbolically 
homo-sexed and thus displaced and disembodied through jouissance. This happens 
because both homo and hetero sexuality are always tethered to the Symbolic order 
which facilitates the 'depersonalising' of how sexual identity is expressed. For instance 
the advert and DVD sleeve for Triga’s Banging Builders (2013) (Figure 5.3) combines 
metaphor and metonym to articulate and symbolise gay male builders having anal sex. 
The tagline to the film is ‘Time to hammer that dirty nail….get your hard hat on’ which 
uses the impersonalising notion of the builder’s tools and protective clothing to 
facilitate the image of hard-core penetrative sex. Here the problem of identity, read in 
and through the lens of metaphor, is in effect the problem of metonymy to the extent 
that the signification and realisation of gay male desire is always incomplete and in 
many ways oblique.  
 
It is in the re-organisation or inter-sectioning of this homo/hetero binary in Triga Films 
and through the identity of the chav examined later that desire Symbolically-stutters 
as jouissance because it can only be expressed as an impersonality of desire. Just as 
Hennessy suggests that elements of same-sex desire are configured in terms of an 
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asymmetry or tension that she calls ‘heteropolarity’ (ibid) it is evident in Triga Films 
that Symbolic tropes and practices aligned to British, straight, working-class and 
ultimately chav masculinity serve as both the metaphor which defines and the 
metonym that displaces jouissance . This also positions how the index of gay male 
desire and masculinity are interpreted in sexual representation by Triga which 
strategically manipulates a construction of the working class subject as a Symbolic 
Other vis-à-vis his construction in the Imaginary realm. Here the rupture between 
hetero and homo is reconfigured as a duplicitous ‘homo-hetero’ identity signified as 
both obstinate yet complicit with the heterosexual and heterosexist politics and logic 
of gender and sexuality. From here we see that gay desire and more specifically desire 
for a certain type of straight masculinity ‘turns around a particular kind of masculinity; 
pugnacious, violent, but above all straight’ (Brewis and Jack, 2010, p.261). More so, 
this form of gay desire relies upon Symbolic forms of jouissance that construct gay 
desire in terms of ‘a heterosexual male aggressor, pivoting ambiguously on the 
promise of rough sex and the threat of violence’ (ibid). This ‘desirable threat’ is 
something gay pornography contains efficiently and repetitively, and also something 
that the Symbolic Other guarantees distance from in that it can be consumed 
impersonally as pornography without the personal threat of violence and homophobic 
aggression.  
 
An example of this index of gay identification can be seen in Figure 5.4 where straight 
male identity and the nuances of homophobic threat are signified as desire. In an image 
such as this, but in Triga more generally, the central index and catalyst of gay sexual 
identification is articulated through the Imaginary devices of male heterosexual desire 
as ambivalently violent, virile, detached, powerful, and also menacing. A screen-shot 
like this is allied to a bodily rhetoric of threat and the notion of straight masculinity as 
frightening, intimidating, and unapproachable. In this instance the impersonality of 
desire works through this notion of the hyper-straight Imaginary other as one that must 
be threatening to trigger gay male jouissance. This image does not explicitly address 
or explain to the viewer that they are threatening; rather the bodily poses and gestures 
are constructed through ruptures of sexual threat and allure. The tensed muscular arms, 
tattooed skin, and menacing stare are exaggerated as fragments of straight masculinity 
that can only be allied to straight male identity and personality through their 
impersonal signification and exchange as gay pornography. Here a straight male threat 
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is contained as a Symbolic signifier of risk and as a result the threat is in some 
extinguished as gay desire. It is done so through representational guises of a straight 
masculine body that would harm, exclude, and violently disavow gay identity that are 
now contained as an Imaginary deception and Symbolic trace of their real threat. In 
this way the images and the representation of bodies in them stutter but we could also 
suggest that the gay male responses to them Symbolically-stutter because they can 
only be understood and formed in terms of gay desire through an impersonal distance 
from it.   
In John Champagne’s The Ethics of Marginality: A New Approach to Gay Studies 
(1995) it is through the impersonality of the signifier and the impersonality of 
pornography more generally that desire as personal is perpetually blocked. If we 
connect these tensions between personal and impersonal modes of desire to Triga 
Films we see that it is constructed and sustained on the basis of ‘epistemological traps’ 
(p. xvi) that a work like Champagne’s has ‘designed his [new] ethical practices to 
evade’ (ibid). Yet this drive towards a new ethics of gay-straight relationality and 
indeed a new ethics of impersonality in pornography is difficult to instigate and more 
so to sustain when gay desire is formed in relation to, and in terms of straight 
masculinity.  On the one hand, this realtionality between gay and straight male identity 
and desire in Triga Films is indicative of what Champagne see as  ‘monovocal’ (ibid, 
p.34), in that it is defined by relations that ‘cannot adequately acknowledge the 
heterogeneous weaving of the porno text[s], as themselves contested spaces of and for 
the production of cultural explanations’(ibid). Yet, on the other, this monovocality 
allows the convergence of gay-straight identity and desire to open up the possibilities 
of reinterpretation and incomprehension (ibid) that imprecision’s in the discourse of 
porn can only themselves reveal. It can also be argued that in gay pornography such 
as Triga Films and its emphasis on  homosexual sex between straight men, there may 
be a move towards a space where ‘homosexuals will not have the same sort of 
discontinuous perceptions of themselves, that by definition constitute the subject of 
mass publicity in straight representation’ (Cante and Restivo, 2004, p.153). This also 
relates to claims that the broader Symbolic aesthetics of gay male pornography are 
subject to a very different set of political and ideological constructions (and thus 
interpretations) than that of its straight equivalent.  
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If gay porn such as Triga intentionally attempts to subvert and transgress heterosexual 
masculinity, it has the capacity to reposition heterosexual masculinity and the ways in 
which it contains a series of ‘socially pervasive, [and] underlying myriad[s] [of] taken-
for-granted norms that shape what can be seen, said and valued’ (Hennessey, 2000, 
p.114). Gay porn which is constructed through discourses of male heterosexuality is 
also located within a much broader Symbolic system of heterosexual representational 
and cultural signification which Edelman (1994) suggests is located through ‘the 
critical force of homosexuality at the very point of discrimination between sameness 
and difference as cognitive landmarks governing the discursive field of social 
symbolic meanings’ (p.20). In Triga there is a notion that these pulls between 
sameness and difference both threaten and fascinate the Imaginary other and 
Imaginary order of heterosexual masculinity because heterosexual desire can only be 
expressed through the Symbolic Other’s jouissance allied to gay desire within gay 
pornography. In Triga when heterosexuality succumbs to gay desire then unseen, 
unsaid, and unconscious modes of straight masculine desire are expressed so that ‘the 
excluded difference’ (Bersani, 1995, p.36) of homosexuality ‘that cements 
heterosexual identity’ (ibid) also becomes a constituent part of it. This capitulation of 
straight desire towards gay jouissance also reveals that perhaps ‘lurking behind 
heterosexuality is a more original homosexuality, a same-sex sex drive that the 
invention of homosexuality helps to repress’ (ibid.).   
 
Here the Imaginary-ego of the heterosexual and his ‘otherness’ becomes a constituent 
part of how gay male desire is constructed. Yet the metaphoric power of this other is 
only permitted by the metonymic capacity of the Symbolic Other insofar as this 
Imaginary other is only ever expressed and understood as a pornographic image which 
Symbolically stutters. Paradoxically, this occurs because violence, virility, 
detachment, power and disgust are constructed through Symbolic identifications and 
associations that can only be personified through the seductive identity of an Imaginary 
other. Stuttering occurs in this way because the gay consumer of pornography attempts 
to identify with an Imaginary other that has been constructed via signifiers that have 
come to be associated with straight masculinity. We most obviously see this in the 
metaphors allied to straight (and gay male) masculinity as an Imaginary identity.  
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In Triga this problem is instilled in a production like Saturday Nite Special (2010) 
which uses the notion of ‘Straight lads out of Control’ as its narrative device and 
tagline. In the screen shots (Figures 5.5 and 5.6) metaphorical tropes allied to 
heterosexual masculinity are understood through ‘laddish’ forms of boisterousness and 
horseplay and underpinned by a ‘mosaics of homosociality’ (Waugh, 2004, p.139) that 
has spiralled ‘out of control’. Here the straight lads are initially understood through 
aspects of ‘”male bonding”’ (Sedgwick, 1985, p.1) inasmuch as there relations are 
built around the processes of socialising, drinking, watching straight pornography, and 
play-fighting together. Yet it is not long until this level of straight ‘male friendship, 
mentorship, entitlement [and] rivalry’ (ibid) which may be understood as ‘homosocial’ 
(ibid) is transformed into homo-erotic and then homosexual sex. Here there is a 
‘discontinuous relation of male homosocial and homosexual bonds’ (ibid, p.5) that can 
also be connected to the tensions between an Imaginary other and a Symbolic Other. 
We see that the lure of homosexual desire is facilitated by a Symbolic Other that allows 
the sex to take place yet also guarantees that the lads do not ‘become gay’.  Here 
homosexual sex undercuts their legitimately straight identities but also affirms the 
ways in which these lads are positioned as Imaginary others with heterosexual egos 
and heterosexual bodies.  
 
In Saturday Nite Special one of the straight ‘stars’ Andy Lee slaps the bottom of one 
of his ‘straight’ co-stars (Figure 5.5) and also pisses on the other lads (Figure 5.6) as a 
‘guarantee’ of his Imaginary heterosexuality. Lee is a self-identified ‘gay-for-pay’ 
porn-star and in all of the Triga productions in which he appears he has no ‘sexual’ 
contact with his co-stars. However through these processes of slapping other lads, 
pissing on them, and also masturbating whilst surrounded by several other lads having 
gay sex the question of what constitutes his ‘sexual’ personality and how that is 
expressed as impersonal jouissance is puzzling. Whereas Lee’s Imaginary identity 
(straight lad / ‘gay-for-pay’ porn-star) seems to legitimate his heterosexuality we see 
that this Imaginary identity also begins to stutter through the force of the Symbolic 
Other. This occurs because the Symbolic requires Lee to shed something of his 
heterosexual ego to account for his pleasure and the signification of pornographic 
desire as jouissance of the Other. Here his metaphorical persona as a ‘straight lad’ is 
subsumed by a much broader metonymic contiguity allied to his being ‘out of control’ 
in that the Symbolic modes of jouissance (as an intrinsic feature of pornography) are 
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the only way for Lee to articulate his own, and relate to, the jouissance of the Other.  
This representation of Lee slapping his mates arse and pissing on the other lads serves 
as a visual marker and Symbolic sign of his straightness yet it fails to fully signify him 
as ‘straight’. In this way it stutters, and through this stuttering we see that the identities 
and personalities of the straight lads begin to lose their Imaginary credence as ‘straight’ 
when they slip into sex acts understood as ‘gay’. In this way the Symbolic Other and 
the Imaginary signifiers of straight masculinity contained therein ensure that the 
personality of the pornographic actor or star (in this case Lee) as well as the actions 
which serve to identify him as straight are only ever manifested as impersonal 
signifiers of his straightness.  
 
When straight male sexual identities like this are signified as gay porn they are also 
commodified and interpreted as gay porn.  Through this process they become, as 
Hennessey observes, subject to the ways in which ‘gay […] images in consumer 
culture [have] the effect of consolidating an imaginary […] gay subjectivity for both 
straight and gay audiences’ (2000, p.112). For instance, the reliance on straight 
masculinity as both a trigger and affirmation of gay jouissance in pornography presents 
that masculinity as ‘the fiction of a coherent identity […] inevitably vulnerable to 
exposure as a representation’ and its ‘deliberate enactment of this fiction as a fiction’ 
(ibid, p.116). If both gay and straight masculinity and thus desire in pornography are 
performed through ‘knowledges, discourses, significations, [and] modes of 
intelligibility – by which identity is constituted’ (ibid) we see that this constitution is 
always fictitious and as the latter half of this chapter suggests vulnerable to forms of 
Symbolic-stuttering in pursuit of jouissance.     
Pornography also nurtures a Symbolic space where the Imaginary nuances of self-hood 
and identity are (re)presented precariously and ambivalently. If pornography is a 
discourse in which gay bodies attempt to speak and represent gay desire we see in 
Triga that this representation either fails or works paradoxically. The bodies which are 
difficult to identify as gay and/or homosexual in Triga  stutter, and in so doing serve 
to underline the problems of personality and impersonality also embedded in both 
Dean’s and Butler’s bodies that mutter and matter detailed and outlined in Chapter 2. 
As previously discussed, if bodies are never ‘whole’ (coherent, unified, definitive), 
always living with the deferral of desire then it is impossible for the Imaginary other 
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and a gay or straight body to be understood as personal.  Thus it is processes of 
impersonal identification rooted in the Symbolic Other as much as identity and 
personality which serve to facilitate and sustain processes such as stuttering and 
jouissance. Identification with a body is also a metonymic and thus plural undertaking, 
at once subject- and object-forming, both personal and impersonal at the same time.  
In the subject-forming sense, then a subject’s identifications with another person 
(other) or object (other) serve to structure the perception of the person and object as 
‘Other’ through language and representation. In the object-forming sense, a subject 
only locates a particular object in relation to its own metaphoric sense of ‘I’.  In gay 
pornography such as Triga Films the associated displacing and condensing of these 
operations via straight masculine identity is expressed as stuttering. We see this in the 
ways that the signification of straight masculinity in gay pornography relies upon a 
series of impersonal symbols and fantasies, and not a coherent dialogue at the level of 
interpersonal or intersubjective exchange. Here pornographic representation 
guarantees that the metaphoric and personal meaning of an identity is displaced by the 
metonymic impersonality of the Symbolic Other. It is also here that desire as 
jouissance is expressed as a stutter as opposed to being clearly enunciated and thus 
contained within an Imaginary desire for wholeness or mastery.  This concern is 
detailed in the next section which attempts to situate a body that stutters in several 
Triga Films and identify how the ways in which Symbolic-stuttering is demonstrated 
and expressed.  
5.4 Positioning the ‘Body that Stutters’ in Triga Films 
 
In Triga the subversion of heterosexuality is affirmed through the impersonality of 
desire and the metonymic dimensions of how it is stutters. The transgression of straight 
masculinity into sex acts and scenarios understood through the Imaginary-ego of both 
straight and gay masculinity repositions that masculinity in terms of jouissance and its 
Symbolic representation as pornographic. It is only through the Symbolic specificity 
of pornography and the convergence of sexual urgency and sexual hesitancy that 
jouissance is able to represent desire at all. In all of the instances examined in this 
chapter the central feature that defines this is the alignment of straight masculinity to 
a series of gay male sex acts.  The ways in which the film DVD’s are displayed and 
categorised on Triga’s website (http://www.Trigafilms.com) gives an indication of 
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how the studio positions its brand as one that uses the Imaginary-ego of a heterosexual 
alongside of the broader dimensions of how hyper-masculinity is constructed 
Symbolically.  
 
The tagline of Triga is ‘The original British Filth Factory since 1997’. Here ‘filth’ and 
the dynamics of disgust and desire examined in more detail later in this chapter are the 
central locus of how jouissance is pursued. The ‘factory’ like production of filth 
reflects the mode of ‘technical reproduction’ (Benjamin, 1936 [1999], p.214) 
identified by Walter Benjamin and also resonates as a metonymic symbol of working 
class masculinity that connects to factory work and labour as something ‘that sustains 
particular masculine beliefs and values’ (Haywood and Mac an Ghaill, 2003, p.29) 
whilst also positioning the factory as a space ‘of deep alienation […] also characterised 
by dependence’ (ibid). This systematic production of ‘a factory of filth’ and its 
alignment to a straight working class other also refers to the ways in which Triga relies 
upon this Imaginary other to profit from a ‘commodification of same-sex desire via a 
particular articulation of working-class identity and the mapping of that desire in 
public culture in highly visible and organised ways’ (Brewis and Jack, 2010, p.253). 
This commodification can also be seen through the film and online downloads that 
‘put the copy of the original into situations which would be out of reach for the original 
itself’ (1936, ibid) whilst also ensuring that Triga films as a metonymic ‘filth factory’ 
retains the Symbolic capacity and economic power to reproduce and repeat gay desire 
as impersonal traces of the original exchanges that occurred between the actors 
captured by the camera.    
 
Films are available to order as DVD or to download according to production date or 
filmic theme. ‘Latest’ include titles such as Gangland Cock – Extra Fuckin Swag 
(2013) Builders Piss Up (2013) Blokes down the Boozer (2012) and Job Seekers 
Allowance – Extra Benefits (2012). Alongside of this other productions are organised 
according to the metonymic contiguity of ‘British’, ‘Sport’, ‘Scally’, ‘Audition’, 
‘Wet’, and ‘Skinhead’ where the partiality of an identity, desire or discourse are used 
as its entity.  On their website the founder and also director of most Triga films Jamie 
Carlyle states ‘we’re not into buffed up bods, white satin sheets and lilies on the 
floor…Triga  is about British council estate lads fresh from a football game, builders 
and decorators stealing a quick fuck on the job, hod carrying labourers getting down 
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and dirty together’ which seems to  reinforce and offer an insight into the ways in 
which gay male jouissance is reliant upon the Symbolic and metonymic signification 
of predominantly working class and heterosexual identities to motivate and trigger 
sexual desire.  
Triga productions are knowingly filmed in an amateur way. They utilise jerky and 
erratic camera-work, overdubbed sound, unprofessional actors, cheap non-studio sets, 
overexposed shots, shoddy editing, and obtuse camera angles. These techniques work 
at constructing an aesthetic of ‘truth’ and ‘authenticity’ so that the homosexual sex 
acts between straight men are signified through ‘a sense of presence guaranteed by 
what is perceived as a privileged relationship to the real’ (Patterson, 2004, p.113). It is 
as if the men in Triga have been ‘caught’ on camera, as if the person filming the sexual 
action has stumbled upon it and entered into a scenario in which bodies and identities 
stammer, hesitate, and frustrate. For instance the close-up camera-work and levels of 
intimacy seduces both viewers and actors into the positions of Imaginary others. This 
initially works because the signification of football supporters, rugby-players, and 
drunken lads indulging in gay sex seems to metaphorically reflect and personalise an 
identity that moves towards jouissance. Yet, the camera techniques and modes of 
signification that Triga use also ensure a sense of metonymic displacement in so far as 
these men are performing in a porn film, the scene has been strategized and structured, 
and they are being paid to have sex. In this way, and within pornography, we see that 
these sexual bodies are riven by a Symbolic Other that undermines the Imaginary 
aspects of their ordinary, authentic, and amateurish identities. This Other also serves 
to impersonalise and displace their identities through jouissance so that what remains 
is a remnant of identity the viewer of the text can never reach and one that remains 
impersonal. 
 
Here the extreme close-up’s and jerky hand-held camerawork strive towards 
representing gay sex so that ‘proximity [is] even more proximate’ (ibid, p.111) and in 
so doing offers the representational promise of a seemingly personal and therefore 
intense form of jouissance. Yet this visual intimacy with straight male bodies is 
precarious because it allies them to an Imaginary other that is always impaired by its 
Symbolic counterpart. These representational techniques that are used across all Triga 
productions are the deceptive guarantee that these ‘real’ men can and indeed have 
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‘really’ been captured doing this together. However, these sexual encounters are only 
enabled via impersonal modes of pornographic representation and ultimately 
identification. The camera serves to seductively personalise them but their 
signification as pornographic renders them impersonal. As a result the bodies within 
the Triga productions begin to stutter in that they are only capable of expressing 
jouissance via a representational image that the subject can never tangibly reach. Here 
the visual techniques which are strategically utilised by Triga to construct a personal 
and tangible body only ever cultivate an intangible one that stutters because it has been 
constructed as pornographic. This also ensures that the immediacy, urgency, and thrill 
of seeing straight men having gay sex is achieved through technical ways of signifying 
intimacy, liveness, and rawness. In turn, this works towards the signification and 
staging of impersonality as ‘personal’ through productions that present seductively 
‘live’ and seemingly unrehearsed action alongside of the intensity of close up’s of arse-
holes, cocks dripping with cum, and piss-soaked bodies identified as straight.  
 
This visual rhetoric of closeness, intimacy and the tensions between modes of personal 
and impersonal representation can also be understood as part of 'a broad postmodern 
taste for ‘authentica’’ (Attwood, 2007, p.448) which includes webcam culture, public 
nudity, and amateur porn focused on new displays of 'the ordinary’ (ibid). In Triga this 
commodification of the ordinary serves to impersonalise it and intensify how an 
ordinary personality is signified. For instance, in the Triga ‘auditions’ the gay porn-
star as an ordinary lad / man is presented through moments that signify them as 
‘personal’. These ‘auditions’ are filmed in ways which seem to ‘personalise’ the 
auditioned. The subject of the audition is captured by a camera which retains a shaky 
and grainy aesthetic and closely interrogates their body in intimate detail. In Figure 
5.7 which is a screen-shot taken of a lad auditioning to be in a Triga ‘Wankers’ feature 
we see this occurring. In these scenes Triga allows for experimentation, mistakes, and 
new interventions from the actors. We also see them watching straight pornography to 
get aroused, masturbate and ejaculate in real unedited time. This subject is filmed for 
23 minutes and whilst he remains unnamed and silent he seduces the viewer into 
personalising and identifying with him as an Imaginary other through impersonality 
formed in the Symbolic.  
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His chiselled and muscular body, unkempt pubic hair, the cap that he wears, his 
arrogant smirks and winks at the camera, and the way he holds his cigarette and 
skilfully blows smoke rings with the smoke are allied to a visual index of capturing 
straight masculine sexuality for a gay male audience. This lad masturbates and 
eventually cums on the floor to initially affirm that these particular scenes operate 
within the ‘”documentary illusion”’ (Escoffier, 2003, p.537) inasmuch that ‘the 
erections and the orgasms putatively “prove” to a gay male spectator that these 
“sexually desirable, masculine, and energetic performers” are really gay’ (ibid). Yet 
this notion of the lad ‘really being gay’ is also allied to his ‘being straight’.  Here the 
affirmation of gay desire and jouissance requires the construction of his straightness 
and its production through a Symbolic signifier that does not coherently exist as 
‘straight’.  These tropes constructed in Triga through the ‘straight’ and/or ‘straight 
acting’ men who commodify that ‘straightness’ as the main object of gay male desire 
is subsumed by the impersonalising or ‘Othering’ of jouissance and how it stutters. 
This issue of stuttering and the body that stutters is also aligned to a jerky and 
asymmetrical aesthetic which positions the chav / chav’s as an Imaginary identity via 
their Symbolic displacement in pornographic representation. In light of this and even 
in scenarios where the porn-actor is alone the metaphoric personality of straight men 
are susceptible to a Symbolic Other that positions the gay consumer / viewer as a 
metonymic part of the scene.  As a result the impersonal dimensions of that desire and 
how it stutters become the central way of constructing it.   
 
By now it is clear that Triga is defined by a visual rhetoric based on a set of pre-defined 
and designated sexual and social practices associated with straight male identity and 
the construction and consumption of straight maleness by gay men. In many of the 
Triga productions the Imaginary other and associated metaphors of the chav are used 
to express gay desire as impersonal.  Within this context the term ‘chav’ as ‘a 
commonplace socio-economic signifier in the British cultural lexicon’ (Brewis and 
Jack, 2010, p.257) is demarcated ‘by its apparently distinctive demographic, attitudes, 
behaviours, consumption patterns and language’ (ibid).  This is particularly relevant 
to the Symbolic and impersonal eroticisation of the chav in Triga in that their identity 
is always represented as a personality and one which seems to be identifiable. Brewis 
and Jack (2010) understand this through the discursive construction of ‘gay chavinism’ 
which is reliant upon a ‘commonality of themes used in selling the ‘chav experience’’ 
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(ibid, p.260). This identification and personalisation of the chav are stylised and 
configured through identity and personality traits such as ‘hypersexuality […]; drug 
and alcohol abuse; aggression and violence; unemployment; poverty and living on 
benefits; the council estate; and dress and appearance (ibid).  
In the next section these practices of representation will be discussed in more depth by 
examining the identity of the chav in Triga Films. Here it is suggested that the 
metaphors associated with this Imaginary other are Symbolically displaced via modes 
of jouissance which stutter.  On the one hand this Symbolic stuttering is constructed 
through ‘amateur’ and seductively authentic camera-work, and on the other it is 
signified through the sexual representation and/or gay subversion of straight working 
class masculinity. In so doing the straight chav engaging in gay sex suggests there is a 
tension between Triga as a pornographic commodity which holds the ‘symbolic power 
of those who create representation’ (Johnson, 2008, p.76) and the signifiers it produces 
which ‘allow[s] for both the plundering of working-class culture and for its use as a 
marketable commodity’ (ibid). In gay pornography such as this the metaphoric 
identities of chav’s and the working-class signifiers associated with them ‘create and 
mark the chav body with characteristics which become a detachable resource for non-
chav consumers’ (Brewis and Jack, 2010, p.258). This suggests that it is through 
detached and thus impersonal modes of Symbolic Othering that jouissance for and 
identification with the chav is expressed as series of stutters.  
 
5.5 Commodifying and Impersonalising the Chav in Triga Films  
In order to explore the importance of stuttering and its alliance to an impersonality of 
desire we need to examine in greater detail the use of chav in Triga Films. More 
specifically, we can see the chav’s in Triga Films as visual examples of Symbolic-
stuttering that are reliant on Imaginary metaphors of identity yet displaced through 
metonymic identifications in the Symbolic. Chav is a discursive identity category that 
relies upon a ‘new terminology in which socially marginal groups are characterised, 
classified, and understood’ (Hayward and Yar, 2006, p. 10) and does so through the 
construction of ‘pathological class dispositions in relation to the sphere of 
consumption’ (ibid). Here the chav as a working-class and consumer subject can also 
be ‘identified on the grounds of the taste and style that inform their consumer choices’ 
(ibid, p.14). In turn this allows for a Symbolic ‘Othering’ of the chav occurring on the 
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basis of their aesthetic and representational appearance. Another form of Symbolic 
Othering that is transformed into Symbolic-stuttering is the notion of the chav as a bad 
or ‘dirty’ form of whiteness. Imogen Tyler suggests that this is indicative of chavs as 
‘hypervisible “filthy whites”’ (2008, p.25) in that they signify and also ‘foreground[s] 
a dirty whiteness – a whiteness contaminated with poverty’ (ibid). This is something 
that is both connected to ‘gay chavinism’ and the ways in which Triga instils elements 
of chav into gay pornography through the excessively sexual and invasive images of 
not only the chav but more broadly the Symbolic Other of the ‘the straight lad out of 
control’. In so doing we see that ‘metaphors of invasion […] invoked in white racist 
responses to immigrants and ethnic minorities are mobilised in white middle class 
accounts of chavs as a way of differentiating their “respectable whiteness”’ (Nayak, 
2003, p.84 in Tyler, 2008, p.26). Yet, in gay pornography the mobilisation of these 
tropes are displaced into metonymic forms of sexual desire that transform the chav 
into a Symbolic site of jouissance.  In part this is due to the fact that in Triga the chav’s 
dirty whiteness is transformed into a desirable whiteness, yet one which must be 
contained and located by the Symbolic Other for it to function as such.   
This desire for the ‘dirty’ chav in Triga is also allied to Mary Douglas’s concept of 
‘dirt-affirming and dirt-rejecting philosophies’ (2002 [1966], p.203) and the ways in 
which desire for the unclean heterosexual chav repositions gay desire as ‘out of place’ 
(ibid, p.50). As Douglas claims ‘uncleanness or dirt is that which must not be included 
if a pattern is to be maintained’ (ibid). If it is included then ‘patterns’ and ways of 
understanding gay desire are disrupted. Here the dirty white chav as a marker of gay 
jouissance avows that dirtiness is included, incorporated, and realised as gay desire. In 
turn, this is the ‘first step towards insight into pollution’ (ibid) and a form of gay desire 
connected to modes of disgust and dirtiness enabled through the pornographic 
representation of the straight white chav. The dichotomy between whiteness and dirt 
is addressed in White (1997) by Richard Dyer.  In his reading of Joel Kovel’s White 
Racism (1970) Dyers claim that ‘to be white is to have expunged all dirt […], to look 
white is to look clean’ (p.76) functions paradoxically because whiteness also ‘shows 
the dirt with unique clarity and certainty. In particular the dirt of the body’ (ibid). The 
chav in pornography encapsulates some of this contention in that his cleanliness gives 
way to dirt, yet dirt that must remain sexually desirable so it can catalyse jouissance 
through the Symbolic.  Here this dirtiness of the chav is also allied to how this dirt is 
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displayed and/or ‘comes out of the body’ (ibid). Here the body that stutters in the 
Symbolic realm of the pornographic text is the body that pisses, cums, rims, spits, and 
sweats. The ‘dirty’ ejaculations and secretions of the Imaginary other are contained by 
the Symbolic as evidence of gay desire which relies upon dirty whiteness to express 
jouissance at a Symbolic distance.  
In Triga the metaphors of white dirtiness, abjection and contamination are riven 
through the discourse of metonymy in that they are construed and constructed through 
an impersonality; that is a Symbolic way that the chav as a pornographic commodity 
allows gay subjects in the Symbolic realm a number of ‘safe ways of temporarily 
venturing into dangerous terrain’ (ibid, p.264). For instance in an image like Figure 
5.8 the chavs are constructed around the tensions between them as both a threatening 
identity and a sexually desirable fantasy for gay men. Here Symbolic Othering is also 
built around chav’s as Imaginary other’s that have ‘become commodities for others’ 
consumption’ (Brewis and Jack, 2010, p.252). This image relies on the chav as 
sexually intimidating and violent via ‘established associations with notions of 
marginalisation and social exclusion’ (Hayward and Yar, 2006, p. 16). Yet it is this 
way of excluding and positioning the chav as an ‘other’ that becomes a   way of 
triggering jouissance and sustaining them as a signifier of ‘Bodies that Stutter’.   
These chav’s are understood through systematic and repetitive tropes such as binge-
drinking, racism, nationalism, and discourses of sport such as football, all of which are 
also used to position and construct identities within the remit of what gay culture and 
the gay porn industry require the commodity of a chav to be. Here the chav and more 
specifically the chav as an object of desire and a catalyst for jouissance is also formed 
in terms of an assurance that he is ‘kept in its place’ (Brewis and Jack, 2010, p.258). 
This is assured because the Symbolic impersonality of the pornographic text contains 
the chav somewhere else. In these images the boisterous groups of lads and the 
inflections of homophobic intimidation, disgust, and dirty whiteness allied to their 
representation are now reinscribed as jouissance because they are signified as gay 
pornography. In this way the chav as a gay pornographic desire allows aversion and 
distaste to be Symbolically transformed into jouissance. Yet this transformation can 
only to happen through the need to signify that jouissance. In this way both the identity 
of, and a personal desire for the chav fails and thus ensures that the chav’s identity 
stutters. It does so as it moves towards an impersonality of desire reliant upon the 
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Symbolic Other and an identification that never attains or clearly expresses a 
jouissance of the chav.  
Tyler builds on broader notions of the term ‘chav’ to suggest that it is not only ‘a 
ubiquitous term of abuse for white working class-subjects’ (2008, p.17) but also that 
its signification in popular British culture is central to ‘the role played by disgust 
reactions in the generation and the circulation of the chav figure’ (ibid). This disgust 
is also linked to the Symbolic construction of the chav as an emotional and affective 
commodity of desire. In this way the pursuit of a jouissance of the chav is aligned to 
representations which rely on a demonised (Jones, 2011) and disgusting (Skeggs, 
2005; Tyler 2006, 2008) social identity and personality. Some of these issues are put 
into context by Dyer in his analysis of the movie star Rock Hudson’s private 
homosexuality in light of his public death from AIDS in 1985. He examines how 
Hudson’s metaphorically ‘desirable’ / heterosexual ‘antiseptic machismo’ (2002, 
p.159) concealed his ‘disgusting’ / homosexual identity through an Imaginary lexicon 
of heterosexual traits such as virility, muscularity, and the square-jawed heart-throb 
linked to goodness and likeability. All of these qualities were reiterated and sustained 
as representations through ‘a performance style […] expressing the security of 
heterosexuality’ (ibid, p.162) against ones which contain the potential to expose the 
insecurity of homosexuality.  
The paradox of Hudson’s identity and stardom can also be seen in what Dyer refers to 
as ‘press and television coverage before and after AIDS’ (ibid, p.170). The polarisation 
of Hudson as healthy, strong and handsome act as a metonymic marker to 
metaphorically other him as ‘tired, haggard, tragic’ but rather than an opposition of a 
before/after they form a ‘simultaneity’ or ‘two images of the same thing, two aspects 
of the condition of homosexuality’ (ibid, pp.171-72). This reflects the ways in which 
the chav in Triga functions. He is Symbolically and duplicitously disgusting and 
desirable and his positionality in pornography assure that he remains Symbolically 
impersonal because porn allows for disgust to ‘always bear[s] the imprint of desire’ 
(Dollimore, 2001, p. 374). In the case of Hudson the concerns associated with the 
‘exquisite surface, masking depraved reality’ (Dyer, 2002, p.172) also highlight 
another aspect of how chav and heterosexual male representations of gay desire may 
intersperse to allow the personality and identity of each to be re-read through 
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prolifically impersonal identifications with Symbolic forms of jouissance   and not 
through Imaginary ego’s or bodies.   
Yet in Triga the chav and corresponding identities such as the ‘scally’ and the ‘lad’ 
are constructed as identities. This appeal is also examined by Paul Johnson (2008) and 
the dialectic between ‘sexual desire and sexual disgust’ (p.73). In this double-aspect 
jouissance acts as both the energiser and the site of conflict and  allows Symbolic 
disgust for the chav to be transformed into Imaginary desire. Yet this transformation 
is not one in which the disgusting subject is empowered by the Imaginary desire, rather 
that Symbolic disgust becomes the central catalyst of that desire. If as Johnson claims 
the chav represents ‘a margin, and potential transgression of bourgeois civility’ (ibid) 
then this margin is the index in which Chav’s ‘are attractive to those who are 
differentiated from [them]’ (ibid.). The consumer of Triga has to Symbolically 
understand and position the chav as an ‘other’ and one that is configured as impersonal 
to realise how their jouissance is being Symbolically expressed through stutters.  
This construction of the chav discussed in terms of disgust is particularly relevant to 
the contextual discussions in the final part of this chapter. In his essay ‘Sexual Disgust’ 
(2001) Dollimore claims that for Freud ‘there is, in the individuals continuing struggle 
between desire and disgust […] the larger struggle between instinct and civilisation’ 
(2001, p.378). The Symbolic-Imaginary tensions and their struggle for dominance 
which are filtered through Lacan also encapsulate the dialectic that Dollimore suggests 
lies at the root of how desire finds in disgust ‘a pleasure whose intensity it could never 
have known without the history of disgust; at another moment desire gives way to a 
revulsion the more intense because its history is grounded in the very desire it 
displaces’ (ibid.). Here the abject relationship that desire has to disgust is also ‘the very 
same bodily orifices that disgust because of their excretions – vomit, urine and shit 
[…] – also excite sexually’ (ibid). In Triga there is a reliance on this dialectic whereby 
the sweating, piss-soaked, and ‘gobbed-on’ chav is a   representational image of desire 
that the spectator desires. Also Triga offer a full collection of films metonymically 
grouped together as ‘Piss’ which also express the  construction of a chav as a 
‘disgusting’ identity transformed by the desire for disgust.  In Figures, 5.9 and 5.10 
the chav and other straight masculine identities are signified as desirable in light of 
their predilection for drinking, basking in, and pissing on other men. Here these men 
as ‘disgusted subject[s]’ (Lawler, 2005) are the key facilitator of and for jouissance. 
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The de-personalisation of that disgust and its association with piss is enabled through 
its Symbolic representation. This works through multiple forms of identification with 
the text. For instance in these screen shots the ‘dirty’ desires and pursuits of drinking 
piss or having someone piss on (and in some cases up you) can be aligned to the ways 
in which Tim Dean analyses bare-back sex as a sexual act with ‘”No Limits!”’ (2009, 
p.137). That is sex which ‘can function as an arena in which the most basic barriers – 
including those of disgust and shame – may be negotiated or overcome’ (ibid).  
Positioning this through the pleasure of having someone piss on you it is also clear that 
for sexual desire to be connected to disgust it also has to be ‘satisfied only by exceeding 
a limit, specifically, a boundary of one’s own psychic constitution’ (ibid). In Triga as 
groups of straight men piss on one another in their pursuit of jouissance they ensure 
that crossing or transgressing the disgusting or the desirable sexual act involves ‘the 
challenge of locating new limits to repel’ (ibid) for a gay audience. This seductive form 
of repulsion can be seen in the ways in which Triga allows for gay sexual fantasies to 
occur on the basis of images and acts that re-position the chav and in this instance 
chav’s that piss and are pissed on via paradigms of disgust which hold an aversive 
appeal and impersonal seduction.  The Symbolic power of the pornographic feature 
both sustains and reinscribes the piss-ridden chav in the name of gay desire as 
something which represents an intense form of ‘intimacy at a distance’ (ibid, p.138).  
Here the politics of disgust and the abject stench of piss are not realised through the 
Imaginary other rather they are contained by the Symbolic Other. This keeps them at 
a safe distance and assures that a more vital and urgent sense of jouissance and/or 
desire to be contaminated by the disgusting and abject stench of bodily fluid is 
sanctioned and permitted within the stutters of a pornographic representation.  
These practices and processes in Triga are also heavily reliant on ‘definite classed 
subject positions’ (Tyler, 2006, p.74) and the ways in which their status as ‘repulsive, 
filthy and disgusting’ (ibid) are intrinsic to their potent sexual appeal.  Here the chav 
as a working-class, under-classed, and disgusting sexual subject is amplified and so is 
their appeal to gay male sexual desire and jouissance. Through the broader ‘role of 
emotion in the formation of class based identities’ (Tyler, 2008, p.20) the chav as 
sexually desirable must remain socially disgusting and is required to function through 
the tensions of class-based desire and disgust through the distancing effect of the 
Symbolic Other. Yet metaphors of the abject, repulsive and abhorrent sexual subject 
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are also signified through the chav as the Imaginary other who is intimately connected 
to a sexual identity we are enabled to see within the Symbolic mechanisms of 
pornography. Triga maps out and relies upon a visual rhetoric of desire and disgust 
that partners gay male desire to the ways in which ‘gay sexuality and pornography are 
both theoretically “transgressive” (Champagne, 1995, p.30).  Yet this notion of 
transgression is contained by a limit, in this instance the limit is the Symbolic 
impersonality of the chav and the production of an Imaginary-ego within pornographic 
media. In other words, the construction of chav as a transgressive sexual identity and 
more broadly the subversion of a chav’s heterosexual identity in light of homosexual 
desire fail to transgress the boundaries of desire because it is contained within 
representation. Here the transgression of these forms (the chav, the heterosexual, the 
perimeters of gay desire) mirror ‘Foucault’s use of the term’ (ibid)  which states that 
to transgress something is to position it in terms of ‘a limits density as well as 
necessarily a reinscription of that limit’ (ibid).  
This representation of the chav is aligned to how jouissance articulated as Symbolic 
disgust both ‘constitutes and reifies sexuality in relation to the organisation of social 
space to fix a relationship between two subject positions – the devalued working class 
spectacle and the resourced middle class spectator’ (Johnson, 2008, p.76). Here gay 
men are ‘seduced by the style’ (ibid) of the chav in the films which Triga produce 
because an Imaginary other is allied to the viewer / consumer of Triga features and the 
actors / participants in them. Whilst the gay man is positioned as ‘a universally 
resourced consumer’ (ibid) and the chav as a disgusting, dangerous yet ultimately 
sexually desirable ‘other’ it is the Symbolic Other that keeps the chav at a safe distance 
through his pornographic mediation. In this way the allure of jouissance means that if 
the Imaginary other desires the chav and wants to ‘see’ them through an intimate and 
proximate encounter they must look to the Symbolic Other enabled by the 
pornographic production to do so. In all of the Triga features this is facilitated by the 
use of the camera and the ways in which the close-up is used to film the bodies, 
genitals, orifices, ejaculations and sexual acts of the participants. The chav and his 
body are sexually seductive and desirable only if they are viewed as stutters of 
jouissance. If they are viewed as merely ‘chav’s’ and the discourse of pornographic 
desire is removed or abstracted from the Symbolic encounter then the exchange is very 
different and they retain something of the ‘intense homophobia, fear and hatred of 
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homosexuality’ (Sedgwick, 1985, p.1) which inflect and haunt male to male 
homosocial relations when they are abstracted from tropes of homosocial desire (ibid). 
Outside of gay pornography and Triga the chav becomes a figure of resentment, 
repulsion and disgust once more understood through the discourses of ‘deprivation, 
exclusion and social polarisation to crime and deviance’ (Martin, 2009, p.142). 
Furthermore the disgusting and disillusioned working class subject as a pornographic 
text expresses the ways in which sexuality is (and continues to be) tied to the 
impersonal operations of the Symbolic and the discursive. In pornography which uses 
the personality of the chav and heterosexuality as the central index of gay male desire 
we see that this can only be articulated through stutters which attempt but never quite 
attain a form of jouissance that both signifies and satisfies desire.  
5.6 Conclusion 
Triga seems to complicate ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-stuttering in several 
ways. Firstly it is a body stutters when it is torn between modes of straight and gay 
sexual desire, representation, and identity. It is also a Symbolic body that stutters 
through the commodity of pornography itself and the impersonal dimensions of its 
production and consumption. It also stutters when it is captured through camera and 
film-making techniques that work at rendering the ‘straight’ subjects of gay desire 
more ordinary, authentic and in many ways ‘personal’. In this way the body that 
stutters is that which is left after the initiative to personalise jouissance and 
metaphorically position a straight male identity has occurred. Here this body is the 
signifier located within the Symbolic order where impersonalisation is facilitated by 
the Symbolic’s stresses on language and its power to suggest that coherent homo 
and/or hetero-sexual identities are not in fact the main points of desire and how 
jouissance is energised.  It is also worth noting here that stuttering in Triga does not 
shift identity and desire into an orthodoxy of identifications and impersonality in 
pornography. Rather ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and how they stutter continue to shift and 
relocate themselves somewhere between the modalities of personal and impersonal 
desires and identifications we see in Triga.  
The Symbolic problem of terminology and language keeps alerting us to this paradox 
in that if a signifier refers to someone as, ‘straight’, ‘gay’, etc. this positions the 
identification as personal in the sense that the subject might appear to speak or 
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represent that particular desire. However, it is also impersonal due to the fact that there 
is always articulated through a broader Symbolic language or linguistic system of 
representation which also holds the potential for subversion and negation. In the 
pornographic setting of Triga the subject that attempts to speak or represent either gay 
or straight desire stutters and falters because of desire. Yet, this trap which is implicit 
in the rhetoric’s and aesthetics of Triga is not intended to underline or celebrate a 
trajectory where gay and/or straight bodies, identities, and subjectivities are 
nihilistically eradicated and agency is subsumed by impersonality.  Neither is a body 
that stutters (that in this chapter may exist between modes of straight and gay sexual 
desire, within the commodity of pornography itself, and through particular image 
making techniques) a one which is identifiable across pornographic representations 
that work with images of straight men having homosexual sex. Rather, the 
problematisations of identity which the stuttering body alerts us to ought to be viewed 
as part of this project’s aim to understand the force of jouissance and its place in 
relation to the tensions between an Imaginary other and Symbolic Other.  
The representations analysed so far seem to be defined by this strain and they draw 
attention to how sexual identity is (and continues to be) tied to impersonal operations 
of speech (as non-jouissance) and jouissance (as non-speech) thorough linguistic, 
discursive and representational forms which remain out of reach of the sexual subject.  
Just as Lacan’s work demonstrates how jouissance is not allied to personal identity so 
much as it endangers the supposed subjective coherence which identity is thought to 
manifest, we also see in Triga that a unified sexual identity is always frustrated as a 
result of a conditional and contingent division in the very constitution of the sexual 
subject.  Furthermore, this split or ruptured subject is the subject that stutters. When 
this subject is positioned as the simultaneously gay and straight subject we see that 
this stuttering and its alliance to sexual desire also makes it more complicated and 
challenging to identify and locate ‘him’ as a gay subject.  
The representational complexities examined in this thesis are derived from instances 
in which spoken, written, and visual signifiers combine go some way towards 
demonstrating this frustration through the indices of Symbolic-stuttering. In the next 
chapter which addresses how stutters manifest themselves in multiple forms on the 
social network / online blog tumblr.com we also see another strategic and sophisticated 
form of gay male communication and representation that allows users to personalise 
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their identity onto the computer screen manifested as the selfie. Here images may have 
taken the user twenty or thirty re-positioning’s and re-clicks of the smart-phone to 
capture, yet may look as if it were spontaneous and unplanned. These duplicitous 
representations of identity and personality stutter because they fail to fully articulate 
something (indeed anything) of the subject trapped inside of them. This form of 
stuttering also allows jouissance to both frustrate and satisfy sexual desire and how it 
is often pursued, expressed, and realised through sexually explicit media where the 
subject feels they can manipulate and optimise their self-presentation through this 
range of possibilities and gaps manifested as ‘Bodies that Stutter’  
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 Figure 5.1 - http://trigafilms.tumblr.com/ 
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 Figure 5.2 - http://trigafilms.tumblr.com/  
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  Figure 5.3 - http://www.trigafilms.com/shops/info_p.asp?prid=670 
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Figure 5.4 - http://trigafilms.tumblr.com/ 
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   Figure 5.5 - http://trigafilms.tumblr.com/  
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Figure 5.6 - http://trigafilms.tumblr.com/  
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 Figure 5.7 - http://trigafilms.tumblr.com/ 
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           Figure 5.8 - http://trigafilms.tumblr.com/ 
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    Figure 5.9 - http://trigafilms.tumblr.com/ 
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       Figure 5.10 - http://trigafilms.tumblr.com/ 
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Chapter 6: Reflections and Refractions of Jouissance: 
‘Bodies that Stutter’ on tumblr.com 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines issues of gay male representation, impersonality, and sexual 
desire on the micro-blog/social networking site tumblr.com.  The first part of the 
chapter continues to deal with the implications that an impersonal shattering of desire 
has on the gay male ego and sexual subject, through the ‘Bodies that Stutter’. The 
hesitancies and frustrations that catalyse this stuttering are also positioned in relation 
to how gay desire is understood when it is represented metonymically on three micro-
blogs.  The three main sections of the chapter examine this stuttering through a re-
reading and re-evaluation of the gaze, Imaginary-Symbolic relations, and the 
significance of Lacan’s ‘The Mirror Stage’ (‘Le stade du miroir’).  The practices of 
representation and contexts of each micro-blog are analysed in response to these 
concepts and in relation to specific instances of gay male self-representation that are 
located in the blog because they have been shared online.  In this chapter the three key 
micro-blogs being used to develop and hone in on  ‘Bodies that Stutter’ are 
http://homo-magazine.tumblr.com/, http://actionrigger.tumblr.com/, and 
http://nakedgayguys.tumblr.com/.  
These contexts have been selected because they are aligned to the paradox that when 
personal desire, allied to an Imaginary-ego, is signified via online, pornographic, and 
here socially mediated space, it is always impersonal because it is located in the 
Symbolic register through the nuances of stuttering.  The examination of images that 
have been posted and organised on the blogs listed above also suggest that gay desire 
and gay identity in online and self-representational spaces is precarious in light of 
Symbolic-stuttering and jouissance. The chapter also considers much broader nuances 
of technological and cultural discourse which seem to enable and ensnare ‘Bodies 
that Stutter’ through a series of repetitive speech or image-making acts.  As this chapter 
evolves, and moves towards the thesis’ conclusion it suggests that the processes of 
micro-blogging, the proliferation of the selfie, and the discourse of tumblr.com itself, 
may form recognisable and recurrent modes of gay male jouissance through methods 
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of sharing and techniques of image-making. It is these which persistently reproduce 
how the tensions between an Imaginary other and Symbolic Other are articulated in 
sexual, online, and self-representation.   
Gay male photographic and pornographic representations seen online, and, 
specifically, on tumblr.com offer the paradox of being able to manage and contain gay 
desire whilst also allowing it to unravel and disperse in limitless ways.  Here, the need 
or demand a gay individual may articulate for sexual pleasure, or a sexual relation 
through identification with an image, will always be filtered through the mediating 
figures of the Imaginary other and Symbolic Other.  As an inevitable result, the subject 
searches for his jouissance in language only to find that he is unable to locate and 
sustain it.  For instance, we see micro-blogs on tumblr.com which promote and contain 
signifiers of gay desire related to straight masculinity that an Imaginary-ego is initially 
captivated by.  Tumblr.com and the range of micro-blogs it offers also seem to supply 
an inexhaustible image bank of sexually explicit, self-representational, and/or 
pornographic imagery. However, these images and their circulation as markers of gay 
desire and identity rely upon a far more complex network of Symbolic exchange. This 
is because gay desire is entrenched in a Symbolic Other capable of extricating it 
through any combination of enigmatic and capricious identifications spurred on by 
jouissance.  On tumblr.com we also find that the production, but more so the sharing 
and circulating of images in line with the metaphorical markers created and sustained 
around gay and straight male desire are problematic because they can only be 
expressed as metonymic modes of gay and straight male sexual identification.   
As the next sections will demonstrate, this is constructed as a key feature and trigger 
of desire on http://actionrigger.tumblr.com/, where nine specific categories related to 
heterosexual masculinity, athletes, and workers are assembled as the foundations 
and/or objects of gay male jouissance.  In contrast, http://homo-magazine.tumblr.com/ 
presents gay culture and desire through a manifesto on its main home-page (see; 
http://homo-online.com/MANifesto), which proclaims, through twenty-five points, 
what the blog’s intent is.  The diverse and divergent scope of posts on this blog come 
together around an index of pornographic, cultural, historical, and political images 
associated with gay masculinity. Here, incongruous and analogous signifiers are 
collaged together through an evolving stream of Symbolic meaning signalled towards 
jouissance.  For example, if we attempt to align, interpret, deconstruct, and categorise 
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the relations that exist between images such as Lee Edelman’s No Future, Rock 
Hudson, a photograph of rugby players showering, and a selfie of a guy with a heavy 
ginger beard we see that the nuances of how they are associated become both exciting 
and perplexing.   
This sense of Symbolic dislocation as jouissance is also aligned to the opening and 
closing points of the manifesto, which claim that, ‘WE 1. are not an identity, more a 
stance or better yet a pose [...] 2. hold manly desire as our fundament […] 23. see a 
great value in being intentional travellers and strangers, 24. are more of a mood than a 
movement’ (http://homo-online.com/MANifesto).  In this way the homo-online blog 
attempts to construct a sense of subversive and transgressive gay male identity vis-à-
vis the representations assembled on it.  The final blog, 
http://nakedgayguys.tumblr.com, is most closely allied to discourses of the gay male 
body, narcissism, and ego and their propensity to schism, shatter, and stutter in relation 
to jouissance.  In this instance, self-representations present both gay and straight male 
subjects photographing themselves with their mobile phones in the reflection of a 
mirror.  This practice of image making is more commonly known as ‘the selfie’.  These 
images, presented as online and networked self-representations, locate the subject of 
gay desire through tropes of repetition, reproducibility, and duplication and these are 
examined later in the chapter.  Whilst there are thousands, and potentially millions, of 
similar micro-blogs, and new blogs that are being created every day, (see; 
nakedguyselfies.tumblr.com,gaymanselfies.tumblr.com,gayphones.Tumblr.com, and 
majdad-iphone.Tumblr.com) that also emphasise this practice of representation, the 
divergent nature of ‘sharing’ and ‘re-blogging’ images discussed in Chapter 3 means 
that the question of ‘where’ these images of gay desire originate also becomes an 
integral part of their meaning and construction as images of gay desire.   
6.2 Enigmatic Bodies on http://actionrigger.tumblr.com    
On tumblr.com (and also on social networking sites such as Facebook.com and 
Twitter.com)   the screen and ‘feed’ of information acts as both an interface and chasm 
between whoever speaks and the ‘position of speaking’ itself (i.e. the tabs that the user 
is asked to follow).  On http://actionrigger.tumblr.com/, there are nine ways that desire 
is designated, categorised, and controlled. ‘I’ (the user) am asked to select the nature 
of my desire from a choice of nine tabs. The options are connected to hyper-masculine 
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and homosocial discourses of sport (‘rugby’, ‘AFL’, ‘MMA’), job/identity-types 
(‘grafters’, ‘forces’, ‘lads’), the body, and, specifically, tattoos (‘ink’d’), and fetish 
(‘smoke’, ‘shorts’).  In all of these categories the signification of straight masculinity 
and masculine desire are the key emphasis within a signifying chain that enigmatically 
locates straightness as the energiser of gay desire, and also its causal index.  Whilst the 
images seem to form and construct a discourse of desire specific to 
‘actionrigger.tumblr.com’ they have been re-blogged from multiple online spaces and 
their origins both as signifiers of gay desire as well as signifiers on tumblr.com are 
unclear. Here, we see how the impersonality of the foundation of desire is 
metonymically articulated in manifold representations that knowingly misalign tropes 
of straight masculinity as ones of gay desire.  We see this in how the images of 
‘grafters’, ‘forces’, and ‘lads’ are connected to the tattooed subjects in the ‘ink’d’ blog.  
As they intersect, the metaphorical and Imaginary essence of a tattooed young lad in 
the army can only be deciphered on the basis of its Symbolic representation as a 
metonymic Other.  It is sexually alluring because it is metonymic, in that it has been 
dislocated from its origin or context and repositioned as a trope that stands in the place 
of the  big ‘Other’ and the ideological discourses of young tattooed men in the armed 
forces.   
 
The power of Lacan’s Imaginary register to ‘drive toward fusion and agreement – the 
impossible one (‘I’) of mirror-stage jouissance’ (Ragland, 1986, p.141), allows it to 
uphold the metaphors of visual repetition and recognition aligned to men as either 
‘ink’d’, ‘grafters’, ‘forces’, or ‘lads’.  Yet, these metaphors of straightness, and their 
slippage into the metonymic of gay desire, render specific characteristics and facets of 
straight masculinity a consequence of the objet a that elicits jouissance.  Whilst these 
images depict practices of stereotypical ‘straight’ maleness, they also attempt to 
establish and, thus, foreclose gay male desire through the subversion of straight 
masculinity as the central catalyst of gay desire on tumblr.com.  Just as the unconscious 
fails to fully express its own registers, we see (as we did in Chapter 5) that the 
positioning of straight masculinity as a trigger for gay male desire fails to 
metaphorically personalise desire because the identities it (re)presents miss the mark 
of a clear and coherent relation between self and other, gay and straight, user and 
representation.   
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The men in the ‘forces’ section of the blog are represented on the basis of a 
signification that is always a refraction and distortion of this metaphoric ‘force’.  In 
many of the images their taut muscular arms are tattooed, pull at ropes, and brandish 
weapons, but the arm as both a corporeal and representational fragment, fails to fully 
reach or articulate the dimensions of the discourse of the army, the military, and/or a 
soldier’s subjective personality and, thus, unconscious desires.  This is also captured 
in the (mis)alignment of the images (in this instance via hyper-masculine images of 
the army), which are only based on a series of Imaginary identifications filtered 
through the Symbolic and its attempt to control desire’s cause.  Also, if I click onto 
one of the likes for an image on the ‘forces’ page, it takes me to 
‘http://ukmilitarymen.tumblr.com/archive’, where my jouissance can be sophisticated 
and concentrated down into images that may get closer to my desire and its cause.  
Here, the potential for locating sexual imagery that seems to connect to the subject’s 
jouissance of the other means that the user of tumblr.com will inevitably continue, 
return to, and then traverse  ‘actionrigger.tumblr.com’ and its Symbolic capacity for 
catalysing jouissance.   
As images in the ‘forces’ section are copied, pasted, re-blogged, and shared, they fall 
out of sequence and slip into other similar blogs, where potentially unlimited 
significations of masculinity in the army and masculine desire can occur.  Jean 
Laplanche’s concept of the ‘enigmatic signifier’ helps to clarify this point.  Laplanche 
initiates the concept of an enigmatic signifier by invoking Lacan’s ‘distinction between 
a signifier of – a specific meaning or signified – and a signifier to – addressed to and 
interpellating a specific subject’ (Fletcher in Laplanche, 1999, p.12).  In this instance, 
we see that this could well be the subject using ‘actionrigger.tumblr.com’ who will 
never be able to determine a specific signifier to the image, but who knows inscrutably, 
or is seduced into believing, that the image is addressing them (ibid).  Particularly 
when the address is sexualised or eroticised through an image, which is silent, 
contained and distant, we see that the gaze of the other collapses the subject-object 
relation.  The bloodied and sweating wrestlers, the muddy and muscular rugby players 
bathing together, or the grafters skillfully using power tools only invite gay jouissance 
to occur on the basis of their impersonal language.  From an imperceptible distance, 
the images allow the other to view the subject as both sexually exhilarating and 
arousing, as well as traumatically tangible and potentially threatening. 
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Whilst Laplanche’s concept refers to the unconscious or unintentional seduction of the 
child by the mother and the ‘enigmatic message that is perhaps inevitably interpreted 
as a secret’ (Bersani, 2001, p.356), it is suggested by Laplanche that, in adults 
‘enigmatic messages […] undergo a reorganisation, a dislocation’ and most 
interestingly ‘some anamorphic elements […] excluded from the translation’, which 
become unconscious (1999, p.97).  On   ‘actionrigger.tumblr.com’, but also in the other 
two micro-blogs of this chapter, this ‘enigmatic signification’ symbolically undercuts 
the power of the enigmatic signifier, in that it controls it, sanctions it and also compels 
it to behave itself.  Just as these images subject desires to repeat and, thus, reiterate 
jouissance, they do so through ‘a knowledge they are at once willfully withholding 
from me and using in order to invade my being’ (Bersani, 2001, ibid).  To the gay male 
user these images of straight men are both distant and, somehow, at the kernel of how 
gay desire is signified.  The subjects in the images unfathomably facilitate and resist 
it.  As Laplanche observes: 
An enigma, like a riddle, is proposed to the subject by another subject.  But the solution 
of a riddle in theory is completely in the conscious possession of the one who poses it, 
and thus it is entirely resolved by the answer.  An enigma on the contrary, can only be 
proposed by someone who does not know the answer, because his message is a 
compromise-formation in which his unconscious takes part (1999, pp. 254-55)  
This enigma seduces me because the ‘other’ straight men in the image stimulate me 
through their gaze. In turn, I am seduced by gazing at the ‘other’ straight men, only 
because the image of them contains the objet a of my jouissance.  Here, the paradox 
of a straight male enigma possesses ‘the very formula of desire of which I myself am 
ignorant’ (Bersani, 2001, ibid), and, thus, shatters both me (the gay male user) but also 
its own ego (the straight male subject) through a duplicitous pursuit of pleasure.  In 
these hyper-masculine images, this temporarily fulfills and momentarily ends 
jouissance through the impersonal act of gazing at that other.  If it is conceptualised 
that sexually enigmatic signification comes from the other (the ‘straight’), that other 
must be abstract, oblique, and necessarily impersonal for jouissance to occur.  Here, 
this impersonality can occur through the metonymy of self-shattering but also through 
a seduction that the subject feels on the basis of ‘a posture of immobility’ (Copjec, 
2002, p.135).  We see this at work on ‘actionrigger.tumblr.com’ which is both a 
referent and a result of the historical, political, and cultural tensions between straight 
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and gay male tropes of desire that seem to reiterate this shattering, which de-
personalises both subjects on both ‘sides’ of the screen.   
In this instance, it is the straight male subject that remains mediated and foreclosed by 
the discourse of ‘actionrigger.tumblr.com’ as ‘a symbolic edifice or […] system of 
signs’ (Gurevitch, 1999, p.527), through which ‘the signifiers fit together, combine 
and concertina’ (Lacan, 1999, p.37) and remain closest to what analytic discourse 
terms ‘slips of the tongue (lapsus)’ (ibid).  This sort of parapraxis on 
‘actionrigger.tumblr.com’ relies on the breaks and stutters in straight male jouissance 
to transform straight male representation into gay male jouissance.  These 
transpositions of meaning through the slips are necessary for this jouissance to occur 
and for the impersonality of desire to continue.  If any of these ‘straight’ male bodies 
and identity types are examined as paradigms of gay male desire, we see that it is 
through their ‘slips’ in replication that the conventions of the Cartesian ‘I’, with his 
identity, personality and metaphorical likeness, collapse into modes of Lacanian 
identification, impersonality, and metonymic correspondence.   
 
The images on ‘actionrigger.tumblr.com’ also prove that ‘I’ never exist or fully 
coincide with the signifier.  ‘I’ do not invent myself; rather, my virtual existence is 
continually co-founded with other users and their ‘other’ desires.  In this instance, 
when images are re-blogged from image-banks of official sports photographs, ‘selfie’ 
representations, pornographic websites, and photo-sets, we see how they are 
incessantly interchanged, shared, and exchanged between users, in what Adrian Rifkin, 
writing on gay male online chat-rooms, describes as both ‘lure and gauge, as an offer 
[of jouissance] or in response to a request […] [or as] some other inner utterance that 
prolongs, ends or concludes’ (2010, p.156).  Just as the arrangement of images 
attempts to organise desire in an off-set series of streaming and shifting grids, the grids, 
themselves, meander and intersect to both arrange and re-arrange the arbitrary chaos 
of Symbolic desire and the Imaginary ego’s attempt to contain it. 
 
It is through this enigmatic form of signification that gay desire is expressed in the 
slips of straight masculinity, which ‘signify something […] and can be read in an 
infinite number of different ways’ (Lacan, 1999, p.37).  More generally, it is how the 
images on ‘actionrigger.tumblr.com’ are posted, as analogous reproductions and 
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repetitive representations of straight male identity, lifestyle, work, and pleasure, which 
allow them to be allied to gay male jouissance.  Therefore, and in terms of a ‘gay’ or 
a ‘straight’ male representation, we are confronted with the key problem of 
psychoanalytic discourse, which, as Lacan observes, always ‘give[s] a different 
reading to the signifiers that are enunciated (ce qui s’enonce de signifiant) than what 
they signify’ (ibid).  There is no corresponding relationship between the person and 
the desire, between the signifier and referent, and this allows for a particular form of 
impersonality, jouissance, and more so stuttering to manifest itself.  This is instilled 
because the images, the blog, and the dialectics between gay and straight masculinity 
can only be understood through lapses, stutters, and struggles to make conscious the 
unconscious and the impersonal personal. 
 
Still, heterosexuality has historically and culturally positioned itself as discursively 
representative of homosexuality by simultaneously speaking for and, thus, foreclosing 
its meaning in language (Dollimore, 1991; Edelman, 1994; Foucault, 1998).  Yet, and 
as this thesis suggests, if the dynamics of power could shift, so that neither hetero nor 
homo were epistemologically coherent and/or ontologically recognisable, the 
representations on ‘actionrigger.tumblr.com’ (as well as the other micro-blogs and 
images in this chapter) could actually be read as ‘unrecognisable’ because they occupy 
the space between the binaries of metaphor/metonym, personal/impersonal, and 
identity/identification.  In this way the enigmatic distribution and consumption of 
online images begin to symbolically splice the subject-to-other relation (Dean, p.43, 
2000) that upholds an Imaginary ego.  In this way we see how homo-to-hetero and 
gay-to-straight male desires stutter and falter from within language to indicate that 
desire is articulated as a break in desire, which is desire.  In turn, this renders the 
desiring subject as a stuttering subject of language, who is absorbed by a 
simultaneously dysfluent and seductive jouissance, always outside of their reach in 
language yet, also, of the language through which they are subsumed and constituted.   
 
6.3 Gay Signification and Jouissance on http://homo-magazine.tumblr.com 
This next section expands on this notion of an enigmatic signifier on the micro-blog   
http://homo-magazine.tumblr.com and does so by grounding the analysis of it in terms 
of how difficult it is to signify and to analyse. On ‘homo-magazine.tumblr.com’, this 
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is tethered to the fact that there is a potentially endless metonymic sequence of images 
allied to gay desires, identities, perceptions, and memories that only come to have 
meaning through the Symbolic impersonality facilitated by the micro-blog itself.  As 
part of the research for this section of the chapter the decision was made to focus on 
the nature of posts from January 2013 to facilitate the points of argument raised in 
relation to ‘Bodies that Stutter’, Symbolic-stuttering, and metonymic impersonality. 
The images in this blog aesthetically, culturally, and thus symbolically border and 
traverse one another and in so doing begin to assemble, retro-activate, and resemble 
close to what Michael Bronski termed, ‘a gay sensibility’, in which gay men have 
specifically ‘created a separate culture that reflects their attitudes, moods, thoughts and 
emotions as an oppressed group’ (1984, p.11). 
 
As well as this the images in this micro-blog create ‘a context for their own feelings 
and imaginations, both [as] a political movement and an articulated subculture’ (ibid, 
p.13).  On one hand, this stands if we literalise and invest in the images on the basis of 
‘gay culture’ and ‘the gay male subject’ existing through personalising, inclusive, and 
tangible forms of desire and identity.  Yet, on the other, if we approach these images 
as traces of the depersonalised, exclusionary, and intangible desires they endlessly 
reproduce, we also begin to see them as close to Bersani’s notions of ‘homo-ness’ as 
a self-shattering jouissance.  Once again, this becomes an inherent feature of gay desire 
and its  potential for ‘“inaccurate self-replication”’ (Dean and Lane, p. 2001b, p.25) as 
‘a type of identification that, by undermining the very terms self and other [also] 
pushes psychoanalytic theory to its breaking point’ (ibid).  This ‘breaking-point’ is 
facilitated by the impersonality of the images and their reverberation or recurrence 
elsewhere on tumblr.com, the internet, and within gay culture.  It is unclear where the 
image originates from and where the image is going, what its purpose is and who it is 
aimed at.  In this way, the (homo)sexual subject has no pre-ordained centre of 
consciousness; he/she is already dominated and subsumed by a prior set of Symbolic 
laws that define and create ‘him/her’ as ‘gay’.  The allure of the images posted on this 
particular blog also make reference to a gay male aesthetic riven through neo-liberal, 
nostalgic, post-modern, and art-house representations, allied to strands of masculinity 
that crisscross the boundaries of gay art, literature, and porn.  Here, this ideological 
approach, which is also enhanced in the blog’s ‘MANifesto’ allow it to ‘slip into 
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becoming an unintended poetic’ (Rifkin, 2010 p.156); yet, also seal its fate as an 
marker and shibboleth of gay male epistemology and ontological signification.   
 
In the rhetoric of images that were observed and archived from January 2013, we see 
traces of this threshold of jouissance, which the unconscious struggles to express.  
Here, it is in the (sub)cultural strategies of representation that the impersonal shapes 
to jouissance are articulated.  Alan Sinfield observes that these sorts of strategies are 
‘ineluctably marginal’ (1998, p.40), whilst also constituting ‘partially alternative 
subjectivities’ (ibid).  That is, the breadth of images that are assembled, shared, and 
that intersect proliferate a repetitious process of ‘interaction with others who are 
engaged with compatible preoccupations’ (ibid); that is, the others who seem to inhabit 
a similar subject position to the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and the subject’s own shattered 
ego.  The images, posted and shared during one month include photographs of book 
jackets by William Burroughs, Christopher Isherwood, Matthew Stadler, Edmund 
White, and Samuel R. Delaney.  We also see a ‘fuck queer assimilation’ poster, a 
photograph of Quentin Crisp, an image of the actor James Franco, numerous images 
of men showering, bathing, changing and/or having public sex in locker-rooms and 
also through glory-holes.  There are two self-portraits of Andy Warhol and we also see 
images understood as ‘post-modern’ or ‘queer’ by Keith Haring, Tom of Finland, and 
Barabra Kruger.  An original film poster for Querelle of Brest starring Brad Davis, a 
man with cum on his face, an image of cum on a white Nike air-max trainer, a shot-
gun inserted into an anus, the logo for gay personals site Grindr.com, a ‘selfie’ of a 
guy wearing a t-shirt with the slogan ‘chubby, single and ready for a pringle’, another 
of a guy saying ‘I’m not gay but $20 is $20’, a photograph of Jack Kerouac and Neal 
Cassady, a poster stating ’20 reasons why 3 ways rule’, a screen grab for the titles of 
the 1982 movie, Wild-Style that is super-imposed over an image of a man penetrating 
his sexual partner, a screen grab of Michael Foucault with the subtitled caption 
‘psychiatry is also a way to implement a political power to a particular social group.  
Justice also’.  There is also an image of Michelangelo’s David alongside that of a male 
model imitating his pose, a muscular naked guy playing baseball with an erection, a 
triptych of ‘London, Paris and New York’ depicting ‘Big Ben, The Empire State 
Building and the Eiffel Tour’, the mask of Agamemnon, and a screen-grabbed caption 
that states ‘the male gaze meets the male gaze and…there’s a party!’.  As well as 
numerous images which have been cropped to reveal and conceal corporeal features 
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of the male body such as the erect penis, the anus, the (hairy) chest, the jaw, the eyes, 
the back, the legs, the mouth and the arms.   Here, this breathless, superfluous, and 
inscrutable range of signifiers can only be situated and discussed through their capacity 
to stutter.  This is brought about because as signifiers of gay desire, identity, and 
culture they are connected to Symbolic modes of jouissance that render them as 
‘signifier[s] of signification’ (Owens, 1978, p.82).   
On ‘homo-magazine.tumblr.com’ this stuttering is not immediately apparent.  The 
visual rhetoric of imagery seems to (re)present, through the simultaneity of 
intersubjectivity, an eloquent space for the Imaginary other both participant and 
viewer.  What is being shared and   exchanged through the subject-to-subject or 
blogger-to-blogger relation seems to ‘speak’ gay desire. Yet, within these posts, ways 
of coherently writing, speaking, and representing gay desire are rendered subjective 
and imprecise.  For instance, the posting, blogging, and/or re-blogging of an image is 
reliant upon what that image signifies in relation to an Other, who cannot be articulated 
or positioned ‘outside of contingent, partial, inconsistent, [and] symbolic practices’ 
(Zizek, 2002, p.72).  Since these images do not clearly articulate, ‘write’ and/or ‘speak’ 
gay desire, we see from the outset that the over-representation of both written and 
visual language on ‘homo-magazine.tumblr.com’ falters and stutters in relation to a 
signifier and the Other involved in its signification.  Here, the barrage of 
representations are instantaneously connected to, and dislocated from, a particular 
group or groups of users, who are seeking out desire through forms of identification 
they are persuaded into associating with both gay desire and in some instances straight 
masculinity.   
We also see aspects of through Lacan’s stress on desire and the object, that is, in part, 
an attempt to understand sexuality ‘outside’ the person (hence his frequent deployment 
of graphs and formal logic).  The dimensions of this are complex, in that any 
representation of desire (a photograph, a video, a song, in fact, any media text) only 
manages to represent desire on the basis of how that representation has been 
assembled, caused, and articulated as desire in language.  To the extent, therefore, that 
the unconscious is structured, like language, so Lacan’s considerations of sex, 
sexuality, and desire cannot be divorced from the operations of language and the 
unconscious.  To recognise Lacan’s move away from egos and persons in his 
consideration of sexuality involves a return to the notions of metaphor and metonymy.  
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This stress on language, of course, serves to underline the impersonal and the symbolic 
far more than simply the personal or the Imaginary.  On ‘homo-magazine.tumblr.com’ 
and in the overexcited visual language of its representation, the Symbolic and 
metonymic dimensions of gay masculinity and its temptation to seek a reflection in the 
Imaginary other are everywhere.  As these images jostle with one another they seem 
to do so in ways allied to gay male culture, politics, lifestyle, and desire as 
metaphorical tropes.  Yet, if they are exposed through a Symbolic Other they both 
betray and display evidence of their impersonal and divergent jouissance.  
Through these images and the paradox of their strategic and capricious formation on 
‘homo-magazine.tumblr.com’, we see how incoherence and transposition of meaning 
offers up a new potential, whereby the signifier unfetters itself from its significatory 
meaning and, quite literally, ‘exceeds its symbolic function, to signify’’ (Fink in Lacan, 
1999, p.19, n.12).  On this micro-blog there is no truth or meaning in ‘gay’ or 
‘masculine’ signification except that which the subject attempts to structure in the 
associated chain of signifiers.  Saying that, the signifier still needs to be emphasised 
and examined because it underpins the Symbolic order, which overhangs the subject 
of representation as the other.  Lacan himself remains uneasy and sceptical about the 
importance of the signifier and, in doing so, he dismantles its ‘substance’ or 
‘substantial dimension’ (1999, p.21).  This dethrones the signifier as a possessive form 
and the Cartesian axiom of ‘I am thinking, therefore, I am’ discussed in Chapter 3 
splinters because of the signifier’s place in the Symbolic unconscious.  This is most 
evident in the representational hyperbole of the blog, where the posting and sharing of 
gay male imagery is always vulnerable to the eradication of meaning and the shattering 
of ego.  The ontological ‘gay’ or even ‘homo’ subject of a master discourse, which 
seems to claim his space in the social and hierarchical order of that discourse, is 
displaced and in the contexts of this thesis stutters.  If this is the case, then the subject’s 
location and function in discourse and within ‘homo-magazine.tumblr.com’, is 
continuously impersonal, precarious, and anxious.  
 
In light of this, Judith Halberstam observes that, in Lacan’s account of sexual 
difference, ‘primacy is granted to the signifier over that which it signifies’ or ‘in more 
simple terms naming confers, rather than reflects meaning’ (1998, p.25).  Since the 
‘homo’ is named in ‘homo-magazine.tumblr.com’, ‘he’ is only ever signified, yet the 
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allure of the signifier and its Imaginary pull also positions ‘him’ as the signifier of how 
‘homo’ is expressed in signification.  If this conferring is encoded, through features 
such as online usernames (as discussed in Chapter 4 on dudesnude.com), or the names 
of the blogs themselves, it strengthens the claim that it is in the Symbolic order that 
the signifier fails and never fully personalises or sustains an identity; rather, it uses the 
powerful thrust of what it can confer to mask its impersonality.   
This notion of an impersonal signifier is clarified by Dean who claims that Lacanian 
psychoanalysis differs from the accounts of sexuality ‘churned out of the rhetorical 
machine’ (2000, p.178), which ’evacuate desire from their accounts’ (ibid) in favour 
of bodies who either ‘speak’ or ‘perform’ sexuality through 
constructionist/deconstructionist accounts of a bodily identity.  In the same way, post-
structural, post-modern, and queer tendencies in rhetorical accounts of gay sexuality 
have led us ‘to a basic misconception’ that ‘although desire is “in” language, desire is 
not itself linguistic’ (ibid).  In other words, it is not possible to read the signification 
of desire as a structural and identifiable trope that is analogous to a mirroring of reality 
and experience.  Rather, desire exceeds or, even, outstrips the signifiers’ attempts to 
duplicate and identify it.  Desire actually precedes the signifier itself; it nervously and 
excitedly anticipates it through ‘the rhetoric of the unconscious’ (ibid, p.180) and the 
tropes of metaphor and metonymy.   
Dean also warns that ‘conceiving unconscious processes linguistically immediately 
de-individualises the unconscious’ (ibid, p.183), so that ‘once the unconscious is 
understood in terms of the discourse of the Other’ (ibid) then it ‘becomes more readily 
thinkable as social and cultural (if not “collective” in the Jungian sense)’ (ibid).  This 
is the danger inherent in accounts that construct ‘bodies bearing egos [which are] 
devoid of subjective desire’ (ibid, p.187).  Here, Dean is suggesting that desire 
antagonises both the model of impersonality which he initiates, as well as the social 
constructionist, psychological, and formalist accounts and their analysis of bodily 
practices rather than unconscious desires.  This radical shift uses, as its core, the notion 
that Lacan theorises sexuality in terms not of gender (the bodily ego as metaphor), but 
of jouissance (the unconscious nuances of metonymic displacement).  This approach 
also reminds us of the enigmatic signifier and its potential to open up a new space of 
desire, which is reliant on ‘our inability to read, to symbolise’ (Tukhanen, 2002, 
p.135).  It is here that the ‘secrets that appear just beyond our reach, behind the mask 
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of the objet a’ (ibid) captivate and fail us as subjects.  It also in this enigmatic process 
that a self-shattered ego and stuttering bodies emerge across ‘homo-
magazine.tumblr.com’; only managing to articulate desire because they are always 
waiting to realise and release it as jouissance. 
The demand allied to waiting, posting, networking, and sharing something (love, 
desire, community, an object, an opinion etc.) on ‘homo-magazine.tumblr.com’ is 
always precarious when it is signified through an interface that seems to assemble and 
momentarily unites ‘it’.  Yet, that demand continues through a process of demanding 
because its demand for jouissance is never fully satisfied or contained.  The user of 
‘homo-magazine.tumblr.com’ can only pursue desire if combinations of images are 
accessed, assembled, and reassembled.  The subject begins a journey that positions 
desire as always occurring but never being expressed between self and ego, through 
simultaneously systematic and arbitrary posts, blogs and re-blogs.  This connects the 
subject back to ego’s unconscious and its relation to the symbolic as a way of both 
marking out and forgetting jouissance.  These vast territories of imagery on 
tumblr.com, which present a potentially infinite number of ways to view gay male 
desire, demonstrate how its sexualised representation carries with itself a point of 
departure that Dean refers to as ‘the dignity of the human individual’ (2000, p.240) 
connected to post-Stonewall, queer and (neo) liberal ideologies of gay liberation, 
equality, freedom, and identity.   
The individual choices and agency bound to this dignity are always subject to 
potentially transgressive or radical acts with liberal origins – specifically the 
interminable self-representations, by and for gay men that have been discussed and 
excessively visualised here. Online spaces such as ‘homo-magazine.tumblr.com’ 
present the sexual and desiring body through an ambiguously accessible, intimate, 
immediate, and (dis)satisfying spectacle of desire.  For example, if the non-specific, 
non-gendered, and non-corporeal object (on this blog we see re-blogged copies of 
paintings, slogans, commodities, items of clothing, book jackets, and logos), which 
causes desire (objet a), is the primary structure of identification, identity formed in the 
name of desire is based on repetition and is secondary.  This is how erroneous versions 
of epistemology and ontology continue to be perpetuated, developed, and sustained 
under the gendered forms of hetero- and homosexuality.  Often the return to the 
unconscious psychic identifications, which undermine and question the post-modern, 
202 
 
fluid, and fragmented social-self, are just another way of attempting to create and 
sustain (under capitalism) the project of (sub) cultural identity politics. In this way, 
‘the signifier is what brings jouissance to a halt’ (ibid, p.24).  There is a jerky tension 
at work in this setting, which locates jouissance as both a cause or spur to desire and a 
stop or terminator of that desire.  On tumblr.com, the ways in which the representation 
of the subject’s and the ‘Other’s’ sexual desires rise and reinforce this counter-
productive track or circuit, relies upon desire always moving and circulating.  The 
blogging and re-blogging, clicking and typing, cutting and pasting indicate that the 
subject is caught in a symbolic exchange between moments of stopping-starting and 
starting-stopping.  This is indicative of the subjects and more so the ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ in this thesis but also the next section which examines the representational 
paradigm of the selfie as a Symbolic mode of jouissance and its place in contemporary 
practices of gay male self-representation. 
 
6.4 The Anamorphic Gaze, Mise-en-Abyme, and the ‘Selfie that Stutters’ on 
tumblr.com  
The significance of the images examined in the next part of the chapter are connected 
to the concept of a Symbolic and its potential to self-shatter the subject and render 
desire impersonal, via the online representational trend known as the ‘selfie’.  The 
modes of self-representation and self- objectification examined in this section are 
primarily allied to the micro-blog http://nakedgayguys.tumblr.com/ but, as we have 
seen on tumblr.com, their origins remain precarious.  As of 2014, several other blogs, 
(at the time of writing the most popular are; nakedguyselfies.tumblr.com, 
gaymanselfies.tumblr.com, gayphones.tumblr.com, and majdad-iphone.tumblr.com), 
are all devoted to the blogging and sharing of images of men who primarily use android 
phone technology, but also digital cameras, web-cams and tablets, to capture their own 
self-image.  On the one hand, the technology allows for the lens to be turned towards 
the subject in a conventional photographic practice of self-portraiture, so the 
appearance of the device that photographed the image of the subject remains absent; 
here the camera or phone enables, yet also remains outside, the representation.  On the 
other, when the lens of the phone is turned away from the subject and pointed towards 
a mirror, the device appears as a part of the image.  It exists within the image and is 
held by the subject as proof of how that image has been captured.  By pointing the lens 
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away from the self and towards the mirror, the subject begins to mark what Lacan 
suggests are images that are not images, per se; rather, they are only defined as images 
through intra-subjective processes of the subject creating, and the other looking at, the 
representation.   
According to Susan Sontag (1977), photographs also furnish evidence; something we 
see but also doubt.  The images are familiar; they are located within the private space 
of the bathroom or the public space of the toilet cubicle, locker/gym changing room, 
(Gove, 2000; Humphreys, 1970; Rifkin, 2010).  They are connected to the Imaginary 
realms of the other and his ideal-ego, presented as body that is young, muscular, 
predominantly white, and well-endowed.  This other is both ‘like us’ – his signification 
appearing through an index of spaces that appear to be recognisable, typical, real, 
authentic, and aligned to the amateurish tropes in pornography, examined in Chapter 
5, which have been read as personal.  Yet he is also ‘unlike us’ – he remains trapped, 
silent, jarring, distant, anonymous, and impersonal.  Here, the technological 
commodity acts as a way to identify with the stuttering subject of the representation – 
in these images the viewer sees what the subject sees.  Since the lens has been pointed 
towards the mirror, and since the mirror has reflected back to the producer of the image 
his reflection, the field of vision and its allure is something that seems to express the 
jouissance of the other.  The lens has been simultaneously pointed towards and away 
from the subject, so that both the subject and photograph fold back upon themselves 
via a doubling ‘generated by an act of internal duplication’ and, in so doing, ‘the 
distance – both physical and psychological – that separates them in reality is collapsed’ 
(Owens, 1978, p.  74) and rendered oblique.   
In the selfie the predominantly young male subject has volunteers himself to the lens 
of his phone, the mirror, and the users of tumblr.com so that he seems to occupy the 
Imaginary position of the other at the level of sexual allure and fantasy which are 
infused on the images surface. Yet in this way the subject can only be seen as desirable 
through his Symbolic relation to the camera-phone and now the computer-screen.  In 
one version of its utility, the camera lens acts as a visual record that implicates him – 
it positions and typifies him as something and/or someone.  Sontag argued that to 
photograph people is to violate and potentially frustrate them, by seeing them as they 
never see themselves, by having knowledge of them that they can never have.  So, 
when a user like this uploads, crops, and edits his selfies online, they are subject to the 
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transformative effect and affect between metaphor and metonymy whereby the image 
itself fails and is exasperated in its articulation of the (gay) identity of the subject.  In 
this way photography, and more so the selfie, which has so many narcissistic uses, is 
the foundational instrument for depersonalising our relation to the world.  It offers, in 
one easy habit-forming activity, both participation and alienation – much like sexuality 
and the use of these blogs.  We are drawn to participate, whilst our alienation is 
confirmed (Sontag, 1977, p.167).  This is seen in the processes of uploading, 
observing, and sharing our own, but also the other’s, photographs online; we 
instantaneously write and represent distance between the ‘you’ in the photograph and 
the ‘you’ in reality.  In this respect, there is always something uncanny about the 
photograph; in the freezing of the moment, the moment is lost through its doubling 
and the unique identity of time and place is rendered ‘obsolete’’ (Doane, 1999, p.31). 
In selfies the male subjects attempt to present themselves to themselves as subjects and 
then, by posting and sharing their self-image, they anticipate a relation to the other.  
By pointing the camera lens of the smartphone or digital camera at the mirror they are 
standing in front of, they self-objectify and capture their image both in the lens of the 
phone or camera and in the mirror.  It is here that the gaze is expectantly and 
immanently assured that others are also capturing their own image, on and in flat empty 
screens and surfaces, only then to see them remediated and entangled with thousands 
of other images on blogs such as ‘nakedgayguys.tumblr.com’, which reproduce 
jouissance through a Symbolic assemblage of impersonal and ‘intra-personal’ triggers 
of desire and mediated bodies that stutter when they gaze and are gazed at.  When 
these images are reproduced through android or smartphones, in privatising or personal 
spaces such as bathrooms and locker-rooms, through the processes of uploading, the 
practices of sharing and practices of gazing at men on tumblr.com connects to what 
Zizek gleefully sees as ‘nothing but confusion’ (Zizek, 2006, p.69)  and something, 
‘which acquires a definite shape only when looked at from a standpoint slanted by the 
subject’s desires and fears – as such a mere ‘shadow of what it is not’ (ibid).   
Zizek also discusses the psychoanalytic ‘gaze’ as experienced as ‘already the gaze of 
the other’ (1991, p.109).  These enigmas, of the inside looking out and the outside 
attempting to look in, are broken down by Zizek as ‘the eye viewing the object is on 
the side of the subject, whilst the gaze is on the side of the object’ (ibid, p.109) and, 
consequently, the object’s gaze precedes the subject’s from a point that the subject can 
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and will never be able to see.  The eye fails to see that ‘when I am looking at the object, 
the object is already gazing at me’ (ibid).  As Dean goes on to advocate, the gaze is a 
‘much-misunderstood Lacanian concept’ and he goes as far as to claim that it cannot 
be used alone to ‘theorise scopic dimensions of sexuality’ (2000, p.195).  It then starts 
to become clear that the Imaginary and intersubjective dimensions of the ego fail to 
account for the selfie as a form of gay desire and we have to look beyond the 
conventions of the gaze to extract new ways of reading the gay male subject.   
 
This approach to the gaze and its alliance to the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ of the thesis are 
most obvious in the ways that the selfie both complicates and slants the 
subject’s/other’s gaze and desire.  In a selfie the reality of the image remains external 
to it as a result of how the subject has both attempted to capture and displace 
‘reciprocal visibility’ (Foucault, 2002, p.4).  The practice of self-representation is 
captured by a subject who is looking at himself through a camera lens but desires the 
other to see fully what he can only see partly; this lens is often elevated and angled to 
point at a mirror and the lens’ reflection in the mirror is also reflected at a mirror that 
forms the screen and frame of the photograph we, the viewers, see.  The subject’s gaze 
is both concentrated on himself, yet shattered through his positioning of the camera 
lens / phone-screen towards the mirror, which acts as a deliberate deflection of this 
self.  In these particularly complex and multi-dimensional images the subject and the 
other can only see the subject through a series of reduplicated reflections and oblique 
diagonals.  The mirrors are mostly arranged to replicate the subject’s body and act as 
a marker to indicate to the viewer that the subject can be captured and desire can be 
articulated persuasively.  Yet in the selfie it is unclear where photographic, mirrored, 
and, thus, ego-driven reality, reflection, and refraction occur.  In this case, the ego is 
shattered and both the image and the subject stutter as signifiers of desire collapse into 
one another.  Since this subject attempts to see himself and is then seen by another, 
this shattering becomes indicative of how his ‘seeing’ in the Imaginary ‘stutters’ and, 
as a result, is displaced by jouissance in the Symbolic, which in turn constructs a 
subject that is distorted by how he and his desire are signified.   
Here, this often anonymous masculine subject has used the dimensions of 
displacement and impersonality to proliferate a form of Symbolic-stuttering and self-
shattering that Tim Dean alludes  to as ‘a different kind of pleasure involved in 
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violating one’s own self-image […] a pleasure in tension with that of secure 
boundaries and self-recognition’ (2009, p.22).  This desecration of the self and self-
image may guide us towards the notion of self-shattering in the ‘selfie’ as a new form 
of jouissance in the Symbolic which repositions not only the gay (and straight) male 
self but also the attendant issues of identity and desire played out through the ego and 
the unconscious.  The selfie also occupies a space between the interplay of eye and 
gaze, visibility and invisibility, and diverts both subject and other towards the 
topography of the Symbolic, which equivocates to what Foucault terms ‘the unstable 
play of metamorphoses established [...] between spectator and model’ (2002, p.5).  Just 
as the subject chooses to look at himself in the lens of the phone, and not in the mirror, 
we can suggest that his level of self-identification is in conflict with the ego’s 
alignment to the Imaginary-Symbolic relation.  Yet, by choosing to look either through 
the lens of the phone or towards the mirror, ‘the seeing subject can only be inferred, 
not perceived directly’ (Jay, 1994, p.404).  The seeing subject does not see – he fails 
to register and perceive his own reality and personality, and this results in an image 
that is slashed and riven by a form of impersonality, cultivated in the subject’s ego, 
and its shattered and stuttering relation to a Symbolic Other.   
Whilst some of the subjects of ‘selfies’ look at themselves in the mirror it seems that 
the majority of the subjects are drawn to their own reflections on the phone-screen, 
reflected in the camera-phone lens. Here, the mirror becomes less of an Imaginary 
crossing point and more of a Symbolic obstacle to desire.  In this instance, the gaze is 
understood as Symbolic in that it ‘is that which is outside of the subject [and which] 
‘in a fragmented form […is] photo-graphed’ (ibid, p.106). These images also express 
and complicate what Amelia Jones calls ‘corporeality-as-surface’ (2002, p.967).  In 
selfies the physical tangibility of the body mutates to metonymically become the 
subject’s and the other’s gaze, and this gaze, as objet a, forms a ‘trap for the gaze’ 
(Lacan, 1994, pp.88-89) as jouissance through the struggle for desire.  Here, modes of 
reflection and refraction, which have constructed the image, have also catalysed the 
gaze.   
These claims, around the gaze as an Imaginary-Symbolic trap, are also contextualised 
by Lacan in his reading of Hans Holbein’s painting, The Ambassadors (1533), (Figure 
6.1) (1964, p.93) and his claim that the subject looking at the painting is not the subject 
of an inter-subjective or recognisable consciousness but, rather, the unconscious 
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subject of desire (Doy, 2005).  It is through the gaze that the ‘subject is annihilated’ 
(Lacan, 1964, p.88) and, because the painting ‘undermine[s] the illusion of […] 
homogenous space’ (Harari, 2004, p.116), it is in the subject’s obliteration that 
identification is attempted or even re-created.  In his reading of the picture, Lacan 
examines the presence of an anamorphic skull, ‘whose natural shape could be restored 
only by an oblique glance from the painting’s edge’ (Jay, 1994, p.363).  This occurs 
in, what Lacan consciously terms, ‘the geometral field’ (1994, p.105) but, more 
crucially, it also occurs through a desire at work in the unconscious Symbolic region.  
Just as Holbein, the painter, subverts the phallic gaze ‘of the dominant Cartesian 
perspectivalist scopic regime’ (ibid), Lacan, the theorist, uses the skull as an example 
of desire found in the impersonal gaze and ‘its pulsatile, dazzling and spread out 
function’ (Lacan, 1994, p.88-9).  When the anamorphosis is seen as a skull, it is a 
‘distortion of perspective that entails the inverted use of its customariness’ (Harari, 
2004, p.116) in disjunction with the homogeny of Holbein’s subjects.   
It is in ‘the symbolic realm in which the subject is decentred, split, and comes to terms 
with its own incompleteness’ (Jay, 1994, p. 363) that this illusory form of reciprocity 
and recognition can be ‘seen’, via the presence of the selfie on social networked and 
digital media. For instance, the phone and camera-lens is often responsible for 
blocking or obliterating of the subjects face and in the moment that the image is 
captured in that the subject (who is looking at the screen of his phone) can only see 
himself as he appears to himself – as an identity, a full personality with a recognisable 
face. It is only after the image is captured by the phone that the subject is able to see 
how he now appears to the other.  The gaze of the other is something that has not yet 
grasped the place of the subject; it is here that the subject remains stuck in an 
anamorphic gaze.  It is only the subject using the phone who can capture the image in 
the mirror; desire can only be invigorated by the phone and its power to both cause 
and capture desire in both a material/technological and unconscious objet a, which 
Zizek refers to as an ‘anamorphic blotch’ or ‘stain’ (2006, p.69) or that undercuts the 
‘seeing subject’ through ‘the gap between the eye and gaze’ (ibid).  It is in this instance 
that the subject is ‘always-already gazed at from a point that eludes his eyes’ (ibid).  
Once again, desire is entrapped – it is seen, from one side, by the subject and, from the 
other, by the ‘other’; it only ‘belongs’ in the image because it has the power to 
anamorphically capture the subject’s, and, thus, distort the other’s, gaze and 
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jouissance.  The phone acts as facilitator of representations, which combine the 
anamorphic blemish, the causal objet a, and the jouissance of the other triadicially.  
Here, the phone/digital camera is expressed in a similar way to Holbein’s and Lacan’s 
anamorphosis.  The commodity, which is in the subject’s grasp, is responsible for 
capturing the image we (the other) see.  Yet, it is also a necessary for the subject to 
distort his coherent image by turning the lens away from himself and pointing it 
towards a mirror.  Whilst the vantage point of the viewer seems to be guaranteed 
because the subject is there for them to see, they are actually seeing him from within 
a distortion. 
Dean also suggests that the gaze ‘connect[s] our bodies to society and culture in a way 
that suggests the conceptual potential of objet a for theorising sexuality as culturally 
inflected, mediated, even “technologized”, without reductively describing sexuality as 
culturally constructed’ (2000, p.196).  Just as Lacan claims the gaze as objet a is 
provisional and chaotic, Dean suggests that ‘Lacan’s characterisation of the gaze […] 
as objet [...] a evokes gay practices of cruising and […] video sex, phone sex and 
virtual sex’ (ibid, p.195).  If we apprise Dean’s suggestions and apply them to the 
selfie, we can see that these processes of self-representation never involve literal 
processes of gay men ‘seeing’ gay desire. Rather, they highlight the conceptual drive 
of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and their ‘failure to distinguish between vision and gaze’ (ibid, 
p.195), and how the positions of subject, mirror, and gaze, in any account of gay 
masculinity and sexuality, may be more usefully understood vis-à-vis ‘a fracture, a bi-
partition, a splitting of the being to which the being accommodates itself’ (Lacan 1994, 
p.106).  This approach to gay desire in these selfies allows us to re-position the practice 
of photographic, online, and pornographic self-representation as something that, under 
the gaze transforms the personality of the subject into a permanently impersonal 
metonym, or more so, and to follow the line of argument that this thesis has developed, 
a body or ‘Bodies that Stutter’.   
This impersonality, realised as representational desire, suggests that the ‘photograph 
as mirror’ or, indeed, the ‘mirror as photograph’ continuously attempts to 
Symbolically capture something of jouissance both for the subject and for the other.  
If, as Craig Owens suggests, ‘the mirror reflects not only the subjects depicted, but 
also the entire photograph itself’, we see that the selfie also alerts us to how we may 
see ‘in [a] photograph what a photograph is – en abyme’ (1978, p.75).  Owen’s work 
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on photographic imagery and ‘en abyme’ (1978) cites Andre Gide, as the originator of 
the term, as one that addresses ‘the very subject of the work transposed to the scale of 
its characters’ and, in so doing, ‘illuminates the work better, or establishes its 
proportions more clearly’ (ibid, p.75).  if it is allied to the practices of self-
representation and the discourses of the selfie discussed in this chapter then mise-en-
abyme can also be conceptualised as ‘any aspect enclosed within a work that shows a 
similarity with the work that constrains it’ (Dallenbach, 1977, p.8).  If the elision of 
recognition is foundational to what troubles the Gaze, it is also this fractured way of 
seeing and being seen that constitutes the mise-en-abyme in the selfie.  It not only 
‘thematises […] an internalising duplication, but also, paradoxically, an externalising 
one’ (Minissale, 2009, p.51), so that the mirror shatters, the ego shatters and the body 
stutters as the reflection refracts. 
Mise-en-abyme also connects to Michel Foucault’s analysis of Diego Velasquez’s Las 
Meninas (1656), (Figure 6.2) examined in The Order of Things (2002 [1970]).  This is 
also useful to re-position the subject of the selfie and his relations to the gaze, desire, 
and the tensions between the Imaginary and Symbolic.  In Velasquez’s painting, we 
see a ‘representation of a pictorial representation’ (Alpers, 1983, p.31) because the 
painter has, as Foucault observes, ‘placed himself to one side of the painting on which 
he is working’ and ‘the canvas has its back turned to [the] spectator: he can see nothing 
of it but the reverse side’  (2002, p.3).  We see the painter painting a picture of the king 
and queen, who are reflected back to us as spectators in a mirror.  Just as Lacan 
suggests, Foucault also identifies the gaze as that which is outside and external to the 
painting, yet also gives meaning to what is inside it.  Using this as a rubric we can see 
in a selfie the subject’s gaze does just that; it looks towards the spectator, whilst 
creating another new self-image in the reflection of the mirror.  The subject turns the 
lens towards himself but turns away from the mirror and, in so doing, he captures a 
simultaneously anamorphic and duplicitous image of his own reflection.  Here, the 
gaze ‘signals from within the picture that the viewer outside the picture is seen and in 
turn acknowledges the state of being seen’ (Alpers, 1983, p.32).  In this way the selfie 
allows us to see a representation from within the image that the subject also sees.   
As spectators, we see the anamorphosis of the phone that Symbolically captures our 
jouissance in the mirror and it appears more distant and shattered.  Still, the image that 
is being made in the moment that the image is taken ‘remains stubbornly invisible’ and 
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‘prevents the relation of these [G]gazes from ever being discoverable or definitively 
established’ (Foucault, 2002, p.5).  Here, the Gaze traverses this form of representation 
and ambivalently forms the tensions wrought between the Imaginary and Symbolic in 
Lacan.  Just as Foucault perceived in Las Meninas, we see here that our experience of 
looking is defined through ‘a matter of pure reciprocity: we are looking at a picture in 
which the painter [the subject of the selfie] is in turn looking out at us’ (ibid, p.4).  
Secondly, the notion that just as we ‘are greeted by that gaze we are also dismissed by 
it’ (ibid) reinforces the metonymic ‘network of uncertainties, exchanges and feints’ 
(ibid) embedded in the Symbolic.  Here, the (sovereign) Gaze of Velasquez [the selfie] 
occupies the position of a subject who, within his own painting, ‘finds in this painting 
its representation’ (ibid).  As before, and in alignment to Holbein’s anamorphic skull, 
we see that this moment of ambivalence is the moment of identification.   
This transmutation of the gaze occurs because these images are located within a locus 
of image making that presents the spectator with the paradox of ‘representations within 
representations’ or ‘photographs within photographs’.  This also occurs in selfies when 
‘the visual identification of mirror and photograph establishes a complex play between 
subject, mirror and camera’ in that ‘not only is the subject double[d] twice (by mirror 
and camera), but the mirror image, itself a double, is redoubled by the photograph 
itself’ (Owens, 1978, p.81).  Once again within those selfies which an indexed with 
this visual redoubling subjects capture themselves using the conventions of pointing 
the lens towards the mirror to capture the self.  Yet, because of the position of another 
mirror or mirrors behind the subjects, the image is made through a process Owens 
terms ‘reduplicative’, which both technically and symbolically signifies the 
reproduction of the ego and the self in reflection.  Owen’s reading of the abyme is 
crucial, in that it identifies the importance of language and the Symbolic in relation to 
the mirror as well as framing some of the claims that have been identified around 
stuttering, jouissance, and the Symbolic in this thesis.   
These duplicative reflections, which are then repetitiously re-blogged and, thus, 
dispersed online, only exist as gay desire through the Imaginary illusions of 
personalising, networking, blogging, and sharing that, in turn, ‘plicate’ them ad 
infinitum.  As the prefix of reduplication is stripped of its signifying function, it aligns 
itself to the gaze and objet a of desire, so that images are pluralised into endless and 
depthless mise-en-abymes ‘without any corresponding semantic increment [which] 
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harbors within [their] semantic folds the concepts of tautology, of redundancy’ 
(Owens, 1978, p.81).  This convergence of selfies, across the interfaced collage of 
‘nakedgayguys.tumblr.com’ and tumblr.com more broadly, is also a further indication 
that the Imaginary ego in the mirror is not simply a reflection that reflects an image of 
its viewer.  Lacan writes that, ‘man’s desire finds its meaning in the desire of the other, 
not so much because the other holds the key to the object desired, as because the first 
object of desire is to be recognised by the other’ (2003, p.64).  Now, whilst this notion 
of recognition through the complexity of shattering, stuttering, mirroring, 
anamorphosis, and mis-en-abyme are problematic (we know that the metonymic axis 
to which desire is linked can never finalise itself), Lacan and more so the selfies 
analysed in this section nonetheless imply that desire might be my specific desire, but 
that can only come to be desire that moves towards jouissance in terms of an Imaginary 
‘other’ preceded and undermined by a Symbolic ‘Other’.   
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has attempted to develop and sustain the key lines of this argument of this 
thesis around ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and their relationship to metonymy, impersonality, 
desire and jouissance on tumblr.com. It has identified the ways in which tumblr.com 
and the key representational practices examined here cultivate an online space that on 
the one hand seems to nurture and sustain gay desire at an Imaginary level, and on the 
other Symbolically cuts it down and renders it oblique, enigmatic, and askew. The 
suggestions put forward in this chapter and the issues around ‘Bodies that Stutter’ that 
have also been developed and linked through Chapters 4 and 5 seem to circulate around 
the overarching notion that there is no resolution (of desire, of identification, of 
jouissance) because the ‘other’ (him, it, x) can never finalise/complete another’s desire 
in the Symbolic. Although desire outside of the field of the ‘other’ is almost impossible 
to visualise and conceive, we see on a platform such as tumblr.com and particularly 
through the selfie that a never-ending proliferation of signifiers of desire seems to find 
a way of moving desire towards a Symbolic form of jouissance which is becoming 
both enigmatic and impossible to pinpoint or categorise.  These attempts to situate 
‘Bodies that Stutter’ in relation to a series of impersonal identifications on tumblr.com 
and allied to the selfie discussed in the latter part of this chapter, also serve to inhibit 
the gay subject as well as fix both gay and straight identity at the level of the Imaginary 
to the detriment of the Symbolic, desire, and jouissance.  Perhaps, this remains one of 
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the underlying problems that galvanises the issue of impersonality and the 
representation of gay male desire in this thesis and in photographic, pornographic, and 
online representations, per se.  In the case of using Lacan’s work to theorise this issue, 
we see, through the field of language and desire, how unconscious fantasy causes the 
subject to represent and self-represent and, in so doing, to relate not to another subject, 
necessarily, but to an ‘object’ connected to that subject’s Symbolic sense of jouissance 
and how it stutters.  
As the thesis moves towards it conclusion it important to acknowledge the ways in 
which ‘Bodies that Stutter’ are both identifiable but also emergent and capricious. In 
this chapter it seems as if this divergent appeal is realised in the contemporary practices 
of self-representation and also the online micro-blogs that have been addressed. As 
with the bodies that stuttered in Chapters 4 and 5 we may well suggest that there is no 
sense of resolution to the stuttering and the nuances of what it can encapsulate. This 
may seem ironic and also disconcerting by way of a link to the conclusion of this work, 
but it serves to highlight that desire and jouissance like these metonymic bodies is 
never consistent or identifiable. At this point it may seem apt to reflect upon the 
tensions of an Imaginary other and a Symbolic Other which allows for an entry point 
into the debates that have been contextualised and developed. It is through these strains 
that we have asserted that bodies stutter and that desires are articulated through them 
as metonymic and impersonal, yet it is also important to acknowledge that bodies may 
stutter in alternative ways and that psychoanalytic concepts and/or approaches that 
may have remained untapped or under addressed in this project can also be accounted 
for and explored in its concluding section.  
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    Figure 6.1 - Hans Holbein - The Ambassadors (1533) 
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Figure 6.2 - Diego Velasquez - Las Meninas (1656) 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
The conclusion to the thesis is going to consolidate and account for the key 
interventions that have been developed in relation to the themes of metonymy, 
impersonality, desire, and jouissance, and how these relate to the concepts of ’Bodies 
that Stutter’ and Symbolic-stuttering. As well as this, this final section of this project 
will account for the terms that were in some way neglected or remain unaddressed in 
this thesis. These sections will focus on the Real, objet a, ‘Matter-Stutter-Mutter’, and 
self-shattering to suggest that the argument presented in this work may now shift and 
reposition ‘Bodies that Stutter’ beyond the rhetoric of gay identity and the scope of 
gay desire.  Ironically, and in a work that is critical of the process of association that 
come from metaphorical comparisons it may be that the ‘stutter’ is in some ways 
condensed into a metaphorical trope. It is at once reflective of the hesitancy, 
frustration, exhilaration, and repetition that it contains, as well as remaining vulnerable 
to metonymic contiguity and transposition of a Symbolic language it cannot control.  
A lot like desire, stuttering is reliant upon stops and starts, structure and chaos, 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction. It is also something that cannot be contained or applied 
to one body above another or indeed one identity and/or identity type. This thesis may 
have isolated gay male identity and posed its key aims, objectives, questions, and lines 
of argument in relation to gay masculinity, but it could also be suggested that ‘Bodies 
that Stutter’ and the processes of Symbolic-stuttering aligned to them may reach out 
towards other forms of desire and identity that struggle to resolve the relations between 
identity and desire, personality and impersonality and self and ‘other’ / ‘Other’.  
This thesis has suggested that stuttering might well occur in multiple, ambiguous, and 
oblique ways. At this point it is useful to assert that ‘Bodies that Stutter’ may also 
operate through manifold settings and encapsulations. The specific ways in which they 
have been conceptualised could be productively and strategically reworked and re-
applied to non-digital or networked representations and those bodies that are nether 
gay or male.  In addition, the key to utilising and using this concept responsibly must 
be alert to the fact that we cannot luxuriate in the conceptual nuances of stuttering and 
allow it continue stuttering as a concept that cannot be identified beyond the 
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psychoanalytic unconscious and/or gay male desire. At this stage it may be useful to 
sum up the dimensions of stuttering and the nuances of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and 
Symbolic-stuttering in four key points. These points are not intended to be read or 
positioned as a manifesto of specific gay male bodies that stutter, rather they should 
be encountered as more as a ‘notes towards stuttering’ that attend to the ambiguity and 
contradiction contained within the concept and its broader appeal and efficacy.  
1. ‘Bodies that Stutter’ are bodies that are riven by the Symbolic and they are 
located there. They are the bodies contained within representation that can only appear 
as bodies through processes of Symbolic power, negotiation, and also subjugation.   
2. As Symbolic bodies, ‘Bodies that Stutter’ do so because they are lodged between 
‘bodies that matter’ and ‘bodies that mutter’. In this way a Symbolic body that stutters 
comes to stutter in response to the identity-led Imaginary-ego and Imaginary other of 
the body that matters and through the oblique forms of jouissance of the body that 
mutters in the Real.  
3. ‘Bodies that Stutter’ are also the bodies that attempt to express their jouissance 
through a language of the ‘personal’ and the metaphorical signifier. Yet, unlike 
Imaginary bodies that rely upon ego, the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ are subject to an 
impersonal Other that underpins how their desire is expressed metonymically – 
through this process they Symbolically-stutter.  
4. Symbolic-stuttering is the process that occurs when ‘Bodies that Stutter’ attempt 
to qualify and articulate their desire. Yet, in the Symbolic this mode of expression 
falters, hesitates and dysfluently utters desire because it is always expressed 
impersonally or metonymically. In this way, Symbolic-stuttering may be a form of 
jouissance that can be partially expressed but never fully realised.    
 
Accounting for these principles we can begin to see the breadth of how ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ and Symbolic-stuttering can be expressed. For example, in Chapter 4 bodies 
stutter because exchanges of desire happen through an online personals website and 
the dynamics between the impersonal and personal as well as the Symbolic and 
Imaginary realms of desire. The ‘Bodies that Stutter’ in Chapter 5 are manifested 
differently in that they stutter when the Imaginary-ego of a straight male ‘other’ is 
signified through pornographic representation. This stuttering occurs in ways that are 
expressed metaphorically yet succumb to processes of metonymic displacement which 
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then results in processes of Symbolic-stuttering. In Chapter 6 the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ 
do so through processes of posting and sharing desire and also self-representations that 
can also be allied to self-shattering in the pursuit of jouissance. We see in this way 
‘Bodies that Stutter’ and the associated processes of Symbolic-stuttering are never 
consistent or coherent. In the section below these concerns are unpacked in more depth 
to both open up and capture how impersonality, desire, and jouissance relate to ‘Bodies 
that Stutter’ and their production of a simultaneously frustrated and enigmatic 
expression of that jouissance through Symbolic-stuttering. As well as this the section 
(and the conclusion more broadly) is now driving towards the assertion that ‘Bodies 
that Stutter’ are not specifically gay and male and/or socially networked, rather they 
have the conceptual potential to navigate and negotiate identity and identification 
through representation in various cultural settings.  
7.2 How Do Bodies Stutter? 
The emphasis that this thesis has placed on the body that stutters that has been set out 
above and how this stuttering is articulated has relied on both the synergies and 
tensions between an Imaginary other and a Symbolic Other. It has also been dependent 
on the ways in which Imaginary and Symbolic forms of sexual desire are signified and 
exchanged between gay men (particularly through the various representational 
practices / contextual examples that were discussed in Chapters 4,5, and 6). Yet, it 
could be argued that the signification and exchange of this stuttering is something that 
always proves difficult due to the nature of stuttering itself. Yet stuttering could also 
be defined, if not determined, through the fact that stutters are manifested as a response 
to the power of the Symbolic and its ability to both sanction and undercut the desire of 
an Imaginary-ego and Imaginary other. As well as this, stuttering is connected to 
modes of jouissance which simultaneously falter, undermine, and enigmatically 
trigger the representation of desire in divergent and capricious ways. To reflect on this 
and to suggest the ways in which ‘Bodies that Stutter’ in representation are allied to 
processes of Symbolic–stuttering it is once again useful and necessary to look at the 
bodies that matter in the work of Judith Butler and those that mutter in the work of 
Tim Dean.  
The argument that has been followed in this project has positioned the ‘mattering 
body’ as one which ‘constantly falls back into the ego’ (Dean, 2000, p.193) because it 
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is allied ‘to imaginary and symbolic formations’ (ibid, p.187). It is also a body that 
fails to recognise how jouissance may shift identity beyond the constraints of the ego 
and the limitations of sexual identity and personality. In contrast to this ‘muttering 
bodies’ are ones that, because of jouissance, are ‘struggling to be heard’ (p.203) 
through ‘a form of signification that condenses and carries with it jouissance in a way 
that ordinary language cannot, since jouissance and language are conceived as 
antithetical’ (ibid). Through this, and particularly in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 we have seen 
that ‘Bodies that Stutter’ are not necessarily struggling, rather they are reliant upon a 
juxtaposition of Butler’s rhetorical body with an identity and ego and Dean’s 
impersonal and desiring bodies which are always ‘directed towards admitting desire, 
finding ways to inhabit desire’ (ibid). This thesis has suggested that the body that 
stutters relies upon the interactions that occur between the Symbolic Other and the 
Imaginary other, and that it is through this that processes of Symbolic-stuttering are 
revealed and have the potential to move desire towards jouissance. In this way, the 
thesis relies upon the dialectic of the Imaginary and Symbolic that Dean criticises 
Butler for assimilating and which occupies the space between the bodies that matter 
and the bodies that mutter so that the grouping of Matter-Stutter-Mutter may be 
tentatively aligned to that of Imaginary-Symbolic-Real. This is something that the 
conclusion aims to consider, as well as issues allied to ‘Bodies that Stutter’ which 
remain open, contentious, or connect to the nuances of the Real and objet a. 
In Dean’s fraught dialogue with Butler (2000, pp. 174-214) he criticises her bodies 
that matter because they ‘stem from a theory of subjectivity grounded in the ego’ (ibid, 
p.214). Such bodies and their rhetorical nature have been modified in this project by 
considering the notion ‘that language only becomes rhetorical when it produces affects 
– that is when it is imbued with desire’ (ibid, p.204). It is also this exchange between 
language and desire that has facilitated ‘different ways of working within language, 
different ways of speaking, different ways of relating to the Other, of desiring’ (ibid). 
In this thesis these ‘different ways’ have been crucial to situating and unpacking a 
body that stutters inasmuch as it has allowed for the Imaginary others and bodies that 
matter to unravel, distort, and splinter in the Symbolic. Just as the body that stutters is 
located between Butler’s body as rhetorical and Dean’s body as a desiring site of 
jouissance, we may also find the stuttering body somewhere between an Imaginary-
ego that ‘matters’ and the dimensions of what Dean suggests may ‘mutter’ in the Real. 
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Here we could go further and now state that a body that stutters as a Symbolic body is 
torn between Imaginary and Real formations of desire and that is why it most 
obviously displays itself as a Symbolic body. This is also because it is reliant upon and 
undermined by ruses of language and desire both inside and outside of its own body 
and its ego.  
In the introduction to Katerina Kolozova’s Cut of the Real – Subjectivity in 
Poststructuralist Philosophy (2014) Francois Laurelle discusses the power that desire 
holds in relation to gendered and sexed bodies. In an emotive and eloquent passage 
which discusses ‘the desiring transformation of bodies’ (p. xii) she suggests that desire 
has ‘reduced [bodies] to the state of a quarter or a half of their anterior unity, losing 
their locality and forming an entanglement […] Bodies floating without the heroism 
of lovers, before calling for the closure of jouissance and the return of institutional 
harassment’ (ibid, p. xiii). These are the sort of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and have formed 
the arguments and concepts examined here. More specifically, they are the gay and 
straight male bodies we have seen in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 which are riven through 
discourses of the personal, the pornographic, and the self-representational and always 
become vulnerable to and yet defined by the signifier. They are also the bodies that are 
unsuspectingly squeezed between the Imaginary and the Real because the Symbolic is 
so powerful. Yet these are the bodies that yield the potential to shift their desire 
towards impersonal and metonymic ways of articulating sexuality ad infinitum.  
For instance, it may be that websites such as dudensude.com but perhaps more so 
tumblr.com provide gay men with the means to do this. They Symbolically act as 
immense and impersonal image banks of sexually explicit signifiers that masquerade 
as if they were a personal Imaginary other. It may also be that these Symbolic spaces 
which offer an endless supply of sexual signifiers are transforming gay men into 
subjects with the capacity to move towards an impersonality of desire. Yet it is also 
apparent that in non-gay and/or non-male settings there are millions of online spaces 
that also operate and function in a very similar way. We see that there is the potential 
to suggest that all dating apps and websites, all of social media, and the increasingly 
convergent nature of media platforms with one another are infused with this notion of 
‘impersonal personalisation’.  By engaging with signifiers of desire we could also 
suggest that spaces like this ‘escape an understanding of desire as based on persons’ 
(Dean, 2000, p. 18) and have the potential to transform sexual desire ‘beyond the 
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[I]imaginary diversification and proliferation of sexual norms to which the critique of 
identity politics has brought us' (ibid). Yet, another element of this thesis has argued 
and demonstrated that this transformation and move towards impersonality is not 
something that can be articulated and negotiated effortlessly or in coherent and 
forthright ways.  If an impersonality of desire means finding a way to articulate desire 
that does not rely upon persons, personality, and identity we see in contemporary 
practices of gay representation that this may seem like an impossible shift. These gay 
persons and personalities online may occupy the space of an intangible and in most 
cases impersonal Symbolic Other but they also have the power to relocate and 
reconfigure the nuances of what constitutes a tangible and personal exchange or 
relationship with an Imaginary other. In other words, an impersonality of desire is 
reliant upon those personalities, identities, and ego’s tied to an Imaginary other, yet it 
also opens up a space in which those others are vulnerable to slippage and enigmatic 
forms of Symbolic Othering which underpin their representation.  
As a result, it also seems appropriate to reflect on the fact that of all the contexts that 
were examined in this thesis were selected because they did not seem to be impersonal. 
If this is allied to how an Imaginary other and an Imaginary-ego pursue desire and 
jouissance, we see in this project that it does so through the personalising tropes of 
identity at work via online, pornographic, and self-representational practices. For 
instance in Chapter 4 the user of dudesnude.com is constructed and viewed by other 
users as through the profile which acts as a personal endorsement of that user’s identity 
as an Imaginary other. In Chapter 5 the straight male subject and more so the chav as 
an Imaginary other is reliant upon a series of metaphors which construct them as 
personalities and persons. In this instance and for gay desire to move in the direction 
of jouissance, gay men who are viewing straight men having homosexual sex in Triga 
Films are reliant on the impersonal construction and in this case commodification of a 
straight male personality.  Also, in Chapter 6 the online community of users of 
tumblr.com who post, share, and link to one another through micro-blogs do so in ways 
they imagine to be personal. Alongside of this the repetitive modes of desire that have 
proliferated in relation to the selfie evidence that the users who capture, crop, edit, 
post, share, and link their identity to a selfie do so in light of its power to mark out 
desire as personal to both satisfy the Imaginary others desire and the Imaginary-ego of 
the subject. Yet, in all three contextual chapters this personalisation of desire is filtered 
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through ‘Bodies that Stutter’ in light of the Symbolic and the pursuit of jouissance. In 
this way all of them are troubled by an impersonal spectre that yields the power to both 
catalyse and extinguish desire at any time and in any number of ways.  
As I have already raised this has the potential to exceed the specific paradigms of gay 
male desire and subjectivity. It may be that at the crux of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ there is 
a broader theoretical application waiting to occur. For instance if we conceptualise the 
‘Bodies that Stutter’ as ones which are in the first instance allied to networked and 
digital media, we see that in this setting they already rely upon discourses of the 
photographic, the public, the gendered, and the sexual. This opens up a wide-ranging 
set of possibilities in relation to the scope of other representational mediation, cultural 
discourse, and identity / identity politics as potential areas for the reapplication or new 
investigation of ‘Bodies that Stutter’. For instance, some of these may broach and 
encompass identities allied to class, race, and belief; the representations we perceive 
through the discourses of celebrity, neo-liberalism, consumerism, nostalgia, and 
globalisation; as well as the mediums of reality TV, advertising, film, and video-text. 
In some ways the contextual specificity of the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ of the thesis have 
now began to productively dissipate and through this they to begin to give rise to the 
potential of other ‘Bodies that Stutter’ in other cultural, political, economic and more 
specifically Symbolic settings.  
This broader utility and application of the concept is still built around the tensions 
between the personal and the impersonal as something that alerts us to the power of 
the Symbolic Other and the ways in which the personalisation of a signifier is always 
an impersonal practice of exchange. This is evidenced in all three of the chapters and 
the close analysis of their contexts. For instance, the Symbolic ensures that the process 
of constructing a personal profile on dudesnude.com is done through impersonal 
methods which are in place for the user to personalise. The Symbolic also guarantees 
that the ‘threat’ and ‘disgust’ discussed in relation to straight male identities such as 
the chav in Triga Films are containable and condensed down into an impersonal text 
that a gay consumer can also contain and control. In terms of the selfie, we see that 
whilst it seems to it originate from an Imaginary other, its online location, its repetitive 
and assimilatory nature in relation to other selfie’s, and its attempts at capturing the 
personality of its subject have all been enabled by a Symbolic Other. In this way the 
Symbolic is capable of regulating, instilling, and rendering the personal content of the 
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selfie impersonal because selfie’s fail to fully self-represent the subjects that they 
contain. Once again, this is something that could be applied beyond the specificity of 
my own contextual and analytical approaches and methods.  
In this way we see that it is both within and beyond the gay and male locales of this 
project that the metonymic impersonality of desire is a far more challenging and 
oblique exercise which has to account for the impersonal barriers, and more 
specifically stutters that challenge how personal desire is expressed.  Just as this thesis 
has focussed on gay male desire and the concepts which relate to gay/male ‘Bodies 
that Stutter’ we see that these bodies and their stutters are not consistent or in some 
cases identifiable.  In this way ‘Bodies that Stutter’ are manifested in both Imaginary 
and Symbolic ways because they rely upon metaphoric and metonymic modes of 
representation, and also personal and impersonal ways of articulating desire. On 
dudesnude.com we see that this occurs through the paradoxes and modes of exchange 
between self and other or more specifically viewer and user. In Triga films it works 
through the construction of gay desire that relies on the construction of a straight 
identity, and on tumblr.com it occurs through the enigmatic processes of sharing and 
re-blogging that both locate and dislocate not only gay desire, but a potentially 
limitless range of other desires in inestimable ways.  
Yet this potentially boundless and uneven way of sharing, representing, and expressing 
gay desire that we see in these online, pornographic, and photographic discourses of 
representation and self-representation are also underpinned by the fact that the 
Imaginary other is the specular force that haunts and seduces the gay male sexual 
subject into repetitive and conventional practices of bodily representation.  Beyond the 
specific contexts of this thesis it may well be that this is a feature of all social media 
and networked mediation, and not just the domain of gay male desire. Just as this 
project argues that these practices are always vulnerable and subject to a Symbolic 
Other, it also recognises that they are reliant on the tensions that exist between 
Symbolic and Imaginary modes of desire and their broader uses and application 
beyond gay male desire. For example, in the discussion of selfies in Chapter 6 we see 
that whilst a gay body may seem to appear within the illusory signifier of an Imaginary 
other it is the Symbolic Other that allows it to do so. It is through this tension that gay 
male ‘Bodies Stutter’, yet it is also apparent that the stuttering produces the potential 
to do so in relation to ‘any’ identity and/or body.  In this way, it may also be that when 
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‘Bodies that Stutter’ traverse or move beyond the specificity of gay male desire they 
realign metonymy, impersonality, desire, and jouissance and move towards a new way 
of working through and contextualising the original concept.   
The diverse ways that a body stutters may also reiterate the issue that the Imaginary-
ego is a powerful element of signification. In light of this and to summarise, we can 
see that the contextual discussions of online personals, pornography, and self-
representation in Chapters, 4, 5, and 6 have attempted to demonstrate that bodies stutter 
when they attempt to express their jouissance as personal, pornographic, and self-led. 
In turn, they illustrate that this stuttering is always embedded in a Symbolic Other that 
governs how and also why a body stutters. As well as this Chapter 2 establishes how 
psychoanalytic terms and concepts have helped to build an argument around the 
paradox of Imaginary and Symbolic exchange, metonymy, impersonality, desire, and 
jouissance. These terms and concepts have also been developed in relation to the 
‘Bodies that Stutter’ and have allowed for instances of Symbolic-stuttering to be 
analysed. However, and as this work is brought to a close it is also important to 
consider the concepts that were involved in the project but were not used or utilised in 
as much detail as those discussed above. In the next sections these areas are addressed 
and used to provoke and incite a way for this work both to conclude but more so to be 
developed and sustained in alternative ways. The first will address Lacan’s third 
register of the Real, this will then be followed by a discussion of the objet a, and in the 
final section the assemblage of bodies that may simultaneously ‘Matter-Stutter-
Mutter’ will be addressed in relation to self-shattering, jouissance and stuttering.    
7.3 Engaging with the Real 
The line of argument and examination of ‘Bodies that Stutter’ that is threaded through 
this work has relied upon the limitations of an Imaginary other. In the close analysis 
of gay desire we have seen that a discussion of these limitations has been focused on 
the representational metaphors of identity and personality of that other. In turn, this 
has allowed the argument of the thesis to suggest that the gay subject is better 
understood via a Symbolic Other and its impersonal and metonymic capacities. Yet it 
has also neglected the more radical notion that the body that stutters may also be a 
body that relies upon, and is positioned in relation to Lacan’s Real register. Dean 
suggests that the Real is where Lacan ‘situates negativity and mutability […] rather 
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than that of appearances’ (ibid, p.230) and in this way ‘the real has no positive content 
[and] has more to do with sex and death than does the imaginary and symbolic’ (ibid). 
Yet, as a consequence the task of using and applying the Real to an analysis of ‘the 
images and discourses that construct sex, sexuality and desire in our culture’ is both a 
difficult and challenging task.  Whilst Dean has an ‘objection to critically analysing 
sex and sexuality in terms of the imaginary and symbolic’ (ibid, p.231) he fails to use 
the Real to identify ‘specific modes of […] cultural images’ and discourses’’ failure’ 
(ibid) that the Imaginary and Symbolic facilitate. It is also interesting to note that in 
Beyond Sexuality (2000) Dean avoids contextualising his claims so that his bodies 
continue to mutter and the Real functions as an abstract and subversive term. 
Interestingly in his later work Unlimited Intimacy (2009) where the contexts are similar 
to the ones addressed here (impersonality, pornography, gay identity, desire, sexuality 
etc.) he not only neglects the Real and the body that mutters but also the work of Lacan 
which is only referred to five times.   
In many ways the Real is embedded in this thesis but it is discussed through the veil 
of jouissance. More specifically, and if jouissance is understood through the Symbolic 
it manages to account for something of the Real that cannot be reached, attained or 
satisfied. This also situates the notion of Symbolic-stuttering as that which ‘point[s] to 
the presence within or influence on the symbolic of the real’ (Fink, 1995, p.30). Fink 
characterises the effect that the Real has on the Symbolic as a series of ‘kinks in the 
symbolic order’ (ibid), kinks which could also be transposed as ‘Bodies that Stutter’ 
through Symbolic-stuttering. What is also clear is that the Real is difficult to apply and 
utilise in relation to Imaginary forms of personal visibility and/or appearance and 
Symbolic forms of impersonality in language and power. Because it remains and 
retains an oblique and capricious presence it can only be understood through its 
absence. Yet, in recent work such as Kolozova’s the Real is repositioned in light of its 
potentials to construct and cultivate new forms of impersonal presence and desire. She 
implies ‘that the Real is always grounded in the material, and it is for this reason that 
the Real is a status that can be assumed by other realities’ (p.2). In light of this and in 
opposition to Dean we see that ‘The Real is not an abstraction, an idea that stands 
independently “out-there” in itself’ (ibid). It is something that resonates and absorbs 
into Imaginary and Symbolic forms of representation and language. In this way it may 
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be that a reconciliation or affiliation of the Real with both the Symbolic and the 
Imaginary can result in new ways of conceptualising desire and identity.  
Zizek’s work has also influenced how the Real is positioned as a ‘brute symbolic pre-
symbolic reality which always returns to its place’ (Zizek, 1989 p.182) and renders 
both the Imaginary and Symbolic as ‘having no real existence’ (ibid) only ‘a mere 
structural effect’ (ibid). In this way we see that the Real connects to jouissance as the 
thing that ‘must be constructed afterwards so that we can account for the distortions of 
the symbolic structure’ (ibid). Whilst the dimensions of Zizek’s Real are inevitable, 
ultimate, and traumatic they are also illustrative of how the Real can be configured in 
relation its Imaginary and Symbolic counterparts.  Zizek’s example of a ‘MacGuffin’ 
(ibid, pp.183-184) helps to illustrate this claim and also to account for the next part of 
the conclusion which addresses the objet a and some of the difficulties involved in 
using it in this project and as a result neglecting it in relation to impersonality, desire 
and jouissance. Zizek’s ‘MacGuffin’ is assimilated from the devices that Alfred 
Hitchcock used to construct suspense in his films. It is ‘the pure pretext whose sole 
role is to set the story in motion but which is in itself ‘nothing at all’ (ibid, p.183). Its 
only purpose or relevance is that ‘it has some significance for the characters – that it 
must seem of vital importance to them’ (ibid). It could be argued that the MacGuffin 
is a lot like the exchanges and impersonal significations of desire that gay men use in 
attempts to capture and personalise desire as ‘personal’. It acts as the preceding 
enigma, the mystery, and also the void that facilitates a dialogue, an exchange, and a 
desire in both the Imaginary and more aptly the Symbolic realm. In this way, it could 
be argued that the Real acts as both the predicate and the aftermath of jouissance felt 
by the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and the modes of Symbolic-stuttering in this project.  
In many ways, and at this final stage of the project it could be argued that this gap is 
the ambivalent foundation to the body that stutters inasmuch as it is the gap that can 
only be located, traced, and captured through the signifier. In Zizek the ‘MacGuffin’ 
is ‘the purest case of what Lacan calls objet [petit] a: a pure void which functions as 
the object cause of desire’ (ibid, p.184) yet ‘Bodies that Stutter’ (in their Symbolic 
form) are never pure and do not   exist within a ‘pure void’. Rather, the ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ as Symbolic bodies ‘act up’ in relation to this void and do so because of, and 
through, Symbolic-stuttering. Saying that, they also have to acknowledge the prospect 
that jouissance is also ‘Real par excellence’ (ibid) in that they rely upon ‘a cause which 
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in itself does not exist – which is present only in a series of effects, but always in a 
distorted, displaced way’ (ibid). As conclusions are drawn it could also be suggested 
that the body that stutters is perhaps a result of this displacement or void whilst the 
objet a is its cause. As a result, ‘Bodies that Stutter’ may offer some possibility of 
identifying desire through the signifier, whilst in marked contrast the objet a as cause 
of desire is impossible to see and in that way impossible to contextualise. We now see 
that whilst ‘Bodies that Stutter’ find their signifiers and modes of expressions through 
Symbolic-stuttering they do so through their hesitant, frustrated, and enigmatic 
attempts at signifying objet a.   
7.4 Engaging with Objet a  
Along with the Real it is apparent that objet a and its alliance to jouissance has the 
potential to inform and perhaps even instigate new dimensions to ‘Bodies that Stutter’ 
and Symbolic-stuttering. Like the challenges of the Real, working with the objet a in 
analyses of gay male desire involves knowing how to conceptualise it and being 
careful not to transform it into orthodoxy has been one of challenges of this project. It 
has also informed the ways in which Chapters 4, 5, and 6  have attempted to balance 
and negotiate the analysis of rhetoric and desire whilst remaining alert to the ways in 
which ‘the theoretical potential of psychoanalysis has been diluted’ (Dean, 2000, p.36) 
because strands of queer and cultural studies have essentialised ‘a psychoanalysis that 
emphasises the linguistically structured unconscious’ (ibid). This attenuation is 
something that can be restored by engaging with jouissance but also acknowledging 
the ways in which the objet a acts is a trigger for desire that occurs prior to that desire. 
In some cases, this is more desirable than the desire itself, in that the pursuit of it only 
ever reaches a particular point. This is also the point that not only brings jouissance to 
a temporary halt but also its critical analysis and investigation. 
In Seminar XX Lacan suggests that objet a ‘goes beyond speech without going beyond 
languages actual effects’ (1999, p.93). This results in what he refers to as a ‘half-telling 
(mi-dire)’ (ibid) of desire that is only ever partially articulated. Through this partiality 
‘the significance of object [objet] a lies in its nonspecularity’ (Dean, 2000, p.34), and 
the ways in which it cannot be coherently visualised and/or spoken. In turn, this non-
specular aspect to objet a draws us closer to how it may be understood whilst also 
alerting us to its main challenge. In a thesis that has addressed the visual dimensions 
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of both gay and straight masculinity there is a danger of  luxuriating in what the objet 
a may or may not manifest itself as and this makes it difficult to both locate and 
therefore to use. Saying that, this work has also been attentive to the notion that on the 
one hand, the objet a is ‘the object of fantasy, as well as of desire – nowhere to be 
found in “the field of reality” (ibid, p.57), and on the other compliant to the fact that 
‘it is […] not be found in the imaginary register’ (ibid).  
The thesis involved a number of close visual analyses and within the processes of 
utilising psychoanalysis there is an inherent danger of sidestepping the objet a and 
thereby falling into the imaginary trap of visual recognition. If the objet a is ‘produced 
by cutting away something from the subject’ (ibid, p.58) in which ‘the agent of the cut 
[…] is, of course, language’ then the ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolic-stuttering rely 
upon objet a in their attempts to express and contain desire. Attempting to locate and 
define this objet a is both impossible and detrimental to desire because ‘the contingent 
foundation provided by objet a is that of desire’ (ibid, p.194). In this way, the visual 
instances in the thesis may also be regarded as nothing more than a series of ‘symbolic 
networks [that] dissect the human body, producing leftovers that cause desire’ (ibid, 
p.59). This may also act as a point of departure but also a way of incorporating the 
objet a into an analysis of the visual which highlights the dimensions of impersonality, 
metonymy, and identification prior to those of personality, metaphor, and identity.  In 
this way the objet a, and its unpredictability, also draws attention to the ways in which 
desire is never stable. More so it alerts us to the ways in which the exchange and 
reconfiguration of how desire may be articulated through all three of Lacans’s registers 
can shift in relation to how it is expressed as jouissance. In Chapter 2 of the thesis it 
was suggested that in its pursuit of jouissance the body that stutters may inhabit the 
space between the Imaginary body that matters and the Real body that mutters so that 
the triadic register of R,S,I would be transposed into that of I,S,R or Imaginary-
Symbolic-Real. In the final section of the conclusion this reconfiguration is considered 
and allied to the nuances of self-shattering to suggest that the combination of bodies 
that ‘Matter-Stutter-Mutter’ may also take the analysis of gay desire and desire per se 
in alternate directions.  
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7.5 ‘Matter-Stutter-Mutter’….Shatter… 
‘Matter-Stutter-Mutter’ and how it is assembled may also begin to evolve and shift 
how the positions of an Imaginary other, a Symbolic Other and the Real can be 
considered. Bruce Fink uses Lacan’s work in Seminar XXI to discuss how changing 
the order of the R,S,I changes its meaning. For instance if the registers are rearranged 
those which move in ‘a clockwise direction (RSI, SIR and IRS) are to be distinguished 
from those that go around in a counter clockwise direction (RIS, ISR, and SRI)’ (1995, 
p.143). This thesis has worked with the established combination R,S,I in its attempts 
to conceptualise ‘Bodies that Stutter’ to ‘realise[s] the symbolic of the imaginary’ 
(ibid). Yet it is also important to consider the ways in which psychoanalysis and this 
project has to account for ‘different discourses […] appropriate at different moments 
and in different historical, social, political, [and] economic […] contexts’ (Fink, 1995, 
p.142).  We can then see that if the combination used in the thesis of ‘Matter-Stutter-
Mutter’ is mirrored by Lacan’s orders they become Imaginary-Symbolic-Real and the 
original principle of working with R,S,I (which would translate into ‘Mutter-Stutter-
Matter’) needs to be realigned. Also if Fink’s own notion of ‘”imagining the real of 
the symbolic”’ (ibid) were used it would calibrate bodies through a process of ‘Matter-
Mutter-Stutter’ and further complicate how desire is pursued and expressed. This also 
sheds some light on Symbolic-stuttering and ways in which it might be followed or 
unpacked beyond the specificity of this work.  
Using the arrangement of ‘Matter-Stutter-Mutter’ we may see there is a level of naive 
desire that comes from an Imaginary body that matters; in contrast the Symbolic body 
that stutters extinguishes some of this naivety. The Real body that mutters destabilises 
it all together and what we are left with is ‘an impossible kernel, a certain limit which 
is in itself nothing; it is only to be constructed retroactively, from a series of its effects’ 
(Zizek, 2008, p.184). In this way the gay bodies examined in this project also ‘Matter-
Mutter-Stutter’. They do so because they pursue desire, repeat desire, and then return 
to the place of that desire through processes of impersonal jouissance they can never 
attain or fulfil. We see this instilled in the personals website, the pornographic film, 
and the selfie all of which demonstrate that the gay subject is involved in processes of 
jouissance that not only stutter but also hold the potential to ‘shatter’ the Imaginary-
ego and the tropes of identity and personality connected to it. This shattering and more 
so ‘self-shattering’, (primarily derived from the work of Leo Bersani) is reflected upon 
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and allied to stuttering in Chapter 6. In this way an interaction of shattering and 
stuttering aims to shift the emphasis from what has been neglected or undeveloped via 
the Real and objet a towards a way of incorporating some of the concepts into other 
aspects of cultural life.  This may also enable alternative ways of conceptualising gay 
and straight desire that hold the potential to transform how that desire is expressed.  
The representations of gay bodies examined in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 were allied to 
several concepts raised in Chapter 2 which attempted to address how an ‘impersonality 
of desire’ (Dean, 2000) could be connected to gay (and queer) paradigms of identity. 
If we recall Lee Edelman’s theory of “narci-schism” (1994) there is a sense that the 
homosexual / gay subject has the ability to move beyond his Imaginary ego and the 
metaphors of identity towards a model of desire that can reposition how his desire is 
realised and conveyed impersonally. Yet this is always problematic to affirm because 
of the burden of Imaginary representation (re)produced through representations of gay 
identity. To shatter something of this cycle we need to ‘shatter the fantasy of Imaginary 
unity’ (2004, p.22) so that new ways of configuring desire lie within the potentials of 
Symbolic forms of jouissance and a body that stutters.  
As well as self-shattering’, it is also in Bersani’s concepts of homo-ness (1995) and 
‘impersonal narcissism’ (2008) that we have seen the potential for a ‘redefinition of 
[gay] sociality’ (1995, p.7) that can only be realised through impersonal modes of 
desire and identification. These concepts have been embedded into the analytical 
chapters, but it may be ‘self-shattering’ which was used to examine the micro-blogs 
on tumblr.com but more so the selfies in Chapter 6 that holds the most potential.  The 
body that stutters allows for jouissance to be articulated through Symbolic modes 
which are also defined in relation to ‘the self which the sexual shatters’ (1987, p.218) 
and in so doing ‘provides the basis on which sexuality is associated with power’ (ibid). 
For instance, this level of self-shattering is akin to ‘Bodies that Stutter’ in selfies, in 
that we see bodies that are self-shattered through practices of sexual representation 
that undermine ‘corporeal integrity’ (Dean, 2009, p.22).  In so doing we find that those 
bodies are coaxed and antagonised by impersonal forms of jouissance which 
proliferate their Symbolic-stuttering as sexual arousal, stimulation, and pleasure.  
Dean understands this self-shattering as jouissance insofar as ‘the tensions between 
the pleasure of recognition and the jouissance of self-shattering is figured by the 
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conflict between the ego and the unconscious, or, in other words between identity and 
desire’ (ibid). Just as ‘Bodies that Stutter’ are ones allied to processes of aimless 
jouissance, the dimensions of self-shattering involve processes of impersonal 
identification that ‘generate[s] anxiety’ (ibid) whilst also ‘generat[ing] something akin 
to pleasure’ (ibid). These tensions between desire and anxiety ‘involved in violating 
one’s own self-image’ (ibid) are also expressed through ‘Bodies that Stutter’ and their 
attempts to represent and encapsulate something of the self through the signifier. For 
instance in the selfie, the subject deceptively recognises himself as the marker of his 
own and the others sexual identity. This allows self-shattering to inflect and seduce 
him into capturing his own image or pursuing images of others like and/or unlike him 
in his search for jouissance. In this way we see that a self-shattering of jouissance 
which is constitutive of jouissance also holds the potential to undermine, reshape, and 
challenge how identity and desire are exchanged and expressed. On those grounds, and 
as the investigation of gay male representation on online personals, pornography, and 
social media has attempted to demonstrate, the sexual subject always contains the 
capacity for self-shattering in that sex, sexuality, and desire rely upon instances of self-
loss and self-shattering signified through bodies that stutter.  The instances of desire 
that have been examined in this project have brought me to this point because all of 
the men in those images seem in some way vulnerable, displaced, and uncertain. Like 
the concept of stuttering, shattering accounts for some of this uncertainty.   
Both self-shattering and stuttering rely upon something of Bersani’s earlier concept of 
‘homo-ness’ which was also discussed in Chapters 2 and 6. Here Bersani suggests that 
if gay subjects knowingly abandon gay identity then we may well see a ‘mode of 
connectedness to the world that it would be absurd to reduce to sexual preference’ 
(1995, p. 10).  If the processes of sharing desire impersonally (through personal 
profiles, pornographic representation and self-representation as overtly sexual) always 
works through moments of mediated exchange there may grounds for realising ‘an 
anticommunal mode of connectedness we might all share, or a way of coming together’ 
(ibid). Yet this must also be a way of sharing that does not rely on ‘assimilation into 
already constituted communities’ (ibid).  Whilst this vision resonates with how we 
should all be using social and personal media and discourses of desire impersonally, it 
also emphasises the more obvious fact that we are not. The anti-communal tendencies 
that could reverberate through an impersonality of desire are repetitively personalised, 
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so that in many of the examples assembled in this project, we see them they fall back 
into the determinism of sexual preference, identity, and ego that Bersani is encouraging 
us to avoid.  
In Chapter 5 this is evident in the ways that gay men both use pornography in an 
attempt to assimilate aspects of homophobic, heterosexist, and hyper-masculine 
identity to catalyse their jouissance. It is also evident within online gay communities 
whereby identifications with identities are designated on the basis of how they are 
imagined. In Chapter 4 this can be seen through the intricacies of the selection criteria 
on dudesnude.com as well as in Chapter 6 whereby the infinite processes for anti-
communal and thus impersonal modes of sharing on tumblr.com are regulated in that 
you are identifiable in terms of the images you are viewing, where they been blogged 
from, and where those images will re-blog you to. Here the impersonal is located in 
micro-blogs which metonymically assemble desire but do so through processes we 
increasingly associate with personal and metaphorical association. In light of this gay 
bodies begin to blend into straight spaces and straight bodies into gay spaces. Yet, 
beyond this criss-crossing the vast majority of those bodies seem to constitute the 
identities and personalities they have the potential to transgress.  
During the time it has taken to complete this project alternative ways and alternative 
‘Bodies that Stutter’ and Symbolically-stutter have also contributed to, but remain 
unaddressed here. In addition to the previous areas of potential investigation, consider 
how ‘Bodies that Stutter’ as sexualised bodies may be positioned in terms of non-
monogamy, bisexuality, transsexuality, transgender, disability, virginity, trans-
national bodies, the desire for the stranger, and the scope of what feminine jouissance 
and feminine desire (both as identities and as identifications) may manifest via modes 
of impersonality, desire, and jouissance.  Also, during the life of the project new social 
networks such as snapchat.com and Instagram.com have emerged to reposition how 
visual and sexual desire is expressed. Alongside of this there are gay networks of desire 
which rely upon GPS such as Grindr.com to indicate that there are exciting, 
challenging, and intricate attempts at impersonally expressing and signifying 
jouissance emerging all of the time. The Symbolic Other, jouissance, and’ Bodies that 
Stutter’ manifest themselves in ways which attend to these constant shifts and assist in 
exploring gay desire or indeed any desire.  
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Accounting for the Real and objet a, ‘Matter-Stutter-Mutter’ and self-shattering has 
also allowed for the final parts of this thesis to consider alternate directions that 
stuttering bodies may now move in. It may also allow us to ask if there is a way to 
transpose the project of gay male identity and consider other patterns of identification 
that may benefit from the issues raised here. This thesis is not able to fully anticipate 
or foresee how the impersonality of desire will be articulated in future discourses of 
sexual and non-sexual representation, neither can it predict how new social and 
cultural formations will be brought about in relation to changes and evolutions in 
ideology, technology, and politics.  Yet ‘Bodies that Stutter’, this thesis concludes, 
help to attend to questions of how desire and identity are marked, whilst also opening 
up a space where the impersonal identifications which both cause and temporarily 
fulfil that desire are articulated. An issue that has evolved in this work is the 
contentious nature of how a ‘gay male’ or ‘straight male’ body stutters in relation to 
the potential limitlessness of other bodies that stutter.  It may be that this project forms 
a way of using metonymy, impersonality, Symbolic-stuttering, and ‘Bodies that 
Stutter’ to read into the simultaneous orthodoxy and fragmentation of other bodies torn 
apart by ideological and political conditions such as class, race, gender, sexuality, 
belief, nation, or geography.  Through this we may find that inter-related yet also 
marginalised and subordinated discourses of sexual desire understood outside of the 
rubric of gay and straight male identity can be aligned to ‘Bodies that Stutter’ as those 
that are only connected to other bodies through modes of desire that occur 
impersonally yet are manifested in mediated representation as personal. 
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